The Federal Open Market Committee approved the following statement for release by a 12 – 0 vote:
+
+
The Committee decided to raise the target range for the federal funds rate by 1/4 percentage pointto 3-3/4to 4 percent, in support of the Federal Reserve's dual mandate. The Committee is continuing its policy of maintaining ample reserves in the banking system.
+
+
Economic activity is expanding at a solid pace. While uncertainty remains elevated owing, in part, to geopolitical developments,domestic spending has been resilient. Productivity growth is strong, and capital investment is robust. Job gains have kept pace with the workforce, and the unemployment rate has changed little.
+
+
Inflation remains elevated. Today's policy action will support a timelier return to the Committee's 2 percent goal. The Committee will deliver price stability.
+
+
For media inquiries, please email [email protected] or call 202-452-2955.
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Employment Situation Summary
+
+
+
+Transmission of material in this news release is embargoed until USDL-26-1549
+8:30 a.m. (ET) Friday, October 2, 2026
+
+Technical information:
+ Household data: (202) 691-6378 * cpsinfo@bls.gov * www.bls.gov/cps
+ Establishment data: (202) 691-6555 * cesinfo@bls.gov * www.bls.gov/ces
+
+Media contact: (202) 691-5902 * PressOffice@bls.gov
+
+
+ THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION - SEPTEMBER 2026
+
+
+Both nonfarm payroll employment (+29,000) and the unemployment rate (4.2 percent) changed little in
+September, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported today. Employment in all major industries
+changed little over the month.
+
+This news release presents statistics from two monthly surveys. The household survey measures labor
+force status, including unemployment, by demographic characteristics. The establishment survey
+measures nonfarm employment, hours, and earnings by industry. For more information about the
+concepts and statistical methodology used in these two surveys, see the Technical Note.
+
+Household Survey Data
+
+Both the unemployment rate, at 4.2 percent, and the number of unemployed people, at 7.1 million,
+changed little in September. The unemployment rate has remained in a narrow range of 4.1 percent to
+4.3 percent since March. (See table A-1.)
+
+Among the major worker groups, the unemployment rate for people who are Black (7.0 percent)
+increased in September. The jobless rates for adult men (3.9 percent), adult women (3.6 percent),
+teenagers (14.5 percent), and people who are White (3.6 percent), Asian (2.9 percent), or Hispanic
+(4.7 percent) showed little change over the month. (See tables A-1, A-2, and A-3.)
+
+The number of long-term unemployed (those jobless for 27 weeks or more) was essentially unchanged
+at 1.9 million in September. The long-term unemployed accounted for 27.1 percent of all unemployed
+people. (See table A-12.)
+
+Both the labor force participation rate, at 61.8 percent, and the employment-population ratio, at
+59.2 percent, changed little in September. These measures showed little net change since January.
+(See table A-1.)
+
+The number of people employed part time for economic reasons changed little at 4.5 million in
+September. These individuals would have preferred full-time employment but were working part time
+because their hours had been reduced or they were unable to find full-time jobs. (See table A-8.)
+
+In September, the number of people not in the labor force who currently want a job changed little
+at 5.8 million. These individuals were not counted as unemployed because they were not actively
+looking for work during the 4 weeks preceding the survey or were unavailable to take a job. (See
+table A-1.)
+
+Among those not in the labor force who wanted a job, the number of people marginally attached to
+the labor force decreased by 236,000 to 1.5 million in September. These individuals wanted and were
+available for work and had looked for a job sometime in the prior 12 months but had not looked for
+work in the 4 weeks preceding the survey. The number of discouraged workers, a subset of the
+marginally attached who believed that no jobs were available for them, changed little over the
+month at 414,000. (See Summary table A.)
+
+Establishment Survey Data
+
+Total nonfarm payroll employment changed little in September (+29,000), following an average
+monthly gain of 45,000 over the prior 12 months. Employment in all major industries changed little
+over the month. (See table B-1.)
+
+Health care employment continued its upward trend in September (+17,000), but at a slower pace than
+the average monthly gain over the prior 12 months (+33,000). In September, employment continued to
+trend up in ambulatory health care services (+13,000) and in hospitals (+12,000), while nursing and
+residential care facilities lost jobs (-9,000).
+
+Employment in construction changed little in September (+11,000). The industry had added an average
+of 10,000 jobs per month over the prior 12 months. In September, employment in nonresidential
+specialty trade contractors continued to trend up (+12,000).
+
+Manufacturing employment was little changed in September (+9,000) but is up by 72,000 since a
+recent low in December 2025. Over the month, employment increased in plastics and rubber products
+manufacturing (+5,000) and in machinery manufacturing (+5,000).
+
+In September, financial activities employment was little changed (-7,000). Employment in financial
+activities is down by 129,000 since a recent peak in May 2025, with most of the job loss in
+insurance carriers and related activities (-90,000).
+
+Employment also showed little change over the month in other major industries, including mining,
+quarrying, and oil and gas extraction; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and
+warehousing; information; professional and business services; social assistance; leisure and
+hospitality; other services; and government.
+
+In September, average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls edged up by 5
+cents, or 0.1 percent, to $37.81. Over the past 12 months, average hourly earnings have increased
+by 3.0 percent. In September, average hourly earnings of private-sector production and
+nonsupervisory employees rose by 7 cents, or 0.2 percent, to $32.60. (See tables B-3 and B-8.)
+
+The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls remained at 34.4 hours in
+September. In manufacturing, the average workweek was unchanged at 40.6 hours, and overtime held at
+3.0 hours. The average workweek for production and nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm
+payrolls remained at 33.8 hours. (See tables B-2 and B-7.)
+
+The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for July was revised down by 31,000, from +21,000 to
+-10,000, and the change for August was revised down by 29,000, from +162,000 to +133,000. With
+these revisions, employment in July and August combined is 60,000 lower than previously reported.
+(Monthly revisions result from additional reports received from businesses and government agencies
+since the last published estimates and from the recalculation of seasonal factors.)
+
+_____________
+The Employment Situation for October 2026 is scheduled to be published on Friday, November 6, 2026,
+at 8:30 a.m. (ET).
+
+
+
+
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Personal income increased $66.6 billion (0.2 percent at a monthly rate) in August, according to estimates released today by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Disposable personal income (DPI)—personal income less personal current taxes—increased $68.6 billion (0.3 percent), and personal consumption expenditures (PCE) increased $190.8 billion (0.9 percent).
Personal outlays—the sum of PCE, personal interest payments, and personal current transfer payments—increased $190.7 billion in August. Personal saving was $990.2 billion, and the personal saving rate—personal saving as a percentage of DPI—was 4.1 percent.
The increase in current-dollar personal income in August primarily reflected increases in compensation and government social benefits.
For definitions, statistical conventions, updates to personal income and outlays, and more information about these statistics, visit “Additional Information.”
Next release: October 29, 2026, at 8:30 a.m. EDT Personal Income and Outlays, September 2026
Technical Notes
Changes in personal income and outlays for August
The August increase of $66.6 billion in personal income primarily reflected increases in compensation and government social benefits.
Within compensation, the increase was led by private wages and salaries based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES).
Within government social benefits, the leading contributors to the increase were Medicare and social security benefits, based on data from the Monthly Treasury Statement and the Budget of the U.S. Government.
Revisions to personal income
Monthly estimates for compensation for January through March of 2026 include revisions resulting from the incorporation of first-quarter wage and salary data from the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages program. Estimates for wages and salaries for April through July of 2026 have been updated to reflect revised monthly data from the BLS CES program. The revision to Medicaid benefits reflects updated information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
Related Data Tables
For the statistics highlighted in this release, as well as historical time series for these estimates, see the following data tables in BEA’s Interactive Data Application.
Note. With the next release, today’s data will be superseded, and the links above will reflect the latest data. The original data featured in this release can then be accessed in BEA’s Data Archive.
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+
+
Month
Total final demand
Final demand less foods, energy, and trade
Final demand goods
Final demand services
Change in final demand from 12 months ago (unadj.)
Change in final demand less foods, energy, and trade from 12 mo. ago (unadj.)
Total
Foods
Energy
Less foods and energy
Total
Trade
Transportation and warehousing
Other
2025
Sept.
0.6
0.2
0.6
0.8
2.0
0.2
0.6
1.6
0.7
0.2
3.0
3.0
Oct.
0.1
0.6
-0.2
-0.4
-2.2
0.5
0.2
-0.9
0.0
0.7
2.8
3.5
Nov.
0.4
0.3
0.8
0.1
3.4
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.8
0.2
3.1
3.6
Dec.
0.4
0.1
-0.1
-0.2
-1.5
0.4
0.6
1.8
0.2
0.0
3.1
3.4
2026
Jan.
0.6
0.5
-0.1
-1.3
-1.7
0.7
0.9
2.0
1.0
0.3
3.1
3.5
Feb.
0.5
0.5
1.0
2.3
2.0
0.4
0.3
-0.3
0.8
0.5
3.4
3.5
Mar.
0.8
0.2
2.0
-0.6
10.5
0.4
0.3
0.5
2.2
0.0
4.3
3.6
Apr.
1.1
0.5
1.9
0.3
7.1
0.7
0.8
1.5
3.7
0.1
5.7
4.4
May ( 1 )
0.5
0.8
2.2
0.6
8.2
0.7
-0.2
-2.7
2.1
0.7
5.9
5.0
June ( 1 )
-0.1
0.2
-1.4
-0.6
-6.8
0.2
0.5
1.3
-0.3
0.2
5.6
5.0
July ( 1 )
0.2
0.5
-0.4
-1.0
-1.7
0.2
0.3
-0.2
-1.1
0.7
4.9
4.9
Aug. ( 1 )
0.5
0.3
1.1
-0.3
4.5
0.4
0.2
0.2
2.2
0.0
5.6
4.8
Sept.
1.3
0.5
2.6
1.2
10.8
0.3
0.8
1.4
3.4
0.3
6.3
5.0
Footnotes
+ (1) Some of the figures shown above and elsewhere in this release may differ from those previously reported because data for May through August have been revised to reflect the availability of late reports and corrections by respondents.
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+
Bank rate maintained at 3.75% - September 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes
+ Published on
+ 17 September 2026
+
+
+
+
At its meeting ending on 16 September 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted by a majority of 6–3 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%. Three members voted to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%.
Protracted conflict in the Middle East has contributed to further increases in crude and refined energy prices since the previous meeting, which remain more volatile and higher than pre-conflict. UK CPI inflation increased to 3.1% in August and is likely to rise further over coming quarters. Monetary policy is being set to ensure inflation comes down to 2% sustainably as the economy adjusts to the energy shock. The policy stance required to achieve this will depend on the scale and duration of the shock and how it propagates through the economy.
There has been little evidence so far of material second-round effects in price and wage-setting. However, the risk of such effects, against which policy needs to lean, is greater the longer higher energy prices persist or are more volatile. Activity has been slightly stronger than expected, although soft labour market conditions, and the higher interest rates faced by households and businesses since the conflict began, will act to reduce inflation over time. Overall, the Committee judges that the risks to the inflation outlook are tilted to the upside, and more so than at the time of the July Monetary Policy Report, although there remains scope for the outlook to change materially as events in the Middle East unfold.
The Committee judges that it is appropriate to maintain Bank Rate at this meeting. The Committee stands ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term.
At this meeting, the MPC also voted unanimously to reduce the stock of UK government bond purchases held for monetary policy purposes, and financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, to zero. This will be conducted through a multi-year plan, such that the remaining stock is unwound at an annual average pace of £46 billion by the end of 2034, through annual sales of £20 billion alongside maturing gilts.
1: Before turning to its immediate policy decisions, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discussed recent developments in global and UK economic and financial conditions, and how these could affect the medium-term outlook and the MPC’s Bank Rate decision. The Committee also discussed its plan for quantitative tightening.
2: Global energy prices had risen significantly since the July Monetary Policy Report and had continued to be volatile, reflecting events in the Middle East and in Ukraine and Russia. The spot prices of Brent crude and UK wholesale gas had risen by 36% and 78% respectively since the period leading up to the July Report. At close of business on 14 September, the Brent oil price had reached $106 per barrel and the UK wholesale gas price had reached 207 pence per therm. Futures curves continued to slope downwards for both oil and gas, although if there were to be a resolution to the conflict it was likely that any normalisation of energy supply would be slow and gradual.
3: Pressures on refineries in several countries meant that crack spreads – the difference between the prices of refined petroleum products and Brent crude oil – had remained well above their pre-conflict levels. The prices of gasoline, diesel and jet fuel had all increased since the July Report to a broadly similar extent as for Brent crude.
4: Increases in oil, gas and refined product prices since the start of the conflict were already having a direct impact on consumer price inflation in major economies. However, as was the case for the United Kingdom, there was not yet judged to have been a significant impact of the energy shock on other consumer goods prices in the euro area or the United States through firms’ supply chains. These effects were expected to build over the next few quarters.
5: The Committee continued to be attentive to other sources of price pressure in the global economy, which could present additional upside risks to UK inflation via import prices. The S&P index for global agricultural and livestock prices had already risen by around 5% since the July Report, and could be pushed higher if harvests were affected adversely by an unusually severe El Niño event. And the continued significant demand for artificial intelligence (AI)-related technology goods and primary products was driving price pressures for affected sectors.
6: UK financial conditions had tightened further since the July Report, driven by increases in short-term overnight index swap (OIS) rates. There had been similar moves in these rates in the United States and in the euro area. As had been the case since February, this co-movement reflected the global nature of the energy supply shock and its implications for inflation.
7: There had continued to be full and fast pass-through from increases in short-term OIS rates to key lending rates faced by UK households and businesses. These rates had remained materially higher than prior to the conflict. For example, the quoted rate on two-year fixed-rate mortgages was around 95 basis points higher than prior to the conflict.
8: Nearly all respondents to the September Market Participants Survey (MaPS), which had closed on 4 September, had expected Bank Rate to remain unchanged at this MPC meeting. Beyond that, median expectations had implied a prolonged period of unchanged Bank Rate. By contrast, the UK short-term interest rate curve was upward sloping and had risen further since the MaPS response window had closed, peaking at around 4.9% by end-2027. Market intelligence gathered in recent days indicated that the perceived probability of near-term increases in Bank Rate had risen. Beyond the near term, elevated risk premia were thought to remain a material contributor to the upward slope in the market curve. That was consistent with increased volatility across energy and interest rate markets since the onset of the conflict.
9: Twelve-month CPI inflation had been 3.1% in August, triggering the exchange of open letters between the Governor and the Chancellor of the Exchequer that was being published alongside these minutes. Around 0.7 percentage points of the 1.1 percentage point overshoot relative to the 2% target was driven by the direct effects of energy prices, mostly motor fuels. Services inflation had been 3.4% in August, unchanged from July, but down from 4.5% in March. Measures of underlying CPI inflation had remained above target-consistent rates.
10: Annual growth in private sector regular Average Weekly Earnings in the three months to July had been 2.9%, a little above expectations at the time of the July Report but down from 3.3% at the start of the year. That measure had continued to be pushed down by temporary compositional effects. Other indicators, including pay settlements and timelier HMRC indicators were higher, collectively suggesting that underlying private sector wage growth was around 3½%, slightly above the target-consistent estimate presented in the February 2026 Report.
11: Although underlying disinflation had continued over the course of the year, the near-term outlook for inflation remained very sensitive to short-term movements in energy prices. Based on energy prices as at close of business on 14 September, the direct contribution of energy prices to inflation was expected to increase over coming quarters, reflecting recent further increases in wholesale oil, gas and electricity costs. Ofgem’s headline energy price cap for October to December would be increased to £1,723, somewhat higher than expected at the time of the July Report, and the cap was now expected to rise substantially further in 2027 Q1, all else equal.
12: The indirect impact of higher energy prices through firms’ supply chains onto CPI inflation was judged to have been small to date, and less than expected at the start of the conflict. This was particularly evident in weaker-than-expected food price inflation.For example, the Bank’s Agents had reported that annual food inflation was now expected to be around 4% at the end of 2026, compared with previous expectations of 6-7% in April. However, there were judged to be upside risks to food inflation going into 2027, owing to energy developments and also because of the impact of drought conditions in Europe and the potential impact of El Niño. Overall, it was possible that indirect effects from energy on CPI inflation had just been delayed rather than diminished. Those effects were expected to increase over the coming months, but the degree and timing would depend on the extent to which firms could pass through energy costs in the current demand environment.
13: Based on energy prices as at close of business on 14 September, CPI inflation was expected to increase to around 3¾% in 2026 Q4, compared with 3.2% at the time of the July Report, and to reach slightly above 4% in 2027 Q1.
14: Households’ inflation expectations had remained elevated and sensitive to movements in energy prices. The Citi/YouGov measure had increased between July and August at both the one and five-year horizons, reversing some of the easing seen in recent months. Household inflation expectations in the Bank/Savanta Inflation Attitudes Survey had fallen back between May and August, notably at the one-year horizon, but caution was needed in interpreting movements between May and August given the recent change in survey provider. Firms’ own-price expectations, for example as reported in the DMP survey, had remained elevated.
15: It was unclear at this stage to what extent households’ and firms’ reactions to higher energy prices might feed into higher wage settlements. DMP respondents had reported that they expected one-year-ahead wage growth of 3.4%, which had been stable since before the start of the conflict. Some Agents’ contacts had suggested that 2027 pay settlements would be broadly in line with or slightly lower than 2026. However, higher-than-expected inflation was one factor judged likely by companies to push up settlements relative to where they otherwise would have been. The Committee would continue to monitor actively a range of indicators of potential second-round effects, using the framework and indicators set out in Boxes A and B in the July Report.
16: UK GDP had increased by 0.4% in 2026 Q2, 0.1 percentage points higher than had been expected in the July Report. In July, monthly GDP had risen by 0.4%, also above expectations, and with a strong contribution from business-to-business services. Although there remained headwinds to demand from the conflict, growth had proven somewhat more resilient than had been expected. The S&P Global UK composite output PMI had edged up in August, and there had been increases in some measures of business optimism and consumer confidence. A Bank staff update of the Q3 GDP projection for the news in the July monthly release implied GDP growth of 0.4% in 2026 Q3, higher than the 0.1% rate projected at the time of the July Report, although business surveys had continued to point to somewhat weaker growth.
17: Labour demand had remained weak and there was still judged to be a margin of slack in the labour market. The unemployment rate was estimated to have been 4.9% in the three months to July, unchanged since the three months to April, although there had been an operational error temporarily reducing LFS achieved sample sizes in May and June leading to an increased use of imputation for those months. At the time of the July Report, the baseline projection for slack in the economy was for a small increase during the second half of the year. However, some timely indicators of employment growth, such as the KPMG/REC measure of hiring and the S&P Global Employment PMI had edged up in August, consistent with the recent resilience of activity. While judgements about the overall level of slack in the economy were very uncertain, it was now judged likely that there had been some stabilisation in slack.
18: Protracted conflict in the Middle East, and its impact on energy prices and the UK economy, remained the dominant source of uncertainty for the inflation outlook. As was outlined in the July Monetary Policy Report and Minutes, the path for UK inflation was being shaped by the size and duration of the energy price shock, and whether energy prices would affect wage and price-setting behaviour and feed through into broad-based inflationary pressures. The Committee had judged in July that the risk of strong inflationary pressures was greater than the risk of weak inflationary pressures. Monetary policy could not influence global energy prices, but was being set to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurred in a way that achieved the 2% inflation target sustainably. This involved setting policy to balance the costs of leaning too little against potential inflationary pressures and the costs to economic activity by leaning too much.
19: At this meeting, the Committee’s discussions focused on: developments in energy prices and their implications for the near-term inflation outlook; medium-term risks to inflation and the prospects for second-round effects; the degree to which economic slack would continue to restrain inflationary pressures; and, taking all the risks together, what this implied for the setting of monetary policy.
20: The Committee noted that conflict in the Middle East appeared to have become more protracted than had been expected previously, without signs of a clear resolution. There had also been continued conflict in Ukraine, with energy production infrastructure damaged in Russia. Consequently, energy prices had increased significantly further since July, raising the prospects of a higher and more volatile near-term inflation outlook. A mechanical update to Bank staff’s short-term inflation projection suggested that CPI inflation could now reach slightly over 4% in early 2027. Developments in wholesale and refined oil and gas prices had almost entirely accounted for this upward news relative to the July Report.
21: The Committee continued to consider the scenarios that had been set out in the July Monetary Policy Report. Oil and gas price paths in the July adverse scenario were judged to be a reasonable proxy for a state of the world in which the conflict continued, perhaps in an episodic manner and with no clear resolution, leading to a very persistent energy shock. The adverse scenario had also assumed stronger and more persistent additional second-round effects relative to the central projection. Members acknowledged that it was difficult to assign any probability to future outcomes for energy prices with confidence given the unpredictable geopolitical environment. Nevertheless, given the passage of time since the onset of the conflict, most members placed more weight on energy prices staying higher for longer in the absence of a lasting de-escalation. Members noted that current spot energy prices were closer to those in the July adverse scenario than those that had been assumed in the July central projection, although futures curves had so far remained lower than in the adverse scenario beyond the near term.
22: In assessing how developments in energy prices could affect inflation beyond the near term, the Committee was also drawing a distinction between pre-conflict developments that were contributing to the continued moderation in underlying inflation, and their forward-looking concerns around second-round effects which were not yet evident in the data but could be exacerbated by the latest developments in energy prices.
23: There had been little sign so far of indirect effects from higher energy prices through to other goods prices, and in particular food inflation had been moderating. Members discussed whether this was a sign of either diminished, or simply delayed, indirect effects. It was possible that these data outturns had reflected mitigants such as firms’ energy reserves drawdowns, their ability to absorb cost increases in their margins or their use of hedging strategies. These were only temporary buffers, however, which were likely to delay cost pressures passing through into higher prices if the conflict persisted.
24: Members noted that there was still little evidence emerging of second-round effects in wage and price-setting, although such effects typically only emerged with a longer lag and no indicators could yet be expected to reflect the latest increases in energy prices. Over the course of the year, wage inflation had generally been moderating, and forward-looking indicators on price and wage-setting from the DMP and Agents’ intelligence had not risen unduly. The Committee nevertheless judged that the risk of material second-round effects had increased since July, and was likely to increase further to the extent that energy prices remained elevated for longer. The persistence of above-target CPI inflation in the run-up to a wage-setting round could increase inflationary pressures, particularly if inflation exceeded thresholds at which households’ and businesses’ attentiveness to inflation had typically increased, and given the salience of energy and food prices for households.
25: In addition, broader global cost pressures could interact with each other and sustain inflationary persistence. Food prices could increase further owing to adverse weather events as well as continued conflict in the Middle East and Ukraine, disrupting agricultural exports and raising fertiliser prices. Demand for AI components could also push up import prices. There could be some offsetting factors, including disinflationary pressures owing to trade diversion.
26: The Committee also discussed other domestic factors that had been and could continue to restrain inflationary pressures. Members continued to judge that weakness in economic activity and soft labour market conditions would help to contain the strength of second-round effects from higher energy prices, with a range of views around whether this would impart sufficient disinflation. Most members acknowledged that there were signs of stabilisation in the margin of slack that had been opening up, underlined by resilience in activity data and some steadying in employment indicators. For some members, it was premature to put too much weight on this stabilisation, particularly on the basis of volatile data.
27: The Committee noted that financial conditions, and consequently the interest rates faced by households and business, had tightened since the start of the conflict and by further since July. This would help to lean against inflationary pressures, although members placed different weights on whether this tightening in financial conditions would endure in the coming months if there were no increase in Bank Rate. While the upward skew of inflation risks appeared to be pushing up market participants' mean Bank Rate expectations in the near term, the upward slope in the OIS curve beyond that was accounted for to a greater extent by risk premia. For most members, movements in UK short-term market interest rates since the conflict had begun, which were still passing through to retail rates, were imparting a broadly sufficient degree of monetary policy restraint, and reflected appropriately the uncertainty around the inflation outlook. For other members, risk premia were not a substitute for changing the level of Bank Rate, including as they were partly driven by factors not related to the UK economy. These premia could therefore change in an unpredictable way.
28: Taken together, the Committee judged that risks to the inflation outlook were tilted further to the upside compared with at the time of the previous MPC meeting. And there was the possibility of a less stark trade-off between weak output and rising inflation in coming quarters. Given the lags with which second-round effects appeared, it was not appropriate to wait too long for evidence of such effects before responding with policy. Nevertheless, the geopolitical environment was highly uncertain and there remained scope for the inflation outlook to change materially as events unfolded.
29: Six members (Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Swati Dhingra, Clare Lombardelli, Dave Ramsden and Alan Taylor) preferred to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75% at this meeting. These members were concerned about recent developments in a range of energy prices and their impact on holding CPI inflation above target for longer than had been previously expected. Domestic activity and tight financial conditions were restraining inflationary pressures, but the risk of second-round effects was growing in the absence of a lasting resolution of the conflict. Two members in this group (Swati Dhingra and Alan Taylor) acknowledged these risks, but placed particular weight on the role of slack in moderating inflation, evidence of restrained pass-through of costs to prices, and the restrictive level of Bank Rate, all of which would allow more time to observe further evidence.
30: Three members (Megan Greene, Catherine L Mann and Huw Pill) preferred a 0.25 percentage point increase in Bank Rate at this meeting. These members noted that the escalation and duration of the Middle East conflict continued to raise energy and food prices. Global factors such as AI supply constraints and El Niño would provide inflationary pressure as well. A projected surge in inflation would peak in early 2027, just as wage settlements were agreed. A mitigating factor for second-round effects, slack in the labour market and economy, appeared to have peaked already given stronger GDP growth and indications of an expansion in employment. This increased the likelihood of meaningful second-round effects emerging. For these members, risk management was appropriate. They believed that a proactive increase in Bank Rate would help anchor inflation expectations. Further, research found that setting policy as if there were stronger second-round effects and course correcting if needed would prove to be less costly to economic activity than vice versa.
31: In line with the commitment made in the August 2022 MPC minutes, the Committee had again reviewed the pace of reduction in the stock of UK government bonds (gilts) held for monetary policy purposes in the Asset Purchase Facility (APF), a process known as quantitative tightening (QT).
32: QT had continued to meet the Committee’s objective of reducing the risk of a ratchet upwards in the size of the Bank of England’s balance sheet over time, increasing the headroom and flexibility available to the Bank to use its balance sheet in the future if needed.
33: The MPC had continued to be guided by a set of key principles. First, the Committee intended to use Bank Rate as its active policy tool when adjusting the stance of monetary policy. Second, sales would be conducted so as not to disrupt the functioning of financial markets, and only in appropriate conditions. Third, to help achieve that, sales would be conducted in a gradual and predictable manner over a period of time.
34: The Committee had set out its latest assessment of QT in the July 2026 Monetary Policy Report. In common with other advanced economies, UK term premia on long-term government bonds had risen since QT had commenced in February 2022, by an estimated 200 basis points. That primarily reflected global economic policy uncertainty, high issuance of government bonds across countries and structural changes within the UK bond market that had reduced demand for long-term government debt. Bank staff estimates suggested that QT had accounted for a modest part of that increase in term premia, around 20-30 basis points. Over the past year, the gilt market had continued to function in an orderly manner, with liquidity proportionate to volatility. In setting Bank Rate, the MPC had taken account of financial market conditions that had reflected the effects of announced and expected QT. The tightening effect from QT would have led to a slightly lower path for Bank Rate, all else equal.
35: The unwind of the APF from its peak of £895 billion in February 2022 to £488 billion in September 2026 had occurred through a sequence of annual MPC decisions. Over the previous 12 months, following the MPC’s September 2025 QT pace decision, the stock of gilts held for monetary policy purposes had been reduced by £70 billion, of which £21 billion had been through gilt sales.
36: The MPC discussed the merits of setting out a more forward-looking plan for the remainder of QT that would reinforce its key principles. In particular, a multi-year plan would reinforce the pace of QT being gradual and predictable. Members discussed the extent to which a multi-year plan should embody a fixed intended pace of unwind, which would provide more certainty and clarity over the future QT path, or instead retain some flexibility to adjust the pace of unwind in response to evolving market conditions. On balance, most MPC members judged that the benefits of a fixed intended pace of unwind and the predictability that entailed would outweigh the loss of flexibility.
37: This multi-year plan should only be reconsidered under very specific circumstances and with a high bar to do so, as had been the case for the MPC’s annual decisions. That was in order to remain consistent with the principles that Bank Rate should be the active monetary policy tool, and that QT pace should be predictable. The Bank would only amend the fixed pace of unwind under two circumstances. First, if the MPC judged that potential movements in Bank Rate alone were insufficient to meet the inflation target. Or, second, if markets were judged by the Bank to be very distressed. The Financial Policy Committee would have a role in this second circumstance through its assessment of financial stability. Outside of these circumstances, the removal of uncertainty over future QT would mean that the intended path for QT was more likely to be embedded into financial conditions shortly after the announcement of the multi-year plan. Going forward, this would enable the MPC to take QT into account better when setting Bank Rate as the active instrument of monetary policy. It would also limit the impact of the remainder of QT on gilt yields beyond the initial announcement effect.
38: In formulating a multi-year plan for QT, the Committee considered the case for fully unwinding the remaining stock of UK government bond purchases held for monetary policy purposes. Such an approach would respect the principle that the stock of assets purchased under quantitative easing (QE) is not permanent.
39: As with all its previous decisions on QT, members emphasised the importance of the MPC deciding the stock of gilts held for monetary policy purposes. This remained a key feature of the UK’s economic framework and essential for the effective delivery of monetary policy. In light of the MPC’s multi-year plan, some portion of the remaining portfolio of gilts held for monetary policy purposes in the APF would likely become less aligned with market demand as unwind continued. The Bank had therefore reviewed its approach to implementation. The Bank had engaged with HM Treasury (HMT) and the Debt Management Office (DMO) to consider a model whereby the MPC’s decision could instead be implemented through APF sales to the Government. The MPC had been informed by the Bank of this model, which remained subject to a final decision to proceed. With regard to this issue, the Committee considered important institutional questions regarding the potential interaction between monetary and fiscal actions and the independence of MPC decision-making over monetary policy. This led to a robust discussion around the balance of costs and benefits within the wider package of measures announced in relation to the Bank’s implementation of QT, as set out in the Governor’s letter to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. On balance, all members of the Committee judged that its multi-year plan would achieve the desired rundown of the asset portfolio accumulated via QE while maintaining monetary policy independence.
40: The MPC decided to reduce the stock of gilts held for monetary policy purposes to zero. This implied that the Bank needed to return to the issue of the appropriate long-term backing asset for the issuance of banknotes. In 2006, the Bank had concluded that gilts were an appropriate backing asset, given the enduring demand for banknotes. Given the MPC’s decision, the Bank, in consultation with HMT, would set aside and retain £120 billion of the longest-dated gilts in the APF to back current and future banknote issuance, as set out in more detail in an accompanying Bank Insights article.
41: After setting aside the £120 billion of bonds to back the issuance of banknotes, the remaining gilts spanned a range of maturities, with the longest gilt not maturing until 2049. The MPC therefore judged that sales remained necessary for its portfolio of gilts held for monetary policy purposes to be unwound in full in a timely manner.
42: In deciding a multi-year plan for QT, the Committee considered the merits of unwinding the remaining stock of UK government bonds held for monetary policy purposes through a constant annual pace of sales, alongside maturing gilts. Members recognised that there was relatively limited variation in the value of maturing gilts in coming years, such that a constant sales pace would deliver a relatively constant annual reduction in the overall outstanding stock of gilts. In addition, members discussed how a relatively faster pace of unwind could allow the MPC to meet its objectives for QT sooner and would be more feasible with sales to Government, but also presented a greater risk of breaching the MPC’s QT principle that sales should not disrupt the functioning of financial markets. A relatively slower pace of unwind would mean QT taking somewhat longer to conclude, but presented a lower risk of disruption to financial market functioning.
43: The Financial Policy Committee (FPC) had been briefed on the MPC’s deliberations.
44: All members agreed at this meeting that the Bank of England should reduce the stock of UK government bond purchases held for monetary policy purposes, and financed by the issuance of central bank reserves, to zero. They also agreed this should be conducted through annual sales of £20 billion per year, alongside maturities. For some members, the involvement of the DMO in gilt sales and its ability to retire bonds increased the size of annual active sales that could be comfortably conducted without disrupting markets. Waiting to choose a number for active sales until the DMO’s involvement was made clear would allow the Bank to shrink the balance sheet faster. However, withholding a number until there was clarity on the DMO’s involvement meant that markets could not effectively price the entire extensive package of QT changes. At a time when bond markets globally had been volatile, this risked destabilising markets. That risk outweighed the benefit of comfortably selling more gilts annually and shrinking the balance sheet faster.
45: After setting aside £120 billion of bonds to back the issuance of banknotes, the MPC’s outstanding stock of gilts held for monetary policy purposes to be unwound in full was £368 billion. The Bank would allow gilts maturing by the date at which QT was expected to be complete to do so passively, totalling £222 billion. The remainder of £146 billion would be sold. Given the MPC’s intended annual sales pace of £20 billion alongside anticipated redemptions, this would correspond to an average annual reduction of £46 billion in the stock of UK government bonds held for monetary policy purposes until September 2034, when QT was expected to be complete.
46: The Chair invited the Committee to vote on the propositions that:
47: Six members (Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Swati Dhingra, Clare Lombardelli, Dave Ramsden and Alan Taylor) voted in favour of the first proposition. Three members (Megan Greene, Catherine L Mann and Huw Pill) voted against this proposition, preferring to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%.
48: The Committee voted unanimously in favour of the second proposition.
49: Members set out the rationale underpinning their individual votes on Bank Rate.
Members are listed alphabetically under each vote grouping. References to scenarios relate to those set out in Section 3 of the July Monetary Policy Report.
Votes to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%
Andrew Bailey: There has been a material increase in energy prices since July, with a consequent effect on the near-term inflation outlook. The risk for energy prices, and thus inflation, continues to be on the upside. The geopolitics of the situation makes the upside risk more prominent with a seeming loss of urgency to find solutions. Indirect energy pass-through has so far been weaker than we had expected, however, and there continues to be very limited evidence of emerging second-round effect though it is still early days. Domestic inflationary pressures have continued to ease. The labour market continues to be soft, with pay in line with expectations, though some forward-looking indicators of hiring have picked up. Weather conditions are likely to push up food price inflation. With risks to energy and food prices more to the upside, second-round effects could materialise more strongly. Financial conditions will continue to work to push down on inflation, and holding Bank Rate is appropriate at this meeting. But if the conflict in the Middle East persists for an extended period, as appears to be the case, and the risk of second-round effects emerging increases, it is likely that policy may have to tighten.
Sarah Breeden: The near-term outlook for inflation has shifted significantly since July. Oil, gas and refined products prices have risen further as tensions in the Middle East have re-escalated with little sign of a rapid or durable resolution. Set against this, indirect energy pass-through has been weaker than expected so far and, although early days, there has been little sign yet of material second-round effects taking hold. What matters is the outlook for such effects. While recent data suggest activity and the labour market have proved more resilient than expected, domestic slack and the restrictiveness of financial conditions should continue to lean against inflationary dynamics becoming embedded. But the scale and likely duration of the energy price shock has increased and there is the potential for more global shocks – related to climate, food prices and AI. These make material second-round effects more likely, particularly if inflation approaches levels associated with non-linear effects. The tightening in financial conditions seen since the onset of the conflict has so far given us time to observe how the shock plays out. Material uncertainty is likely to continue, but if risks to the outlook for second-round effects crystallise, it becomes increasingly appropriate for Bank Rate to respond.
Swati Dhingra: My view of the outlook remains largely unchanged since July, though recent events have amplified the adverse supply shock. Rolling re-escalation of conflict in the Middle East underscores the continuing uncertainty around the size, persistence and transmission of higher energy prices. Monetary policy needs to respond in a timely way to the emergence of self-sustaining second-round effects. Several factors provide insurance against such effects building imminently. Bank Rate remains materially higher than in peer European economies, financial conditions have tightened rapidly since the conflict began, and domestic demand remains subdued. I therefore continue to see value in waiting for a clearer read on the durable scale of the shock over the coming months, including evidence on first-round energy effects and the conditions for 2027 wage and price-setting. This would still allow time to adjust Bank Rate appropriately to mitigate second-round effects, while avoiding pre-emptive tightening before there is greater clarity on first-round effects. So far, there are limited signs that upstream price pressures are broadening materially, despite sharp increases in imported input prices. With consumption subdued, vacancies below pre-pandemic levels and margins not expanding, the domestic economy appears unlikely to sustain second-round effects that would magnify the initial impulse.
Clare Lombardelli: Continued volatility in energy markets dominates the inflation outlook. Oil and gas prices are currently closer to those in the July adverse scenario, leading to a higher and more uncertain future path for inflation. The impact of the conflict to date has been more limited than expected on both sides of the inflation and activity trade-off. Pass-through to indirect effects of higher energy prices has been slower, and growth and the labour market have been more resilient than expected. Financial conditions are restrictive and that is leaning against the risks to inflation. But the longer high and volatile energy prices persist, the more inflationary pressure is building: indirect effects will be higher and the risk of second-round effects in price and wage-setting increases. The balance of risks to inflation has shifted more to the upside since our last policy decision. The outlook for energy prices is uncertain and could change in the coming weeks, but the case for raising Bank Rate is building the longer the conflict continues without lasting resolution.
Dave Ramsden: Protracted conflict in the Middle East continues to be the predominant driver of the near-term inflation outlook. Energy price paths as embodied in the July adverse scenario appear more likely the longer the conflict continues. External risks from global conflicts, extreme weather events and AI supply chain pressures have the potential to combine to generate more volatile and longer-lasting above-target inflation. Meanwhile, domestically generated inflationary pressures continue to appear to be relatively benign and slack is still evident in a range of indicators, with little to suggest second-round effects are imminent. At the same time, food price inflation has been weaker than expected in recent months. Nevertheless, there do seem to be some tentative indications of a bottoming out in labour market easing, activity continues to be surprisingly resilient, and external pressures may start to push up on food prices. So there is more risk that domestically generated price pressures could start to emerge in the near future. Overall, the risks to the inflation outlook have tilted more to the upside. Whilst the policy stance continues to provide restrictiveness, were upside pressures on the inflation outlook to continue to build, there could be a case for increasing Bank Rate.
Alan Taylor: My view is that additional tightening is not warranted at present. Monetary policy is already firmly restrictive: Bank Rate remains materially above my estimate of neutral at 3%, while an elevated curve bears down via mortgage and other lending rates. (The curve is now higher, at all maturities at and beyond the two-year point, than at the final hike of the 2022-23 cycle when inflation stood at 6.8%.) These conditions provide meaningful insurance against the risk that the energy shock becomes embedded in wages and prices. The shock is real, and risks are skewed upwards. But policy should respond to evidence of propagation rather than mechanically to volatile ticks in headline energy prices. So far, that evidence is limited. We see subdued domestic demand, substantial slack, normalising wages, and steady underlying inflation. I therefore favour holding while monitoring closely whether expectations, wages, prices, and margins begin to react. Clearly, any evidence of emergent second-round effects would build the case for tightening. Equally, if geopolitical tensions abate and inflation pressures ease, an easing of policy should be in sight. The right approach is therefore vigilant, conditional, and disciplined, with the burden of proof resting on clear evidence that second-round effects are en route.
Votes to increase Bank Rate to 4%
Catherine L Mann: Since my vote to increase Bank Rate in July, upside risks to inflation have increased as the ‘sporadic continuance’ of conflict has ratcheted up energy prices well above the baseline from the July Report. Our short-term inflation forecast projects CPI reaching somewhat over 4% early next year, mechanically driven by energy prices and expected increases in food price inflation. Both of these are salient for households' inflation attentiveness and both will be uncomfortably high ahead of wage negotiations next spring. Core goods inflation is projected to be well above its target-consistent historical average. Activity has been stronger than expected in the first half of 2026, as investment and government spending have increased. Collectively, this suggests that financial conditions have not been particularly restrictive. However, financial conditions, particularly as measured by the OIS curve, have tightened since July. But, up until last week’s escalation in the Middle East, market participants had expected a prolonged Bank Rate hold, which was hard to square with achieving the 2% target. Raising Bank Rate is a better risk-management strategy when faced with uncertainty about inflation dynamics and second-round effects. Doing so avoids a worse outcome whereby inflation becomes embedded, which requires even tighter policy later.
Megan Greene: Since the conflict in Iran started more than six months ago, we have faced uncertainty around the path for energy prices and, relatedly, uncertainty about the extent of second-round effects. The news since July suggests a greater risk of second-round effects and inflation persistence. Energy prices remain closest to our adverse scenario, contributing to inflation already within the threshold at which business and household expectations are more attentive to inflation outcomes. Previous arguments around a limited risk of second-round effects from the conflict have hinged on economic slack. But resilience in labour demand and activity suggest slack may have already peaked. And forward-looking indicators from the DMP and Agents point to wage and price disinflation stalling above target-consistent levels – all before the recent energy price rise has really hit consumers (given the Ofgem price cap) and firms (given hedging). Beyond the conflict in Iran, persistent inflationary pressures could come from El Niño, AI-related supply constraints and the reversal of a multi-decade disinflation in global goods. Waiting for definitive evidence of second-round effects before acting would leave policy behind the curve, and we cannot rely on premia to do our work for us. I continue to think a risk-management strategy is appropriate.
Huw Pill: A 25-basis point increase in Bank Rate now sends a clear signal of the MPC’s commitment to achieving its price stability mandate amidst the fog of geopolitical conflict and data noise. Admittedly, energy price developments since our previous meeting have been significant. The magnitude and persistence of the inflationary impulse stemming from events in the Middle East have proved stronger than expected in July, swelling the risk of second-round effects in a context of more resilient UK activity. But these immediate developments are only part of my motivation to increase Bank Rate. Responding to lower frequency inflationary pressures inherent in the current uncertain and volatile environment remains the key driver of my policy choice, with broader global threats (stemming from adverse weather, fiscal dynamics and AI build-out) magnifying the obvious energy price risks to the inflation outlook. Raising Bank Rate would put the MPC in a better place to address risks to price stability as these uncertainties unfold, especially since any resulting second-round effects, once entrenched, are costly to overcome. Acting decisively now cuts through in a way that bolsters the clarity and effectiveness of policy choices, thereby heading off inflationary pressures rather having to reverse them once they become ingrained.
50: On 16 September, the stock of UK government bonds held for monetary policy purposes was £488 billion.
51: At this meeting, the MPC had voted to reduce the stock of UK government bond purchases held for monetary policy purposes to zero at an annual average pace of £46 billion by the end of 2034, through annual sales of £20 billion alongside maturing gilts. The Market Notice accompanying these Minutes explained which specific gilts would be sold for the remainder of QT.
52: In light of the MPC’s multi-year plan, the Bank had reviewed its approach to implementation. Over the course of the year, the Bank had engaged with HM Treasury (HMT) and the Debt Management Office (DMO) to consider a model whereby the MPC’s decision could instead be implemented through APF sales to the Government. Progress would be reviewed before April 2027 such that, subject to a final decision to proceed, implementation could begin in a way that would allow it to be incorporated into the DMO’s annual financing remit, as set by HMT. Further operational details would be announced in due course. Irrespective of the final decision, the Bank would announce by April 2027 the operational details through which it would implement the MPC’s multi-year plan. Bank APF auctions would pause in the meantime. Regardless of the method of sales, the Bank would ensure that the MPC’s agreed sales pace was implemented, subject only to amendments in the circumstances outlined by the MPC and referred to above. The MPC had been briefed in full on these operational considerations.
53: The following members of the Committee were present:
Daniel Gallagher was present as the Treasury representative.
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+Speecheshttps://www.bankofengland.co.uk/rss/speechesSpeechesen{52B84329-5132-45B4-A1DB-7769939D3EBA}https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2026/october/physical-shocks-and-economic-resilience-speech-by-james-talbotPhysical shocks and economic resilience: a central bank perspective − speech by James TalbotGiven at the 2nd Annual Conference on Sustainable Finance at the Banco de México on 21 October 2026Fri, 23 Oct 2026 10:00:00 +0100{2FC1AD25-F08D-4B82-BAF4-4B3E39B5B115}https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2026/october/katharine-braddick-mansion-house-city-regulators-dinner-londonThe PRA’s second decade − speech by Katharine BraddickGiven at Mansion HouseThu, 22 Oct 2026 21:00:00 +0100{42D78C43-29CD-4AE3-A194-43FD6C114A62}https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2026/october/megan-greene-speech-at-lse-economics-society-londonLearning about earnings: Can we rely on labour market slack to mitigate the latest supply shock? − speech by Megan GreeneGiven at London School of EconomicsTue, 20 Oct 2026 18:00:00 +0100{34B6B008-4B89-4167-840A-D31B0408149E}https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/speech/2026/october/financial-innovation-dollar-dominance-and-their-uk-monetary-policy-implicationsFinancial innovation, dollar dominance and their UK monetary policy implicationsPresented at the Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium: Financial Innovation — Implications for Payments and Policy in Jackson, Wyoming. 28th August 2026Fri, 16 Oct 2026 21:00:00 +0100
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Bank Rate maintained at 3.75% - July 2026 Monetary Policy Summary and Minutes
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Monetary Policy Summary, July 2026
At its meeting ending on 29 July 2026, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted by a majority of 6–3 to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%. Three members voted to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%.
In response to events in the Middle East, crude and refined energy prices have remained volatile and higher than pre-conflict. The impact of the energy shock on the UK economy remains uncertain. Monetary policy cannot influence energy prices but is being set to ensure that the economic adjustment to them occurs in a way that achieves the 2% inflation target sustainably. The policy stance required to achieve this will depend on the scale and duration of the shock, and how it propagates through the economy including via financial conditions.
CPI inflation has fallen to 2.6% since the previous meeting, although it is expected to rise later this year as the effects of higher energy prices continue to pass through. The risk of material second-round effects in price and wage-setting, against which policy needs to lean, is greater the longer higher energy prices persist. There is little evidence so far to suggest such effects, and there have continued to be clear signs of underlying disinflation in recent data. Loose labour market conditions, and higher interest rates faced by households and businesses than prior to the conflict, will also act to reduce inflation over time. The Committee judges that the risks to the inflation outlook are tilted to the upside relative to the central projection in the July Monetary Policy Report, but there remains scope for the outlook to change materially as events in the Middle East unfold.
The Committee judges that it is appropriate to maintain Bank Rate at this meeting. The Committee stands ready to act as necessary to ensure that CPI inflation remains on track to meet the 2% target in the medium term.
Minutes of the Monetary Policy Committee meeting ending on 29 July 2026
1: Before turning to its immediate policy decision, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) discussed key economic developments and its judgements around them, as well as its views on monetary policy strategy. The latest data and analysis underpinning these topics were set out in the accompanying July 2026 Monetary Policy Report.
2: At this meeting, the Committee discussed developments in global energy prices, the uncertainty surrounding the prospects for them and the implications for near-term inflation. It also discussed the extent of disinflation and slack in the economy, the potential scale of second-round effects and broader global factors as possible drivers of future inflation.
3: The conflict in the Middle East, and its impact on energy prices and the UK economy, remained the dominant source of uncertainty for the inflation outlook. In the run-up to this meeting, oil and gas prices were materially higher than pre-conflict. The Brent crude front-month future and the UK front-month natural gas future were $84 per barrel and 136 pence per therm respectively as at close of business on 28July. In the June CPI outturn of 2.6%, motor fuel prices had contributed 0.6 percentage points to CPI inflation. Inflation was expected to rise further this year from the direct and indirect effects of higher energy prices. Volatility in energy prices would correspond to volatility in this near-term inflation outlook. Members continued to look through direct effects. But policy would need to guard particularly against second-round effects that created inflation persistence, while considering any trade-off with weaker economic activity. The risk of material second-round effects would depend on the scale and duration of the energy shock, which remained uncertain.
4: All members agreed that risks to the paths of energy prices remained skewed to the upside. Energy markets had been volatile, and there was concern that repeated re-escalations of the conflict could prolong this volatility. This could generate further upward pressure on energy prices, with uncertainty over how long this could linger. The release of strategic oil reserves and substitution between energy sources had been restraining more acute oil price increases, but could not mitigate the shock indefinitely. And gas and refined product prices, which were salient for households and businesses, had been less tempered by these mitigants owing to supply constraints. The Committee therefore remained attentive to the risk that consumer energy prices could stay elevated for longer, even if for most members the range of likely near-term global energy price paths had probably narrowed relative to the more extreme levels considered at the time of the April Monetary Policy Report.
5: In evaluating the impact of these developments on inflation, all members acknowledged that there had been sustained disinflation pre-conflict. Although above the 2% target, CPI inflation had fallen since the April Report, accounted for largely by continued moderation in services and food inflation. Abating domestic inflationary pressures had been supported by slowing wage growth and a soft labour market. Some members also noted that the absence of a monetary overhang was helping to create a more benign starting point for the energy shock compared to some previous episodes.
6: Members took varying degrees of reassurance from what this past disinflation implied for the inflation outlook. For most members, past disinflation was consistent with a margin of economic slack. This slack would continue to constrain the strength of inflation persistence in the medium term. For other members, this past disinflation was either not informative about future inflation, or in spite of it there was a significant risk of second-round effects taking hold. All members agreed that the likelihood of material second-round effects was the key uncertainty surrounding the appropriate policy response to bring inflation back to target in the medium term.
7: The Committee agreed that there had been little evidence of material second-round effects so far. It noted that, given lags in pass-through, this could not be taken as a strong signal about their future emergence, especially given measurement challenges. Renewed escalations in the Middle East could also change the assessment. For some members, the absence of adverse developments so far in key indicators including inflation expectations, own-price expectations in the DMP survey, wage-price feedback and food inflation, pointed to a likelihood of limited second-round effects to come. Other members derived little signal from current data given the lagged nature of second-round effects, particularly so for wage-setting dynamics for which indications of 2027 pay settlements were yet to come. And members were concerned to varying degrees that higher energy prices were occurring against a backdrop of persistent above-target inflation as well as elevated household attentiveness to inflation outturns. Taken together, this warranted caution in placing too much weight on initial evidence in determining the possibility of stronger second-round effects.
8: The Committee would continue to monitor the evolution of a wide range of forward-looking data and intelligence to allow timely assessments of the inflation outlook. Box A in the July Report set out a framework, a fuller set of monitoring indicators and analytical approaches that the Committee would continue to consider in evaluating second-round effects.
9: More broadly than the energy shock, global factors pointed to an economic environment that risked being more inflationary in future. While some factors appeared to be exerting some downward pressure on UK inflation at the moment, for example trade diversion due to higher global trade tariffs, some posed upside risks. These included strong demand for AI-related components creating sector-specific price pressures and the impact of El Niño on global food prices. While these risks might not materialise, or occur at the same time, the Committee noted that some could interact with one another and with commodity price developments in potentially inflationary ways. The Committee would continue to monitor these dynamics and their implications for the inflation outlook.
10: Taking all of the risks into account, the MPC judged that the risk of strong inflationary pressures was greater than the risk of weak inflationary pressures, although there remained a high degree of uncertainty around the outlook. The central projection for the economy and two scenarios were set out in the July Report. The central projection was conditioned on the 15 day average of energy price paths to 20 July and assumed moderate additional second-round effects. The adverse scenario was consistent with the likelihood of repeated re-escalations of the conflict with no clear resolution, resulting in persistently higher energy prices, and with an assumption of much stronger second-round effects. The milder scenario assumed lower energy prices around those that had been observed around the beginning of July, consistent with a more durable de-escalation of the conflict. In this case, additional second-round effects did not emerge and, in addition, household consumption was assumed to be weaker leading to softer demand and inflation pressures.
11: Members noted that monetary policy could need to react before the risks around inflation persistence materialised conclusively. There were two dimensions in considering the appropriate policy stance: the level of current monetary policy restrictiveness, and the degree to which policy should guard pre-emptively against the possibility of worse outcomes. Both considerations involved balancing the costs of leaning too little against inflation persistence against costs to economic activity by leaning too much.
12: In considering the appropriate level for Bank Rate, members noted that financial conditions had tightened materially compared with prior to the conflict, which had increased financing costs faced by households and firms. Members discussed the extent to which the tightening in financial conditions reflected ongoing uncertainty and a perception from market participants that risks to Bank Rate were skewed to the upside.
13: The MPC sets monetary policy to meet the 2% inflation target sustainably.
14: Six members (Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Swati Dhingra, Clare Lombardelli, Dave Ramsden and Alan Taylor) preferred to maintain Bank Rate at this meeting. Holding Bank Rate, combined with the significant tightening of financial conditions that had occurred since the conflict started, was providing sufficient insurance against the upside risks to inflation stemming from fluctuations in energy prices. This would allow time to observe further evidence, preserving the option to change Bank Rate in future were the evidence to warrant it. Members recognised the potential need for additional policy restraint were signs of material second-round effects to emerge. But they also noted that the policy strategy could change were upside risks to inflation to subside durably and the underlying disinflation process to continue.
15: Three members (Megan Greene, Catherine L Mann and Huw Pill) preferred a 0.25 percentage point increase in Bank Rate at this meeting. These members were less reassured on the underlying disinflationary process, were concerned that second-round effects could be material, and thought it relevant that inflation had exceeded the 2% target for more than five years. For these members, uncertainty about how the conflict would evolve remained high, and so a risk management strategy was appropriate. They believed that a proactive increase in Bank Rate would reduce the probability of second-round effects setting in. Further, research found that setting policy as if there were stronger second-round effects and course correcting if needed, would prove to be less costly than vice versa.
16: The Chair invited the Committee to vote on the proposition that:
17: Six members (Andrew Bailey, Sarah Breeden, Swati Dhingra, Clare Lombardelli, Dave Ramsden and Alan Taylor) voted in favour of the proposition. Three members (Megan Greene, Catherine L Mann and Huw Pill) voted against the proposition, preferring to increase Bank Rate by 0.25 percentage points, to 4%.
18: Members set out the rationale underpinning their individual votes on Bank Rate.
Members are listed alphabetically under each vote grouping. References in parentheses relate to boxes in the July 2026 Monetary Policy Report. References to scenarios relate to those set out in Section 3 of the July Report.
Votes to maintain Bank Rate at 3.75%
Andrew Bailey: Events in the Middle East mean that the short-run path of inflation is uncertain owing to volatile energy prices. The possibility of repeated resumptions of conflict, combined with lower than usual European gas stock levels and a fall in global refining output, mean that risks to energy prices lie to the upside. Set against that, the process of underlying disinflation that was intact prior to the conflict remains in train. That provides some tentative evidence that inherited inflation persistence may be weaker than had been presumed. Alongside this, the labour market continues to ease, and the demand environment remains soft. There is little evidence yet of second-round effects (Boxes A and B), although it is too early to take much comfort from that. Financial conditions have tightened since the onset of the conflict (Box F). These conditions and the upward sloping yield curve, which in part reflects the energy-related upside risks to inflation, are weighing on any nascent inflation pressures. Holding Bank Rate is appropriate as global conditions look to be more uncertain and inflationary, while domestic conditions are on balance more benign as regards the prospects for inflation.
Sarah Breeden: Energy prices have been volatile since June. For monetary policy, what matters is the scale and duration of these shocks and how they propagate through the economy. Incoming data show underlying disinflation to have been firmly on track, consistent with weak demand and a loose labour market. Neither staff’s new granular measure of underlying inflation (Box C) nor broad money developments (Box E) signal upside inflation risks. Together with staff’s monitoring of second-round effects (Box B), that gives me greater confidence that such effects should be limited, although it remains early days. While my confidence around the domestic inflationary environment has increased, risks to global prices have shifted to the upside. Geopolitical tensions remain unresolved, gas and refined fuel prices are high, and global supply shocks – including those related to climate and AI (Box D) – could reinforce one another, increasing the likelihood of more material second-round effects. Financial conditions facing households and businesses have tightened materially since the onset of the conflict, and consistent with the baseline, provide sufficient restrictiveness for now. Looking ahead, I will continue to focus on how second-round effects are likely to evolve.
Swati Dhingra: The eventual size, persistence and propagation of the energy shock remain highly uncertain. So far, evidence suggests that inflationary pressures are more upstream, concentrated in a limited number of sectors, and do not yet appear to be broadening materially (Boxes B and C). The domestic economy is unlikely to amplify second-round effects as demand remains subdued, the labour market continues to loosen with vacancies below pre-pandemic levels and margins are not expanding in a way that magnifies the shock. An increase in Bank Rate now would be disproportionate as, unlike 2022, the starting point for this shock is much softer and the policy stance is more restrictive. I continue to see value in waiting for a clearer read on the energy shock in the coming months before deciding whether a change in policy is required, given the broad range of possible outcomes. We will learn more about first-round energy effects and 2027 wage-setting towards the end of this year. This would still allow time for monetary policy to mitigate second-round effects as needed at that point.
Clare Lombardelli: The outlook for UK inflation is being driven by global factors interacting with a weakening domestic environment. Indirect and second-round effects of previous higher energy prices remain a concern, exacerbated by the reemergence of elevated energy prices. Second-round effects take time to appear (Boxes A and B) but could be significant. Their current absence is informative but not conclusive. Recent data show underlying disinflation continuing and the looser labour market and weak pricing power should help limit propagation. The stance of monetary policy is restrictive, more so once broader financial conditions and the further underlying disinflation are factored in. This provides sensible risk management given the inflationary impulse from higher energy prices. Policy would need to be adjusted were there to be evidence of risks of significant second-round effects, including from persistently higher energy prices.
Dave Ramsden: There are two distinct aspects to the outlook, pulling in different directions. On the one hand, I see clear upside risks to inflation from the global environment, with the potential for a prolonged disruption to energy prices from repeated energy shocks, though perhaps smaller in amplitude than first considered in March and April. Alongside that, bottlenecks in AI supply chains and the impact of El Niño on food prices may add to inflationary pressures (Box D). On the other hand, domestic developments point to a more benign inflationary outlook (Box C), where inflation would have been likely to return to target absent the shocks from the conflict in the Middle East. And an early assessment of second-round effects (Box B) suggests they are more likely than not to be limited. The policy stance is currently delivering the restrictiveness necessary to weigh against the upside risks posed by the global environment. I will keep the degree of restrictiveness under review as we continue to learn more about the upside risks to inflation. If they were to crystallise, a hike in Bank Rate may be warranted. If the risks were to subside and the underlying disinflation process continued, I would consider resuming the cutting cycle.
Alan Taylor: The inflation outlook is shaped by opposing forces: benign, disinflationary background trends in domestic conditions versus incoming, volatile global shocks of unclear magnitude and duration. On the latter, especially conflict-related energy shocks, there is no evidence so far of second-round effects, but we continue to monitor them. These external risks are important and justify an upside-skewed scenario. But they are not the only risks that matter for policy thinking. In contrast, domestic inflation pressures continue to abate, with wage and private-sector AWE growth reaching target-consistent rates and recent CPI numbers surprising to the downside. The backdrop is one of greater slack, restrictive monetary conditions, cautious households and firms, and limited fiscal space. The economy is drifting further toward deficient demand, with material risk of larger output gaps, labour-market scarring, and a slowdown in growth over the next year or two. In that context, the possibility of downside surprises, and painful trade-offs, remains relevant. For me, the more likely outcomes sit between the baseline and milder scenario, albeit with a long right tail; keeping Bank rate on hold, at a higher level now than the pre-conflict implied path, gives insurance for now, before resuming cuts when and if geopolitical uncertainty clears.
Votes to increase Bank Rate to 4%
Megan Greene: There remains considerable uncertainty about the evolution of the conflict in Iran and its impact on the UK economy. Incoming data suggests the disinflation process has continued and the real side of the economy remains soft. Some recent forward-looking surveys have been collected during a peace deal and a conflict, making it difficult to parse signal from noise. Unsurprisingly, there has been scant evidence of second-round effects, but I expect some to emerge. There have been successive negative supply shocks, inflation has remained above target for roughly five years and inflation is likely to reach the threshold at which business and household expectations are more sensitive to outturns. Other supply risks loom as well, including a second energy choke point in the Red Sea, El Niño and supply constraints for AI-related hardware. As in June, there is significant uncertainty about which projection or scenario is most likely and I believe a risk management strategy is appropriate. Staff analysis illustrates that setting policy as if there are stronger second-round effects and course correcting if they prove to be smaller is less costly than vice versa. Furthermore, a proactive hike in Bank Rate may reduce the probability that second-round effects set in.
Catherine L Mann: Most indicators of nominal conditions have continued to moderate, although near-term inflation estimates skirt the inflation attentiveness threshold at which research suggests stronger second-round effects, which would build on an inflation rate that has remained above target for five years. That said, the key change in the environment for my decision is the collapse of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding, the widening of the Middle East conflict, and the associated volatility in energy prices. This ‘sporadic continuance’ of the conflict that I hypothesised last month appears to be the state of play. The shocks and volatility transmit through salience and production costs to affect expectations and price setting behaviours to impart an upward ratchet to CPI inflation. A variety of research methods concludes that Bank Rate should be higher than 3.75% to return inflation to the 2% target sustainably. Other research emphasises that the costs of leaning against upside risks that fail to materialise would be smaller than the cost of leaning too little against upside risks. Notwithstanding moderately restrictive nominal financial conditions, reinforcing policy credibility when faced with inflationary shocks implies that a 25 basis point increase in Bank Rate is appropriate at this time.
Huw Pill: While energy prices remain volatile, risks to achieving the inflation target lie firmly to the upside. It is comforting that, so far, staff analysis has identified neither a broad money overhang (Box E) nor second-round effects associated with the de-anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations. Nonetheless, I remain concerned about more insidious second-round effects driven by catch-up dynamics in wage and price setting. While these may be slower to emerge, they could prove more lasting and create greater intrinsic inflation persistence. Structural shifts in the economy have rendered the UK more vulnerable to such catch-up effects and are also associated with a less benign view of pre-conflict underlying inflation. The profound uncertainty surrounding the energy price outlook is likely to be prolonged and of unknown duration, rendering efforts to fine-tune the economy with monetary policy hazardous. As a result, it is appropriate to raise Bank Rate now, thereby cutting through noise in commodity and asset price developments to offer a clear and unambiguous signal of our willingness and ability to address upside risks to inflation stemming from events in the Gulf. This would place us in the best position to manage risks to the inflation target as they emerge.
19: On 29 Julyfootnote [1], the stock of UK government bonds held for monetary policy purposes was £491 billion.
20: The following members of the Committee were present:
Brian Bell was present as the Treasury representative.
David Roberts was present on 21 July and 27 July, as an observer for the purpose of exercising oversight functions in his role as a member of the Bank’s Court of Directors.
Correction made on 11 September 2026. This sentence originally referred to a date of 17 July.
Correction made on 11 September 2026. This sentence originally referred to a date of 17 July.
The Bank of England Act 1998 gives the Bank of England operational responsibility for setting monetary policy to meet the Government’s inflation target. Operational decisions are taken by the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee. The minutes of the Committee meeting ending on 16 September will be published on 17 September 2026.
Consumer price index, September 2026:
++3.3% on the same month a year earlier (provisional result confirmed)
++0.6% on the previous month (provisional result confirmed)
Harmonised index of consumer prices, September 2026:
++3.3% on the same month a year earlier (provisional result confirmed)
++0.6% on the previous month (provisional result confirmed)
WIESBADEN − The inflation rate in Germany, measured as the year-on-year change in the consumer price index (CPI), stood at +3.3% in September 2026. The rise in consumer prices therefore intensified once again, after having stood at +2.9% in August 2026 and +2.8% in July 2026. "The rate of inflation exceeded the three percent mark in September, and therefore reached a new record high this year. This was also the highest level recorded since December 2023," says Ruth Brand, President of the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis). "Once again, the development of energy prices was responsible for the increase in the inflation rate. The rise in prices was particularly evident in the price of mineral oil products at filling stations and in the price of heating oil", Brand adds. Compared with August 2026, total consumer prices rose by 0.6% in September 2026.
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Energy product prices up 14.9% compared with September 2025
The prices of energy products (total) were 14.9% higher in September 2026 than in September 2025. Year on year, the rise in energy prices therefore accelerated in September 2026 for the third consecutive month (August 2026: +10.5%; July 2026: +8.3%; June 2026: +3.4%). This was the largest increase in energy prices since February 2023 (+19.1% on February 2022). The price increase which has been observed on the crude oil market (only in German) since the start of the Iran war was reflected in the energy price developments for producer prices and consumer prices. For consumers, this meant that motor fuel prices were up substantially (+37.1%) in September 2026 compared with September 2025 (August 2026: +27.7%) and heating oil registered an even higher increase of 74.9% (August 2026: +49.6%). Firewood, wood pellets and other solid fuels were also more expensive (+15.6%) in September 2026 compared with the same month of the preceding year. By contrast, the prices of electricity (-5.5%), natural gas excluding operating costs (-2.8%) and district heating (-1.0%) continued to be less expensive in September 2026 compared with a year earlier. The downward price trends registered for electricity, natural gas and district heating are in part attributable to the measures of the Federal Government which have been implemented since the beginning of the year. The relief provided by the renewed reduction of energy tax, particularly on motor fuels (fuel discount), was not yet reflected in the results for September, as the measure did not come into effect until 1 October 2026.
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Food prices registered below-average increase of +0.4% compared with previous year
Food prices in September 2026 continued to register below-average growth (+0.4%) compared with the same month in the previous year, after an increase of 0.1% in August 2026. Nevertheless, some food items were considerably more expensive in September 2026 than in September 2025, including eggs (+15.2%), fresh vegetables (+12.0%) and fish, fish products and seafood (+4.5%). By contrast, lower prices were observed particularly for edible fats and oils (-15.0%, including butter: -29.5%), fresh fruit (-4.9%) and dairy products (-5.5%).
Inflation rate excluding food and energy at +2.4%
In September 2026, the inflation rate excluding energy stood at +2.1% and the inflation rate excluding heating oil and motor fuels was +1.8%. As in August and July 2026, the inflation rate excluding food and energy, often referred to as core inflation, stood at +2.4% in September 2026 and therefore remained below the overall inflation rate.
Goods prices up 3.8% on September 2025
The prices of goods (total) were 3.8% higher in September 2026 than a year earlier. Non-durable consumer goods cost 5.4% more, particularly due to the development of energy prices (+14.9%), while the prices of durable consumer goods rose by 1.0%. In addition to energy products, significant year-on-year price increases were also recorded for information processing equipment (+9.2%) and tobacco products (+5.6%), for example. By contrast, coffee, tea and cocoa (-3.3%) and household appliances
+(-2.5%), for example, were less expensive.
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Service prices up 2.7% year on year
The prices of services (total) increased by 2.7% in September 2026 on September 2025. The rise in service prices therefore slowed again slightly and was below the level of overall inflation. Year on year, particularly sharp price increases were registered for social protection services (+6.3%), the maintenance and repair of vehicles (+4.7%) and hairdresser services and other services for personal care (+4.3%). Package holidays (+3.8%) and water supply and miscellaneous services relating to the dwelling (+3.7%) were also substantially more expensive in September 2026 than a year earlier. Net rents exclusive of heating expenses (+1.9% on the same month of the previous year) continued to be a significant factor contributing to the overall development of prices in September 2026. The prices of other services such as telecommunications services (+0.2%) only registered a slight increase compared with a year earlier.
Prices (total) up 0.6% month on month, energy up 3.8%
Compared with August 2026, the overall consumer price index rose by 0.6% in September 2026. Energy prices increased by 3.8% month on month, with consumers paying more, in particular, for heating oil (+18.5%) and motor fuels (+6.9%, including diesel fuel: +7.5%; supergrade petrol: +6.7%). Month-on-month price increases were also observed for clothing (+5.6%) mainly due to seasonal factors.
Food prices (total) were up month on month (+0.4%, including vegetables: +3.5%, but meat and meat products: -0.5%). International flights (-7.3%) and package international holidays (-4.2%), for example, were considerably less expensive than in the previous month.
Methodological notes:
The harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) is calculated in addition to the national consumer price index (CPI) particularly to enable comparisons within the euro area. The HICP is the key measure for quantifying price stability within the framework of European monetary policy and is generally derived from the same data material on which the national CPI is based.
Apart from the individual purposes they serve, the CPI and the HICP differ in terms of coverage, methodology and weighting.
With effect from January 2026, substantial changes have been made to the HICP with regard to methodology and the classification used. Furthermore, the HICP result uses 2025 as the index base (2025=100) as of reference month January 2026. Up-to-date information on the changes concerning the HICP is provided in a web article on the "Consumer price index" page of the website of the Federal Statistical Office. Explanatory notes and a methodological paper are also available there.
Consumer price index for Germany September 2026
Overall index / subindex
+
Weighting
+
Change on
+same
+period of
+previous year
+Change on
+the previous
+month
Index
+2020=100
+
in per mill
+
%
1: Core inflation
Overall index
1,000.00
126.6
3.3
0.6
Food and non-alcoholic-beverages
119.04
137.2
0.3
0.4
Food
104.69
136.6
0.4
0.4
Non-alcoholic beverages
14.35
141.1
-0.5
-0.1
Alcoholic beverages and tobacco
35.26
132.2
3.8
0.2
Clothing and footwear
42.25
112.3
0.5
4.8
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels
259.25
120.0
1.9
0.3
Actual net rent exclusive of heating expenses
68.30
113.0
2.3
0.2
Imputed net rent exclusive of heating expenses
104.13
111.3
1.8
0.1
Household energy
43.44
147.4
0.5
1.2
Electricity
24.50
117.8
-5.5
0.0
Furniture, lighting equipment, appliances and other household equipment
Detailed results can be found in the tables on the consumer price index (61111-0004) and (61111-0006) and on the harmonised index of consumer prices (61121-0002) and (61121-0006) in the GENESIS-Online database. Special items shown in Tables 61111-0006 and 61121-0006 contain CPI and HICP results which are used to measure "core inflation".
Eurostat, the Statistical Office of the European Union, has released provisional results on Euro area inflation for September 2026 (available on Eurostat’s website under News > Euro indicators).
CPI results can also be found on the "Economic Dashboard" (www.dashboard-konjunktur.de) (only in German). In this data portal, the Federal Statistical Office brings together up-to-date indicators from official statistics producers and other data providers on the topics of the economy, finance, the labour market, construction and energy.
Data on the war in the Middle East and its consequences are provided on a special page (www.destatis.de/nahost) (only in German) on the website of the Federal Statistical Office. This page includes information on energy supply and the development of energy prices, air and maritime transport, and foreign trade with the region.
Consumers can use the Personal Inflation Calculator of the Federal Statistical Office to adapt their monthly consumption expenditure on individual product groups according to their own consumption patterns and calculate their personal inflation rate. In addition, the Price Kaleidoscope gives an overview of the price trend and the weights of various products.
Gross domestic product (GDP), 2nd quarter of 2026
++0.2% on the previous quarter (price, seasonally and calendar adjusted)
++0.9% on the same quarter a year earlier (price adjusted)
++0.9% on the same quarter a year earlier (price and calendar adjusted)
WIESBADEN – The gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 0.2% in the second quarter of 2026 compared with the first quarter of 2026 - following adjustment for price, seasonal and calendar variations - after already increasing at the start of 2026 (by a revised +0.4% in the first quarter of 2026 compared with the previous quarter; previously: +0.3%). The Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) also reports that exports were up compared with the previous quarter, after adjustment for price, seasonal and calendar variations. According to the provisional figures, final consumption expenditure showed a subdued trend, while capital formation declined.
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Gross domestic product up year on year
GDP in the second quarter of 2026 increased by a price adjusted 0.9% compared with the second quarter of 2025. After price and calendar adjustment, the increase also amounted to 0.9%, as the number of working days in the seconnd quarter 2026 was the same as in the same quarter a year earlier.
Revision of previous results back to the year 2011
As is usual at this time of the year, the Federal Statistical Office also reviewed the results published for the previous four years (2022 to 2025) and included new statistical information in the calculation of the results. The change rate of price adjusted GDP for the years 2022 and 2023 changed only slightly as a result of this year's summer revision (0.1 percentage points higher and 0.1 percentage points lower, respectively). The revision for 2024, however, was much more pronounced. While a drop in economic performance of 0.5% had previously been reported, current results indicate that economic performance stagnated in 2024 (0.0%). This revision was due in particular to new information from structural business statistics. This information only becomes available 18 months after the end of the reporting year and provides detailed data on turnover, investments and, above all, the cost structure of businesses for the first time. The GDP change rate for the year 2025 remained unchanged at +0.2%. Data on the recalculations are shown in the table comparing new and old figures at the end of this press release. The Federal Statistical Office will provide further information on these revisions with the publication of detailed results on the gross domestic product in the second quarter of 2026, which is scheduled for 25 August 2026.
Departing from the usual procedure, the results for the years 2011 to 2021 were also revised. The reason for this revision was that key data sources, and findings derived from them, were incorporated into the calculations and the results were recalculated back to the 2011 reporting year. This concerns the average rents for rented dwellings, as calculated from the results of the 2022 Census of Buildings and Housing. Furthermore, direct purchases of domestic households abroad are now captured more comprehensively thanks to new data which have become available. As a result, the annual change rates of price adjusted GDP for the years 2011 to 2021 are up to 0.1 percentage points higher than previously indicated (see the table comparing new and old figures at the end of this press release). Overall, GDP growth in the period from 2011 to 2021 was therefore 0.8 percentage points higher. The Federal Statistical Office will also provide more detailed information on these revisions in its press release on 25 August 2026.
1a: Change on the previous year or on the same quarter of the previous year in %.
+2a: Change on the previous year or on the previous quarter in %.
+3a: For full years, the calendar adjusted values are equal to the seasonally and calendar adjusted values (except for rounding discrepancies).
+qtr = quarter
2011
2,747.21
5.0
92.08
3.8
91.94
3.8
3.8
2012
2,800.68
1.9
92.54
0.5
92.59
0.7
0.7
2013
2,869.48
2.5
92.97
0.5
93.12
0.6
0.6
2014
2,988.47
4.1
95.05
2.2
95.20
2.2
2.2
2015
3,094.19
3.5
96.74
1.8
96.65
1.5
1.5
2016
3,204.87
3.6
98.95
2.3
98.78
2.2
2.2
2017
3,345.86
4.4
101.82
2.9
101.93
3.2
3.2
2018
3,450.58
3.1
103.08
1.2
103.23
1.3
1.3
2019
3,557.63
3.1
104.20
1.1
104.38
1.1
1.1
2020
3,477.67
-2.2
100.00
-4.0
99.79
-4.4
-4.4
2021
3,713.09
6.8
103.96
4.0
103.69
3.9
3.9
2022
4,010.63
8.0
105.90
1.9
105.71
1.9
1.9
2023
4,254.93
6.1
104.83
-1.0
104.85
-0.8
-0.8
2024
4,386.94
3.1
104.83
0.0
104.89
0.0
0.0
2025
4,529.71
3.3
105.07
0.2
105.25
0.3
0.3
2022
1st qtr
979.74
9.4
106.04
4.1
105.53
0.8
3.8
2nd qtr
979.68
8.6
104.08
1.6
105.66
0.1
1.5
3rd qtr
1,010.10
7.3
106.36
1.7
106.00
0.3
1.8
4th qtr
1,041.11
6.9
107.13
0.3
105.65
-0.3
0.8
2023
1st qtr
1,052.72
7.4
105.84
-0.2
104.93
-0.7
-0.5
2nd qtr
1,037.88
5.9
102.72
-1.3
104.82
-0.1
-0.8
3rd qtr
1,066.02
5.5
104.89
-1.4
104.98
0.2
-0.9
4th qtr
1,098.31
5.5
105.85
-1.2
104.66
-0.3
-1.0
2024
1st qtr
1,085.49
3.1
105.09
-0.7
104.88
0.2
0.0
2nd qtr
1,076.24
3.7
103.03
0.3
104.74
-0.1
-0.1
3rd qtr
1,099.19
3.1
105.23
0.3
104.85
0.1
-0.1
4th qtr
1,126.02
2.5
105.98
0.1
105.08
0.2
0.3
2025
1st qtr
1,116.18
2.8
105.19
0.1
105.21
0.1
0.4
2nd qtr
1,108.89
3.0
103.06
0.0
105.19
0.0
0.4
3rd qtr
1,136.71
3.4
105.56
0.3
105.16
0.0
0.3
4th qtr
1,167.93
3.7
106.48
0.5
105.44
0.3
0.3
2026
1st qtr
1,155.37
3.5
106.03
0.8
105.89
0.4
0.7
2nd qtr
1,151.12
3.8
103.98
0.9
106.13
0.2
0.9
Comparison between new and old figures - gross domestic product, price adjusted
Unadjusted figures
Figures adjusted for seasonal and calendar effects using X13 1b
1b: For full years, the calendar adjusted values are equal to the seasonally and calendar adjusted values (except for rounding discrepancies).
+2b: Change on the previous year or on the same quarter of the previous year in %.
+3b: Change on the previous year or on the previous quarter in %.
+qtr = quarter
2011
3.8
3.8
0.0
3.8
3.8
0.0
2012
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.7
0.6
0.1
2013
0.5
0.4
0.1
0.6
0.5
0.1
2014
2.2
2.2
0.0
2.2
2.2
0.0
2015
1.8
1.7
0.1
1.5
1.4
0.1
2016
2.3
2.2
0.1
2.2
2.1
0.1
2017
2.9
2.8
0.1
3.2
3.1
0.1
2018
1.2
1.1
0.1
1.3
1.1
0.2
2019
1.1
1.0
0.1
1.1
1.0
0.1
2020
-4.0
-4.1
0.1
-4.4
-4.5
0.1
2021
4.0
3.9
0.1
3.9
3.9
0.0
2022
1.9
1.8
0.1
1.9
1.9
0.0
2023
-1.0
-0.9
-0.1
-0.8
-0.7
-0.1
2024
0.0
-0.5
0.5
0.0
-0.5
0.5
2025
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.0
2022
1st qtr
4.1
4.0
0.1
0.8
0.7
0.1
2nd qtr
1.6
1.5
0.1
0.1
0.2
-0.1
3rd qtr
1.7
1.6
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.0
4th qtr
0.3
0.2
0.1
-0.3
-0.3
0.0
2023
1st qtr
-0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.7
-0.5
-0.2
2nd qtr
-1.3
-1.1
-0.2
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
3rd qtr
-1.4
-1.3
-0.1
0.2
0.0
0.2
4th qtr
-1.2
-1.0
-0.2
-0.3
-0.3
0.0
2024
1st qtr
-0.7
-1.1
0.4
0.2
-0.1
0.3
2nd qtr
0.3
-0.3
0.6
-0.1
-0.3
0.2
3rd qtr
0.3
-0.2
0.5
0.1
0.0
0.1
4th qtr
0.1
-0.4
0.5
0.2
0.2
0.0
2025
1st qtr
0.1
0.1
0.0
0.1
0.4
-0.3
2nd qtr
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
-0.2
0.2
3rd qtr
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
4th qtr
0.5
0.5
0.0
0.3
0.2
0.1
2026
1st qtr
0.8
0.5
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.1
2nd qtr
0.9
x
x
0.2
x
x
Methodological notes:
The differing comparative periods must be taken into account in all press releases on short-term indicators. Short-term economic monitoring focuses on comparisons of seasonally and calendar adjusted figures with those of the previous month or quarter. These reflect short-term economic trends. Year-on-year comparisons enable long-term comparisons of levels and are largely independent of seasonal fluctuations.
More information:
A long time series containing quarterly results on the gross domestic product since the first quarter of 1970 is available in the "Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen” (only in German) statistical report.
The GDP can also be found on the "Economic Dashboard" (www.dashboard-konjunktur.de) (only in German). In this data portal, the Federal Statistical Office brings together high-frequency indicators from official statistics producers and other data providers on the topics of the economy, finance, the labour market, construction and energy.
Persons in employment resident in Germany, August 2026
+-0.1% on the previous month (seasonally adjusted)
+-0.2% on the previous month (not seasonally adjusted)
+-0.5% on the same month a year earlier
WIESBADEN – Roughly 45.41 million persons resident in Germany (national concept) were in employment in August 2026, according to results of the employment accounts. According to provisional calculations of the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), the seasonally adjusted number of persons in employment therefore fell by 29,000 (-0.1%) compared with the previous month. In the period from January to July 2026, employment decreased by an average of 20,000 people month on month.
+ Loading...
Without seasonal adjustment, the number of persons in employment in August 2026 was down by 69,000 (-0.2%) compared with July 2026. In the August average for the years 2023 to 2025, employment decreased by 38,000 people (-0.1%) compared with the previous month.
Year-on-year decline in employment continues
Compared with August 2025, the number of persons in employment in August 2026 was down by 235,000 (-0.5%). The downward trend in the year-on-year labour market figures, which has been observed since January 2025, therefore continued. Compared with the same month a year earlier, the rate of change was ‑0.4% in the months from January to April 2026, and stood at -0.5% in May, June and July 2026.
Adjusted unemployment rate at 4.0% in August 2026
According to results of the labour force survey, 1.86 million people were unemployed in August 2026. This was an increase of 120,000, or 6.9%, compared with August 2025. At 4.3%, the unemployment rate was higher than a year earlier (August 2025: 3.9%).
Adjusted for seasonal and irregular effects, the number of unemployed stood at 1.76 million in August 2026, an increase of 9,000, or 0.5%, compared with July 2026. The adjusted unemployment rate remained unchanged from the previous month at 4.0%. Previously, the rate had last been at this level in June 2016.
Methodological notes:
The differing comparative periods must be taken into account in all press releases on short-term indicators: Short-term economic monitoring focuses on seasonally adjusted comparisons with the previous month or quarter. These reflect short-term economic trends. Year-on-year comparisons, by contrast, enable long-term comparisons of levels and are largely unaffected by seasonal fluctuations.
Seasonally adjusted figures facilitate comparisons across consecutive months, without regular seasonal effects, such as typical seasonal weather conditions, distorting the overall picture. By contrast, results that have not been seasonally adjusted present the actual development in the reference month.
Monthly employment results are based on the national concept, which counts persons in employment who are resident in Germany, regardless of whether they work in Germany or abroad.
The figures on employment and unemployment presented in this press release come from different statistical sources. The employment figures are derived from the results of the employment accounts, while the figures on unemployment are based on the labour force survey, which is incorporated into the microcensus. Any differences can primarily be attributed to the methods and procedures applied in the statistics and, to some extent, to differing definitions and delimitations. Background information on this is available in the explanatory notes (only in German) on the relevant statistics.
Persons in employment and unemployed persons are counted according to the employment status concept of the International Labour Organization (ILO). According to this concept, persons in employment are all persons who worked for pay or in a self-employed capacity for at least one hour in the reference period. Unemployed persons are defined as those who are not in employment, are actively seeking employment and are currently available for work. Therefore, the unemployment figures shown here differ from registered unemployment as determined and published by the Federal Employment Agency in accordance with the German Social Code. In the European Statistical System, the results of the labour force surveys are used as a standard basis for calculating unemployment rates.
More information:
A table containing monthly results on the number of persons in employment (unadjusted values and seasonally adjusted values) from the employment accounts is shown on the "Employment" page of the Federal Statistical Office’s website. Tables with unemployment results (only in German) from the labour force survey including the unemployment rate are also available on this page. Detailed data and long time series are provided in the GENESIS-Online database. Data on persons in employment from the employment accounts are available in tables 13321-0001 (months), 13321-0002 (quarters) and 81000-0011 (years). Monthly data on persons in employment and unemployed persons from the labour force survey can be found in tables 13231-0001 (overview), 13231-0002 (unemployed persons, persons in employment and economically active population) and 13231-0003 (unemployment rates).
Labour market results can also be found on the "Economic Dashboard" (www.dashboard-konjunktur.de) (only in German). In this data portal, the Federal Statistical Office brings together high-frequency indicators from official statistics producers and other data providers on the topics of the economy, finance, the labour market, construction and energy.
A special webpage of the Federal Statistical Office combines facts and figures on the subject of skilled labour (www.destatis.de/fachkraefte) (only in German). It provides data on demography, employment, education and immigration. The information offered ranges from projections of the future size of the labour force to analyses of the labour supply and data on labour migration and the vocational training market. New information is added continually.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/destatis_feed.xml b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/destatis_feed.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7c8ea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/destatis_feed.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+
+
+ Statistisches Bundesamt
+ https://www.destatis.de
+ RSS-Newsfeed des Statistischen Bundesamtes
+ de-de
+ Statistisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden 2019
+
+ https://www.destatis.de/SiteGlobals/Frontend/Images/logo.png?__blob=normal
+ https://www.destatis.de
+ Statistisches Bundesamt
+
+ web-admin@destatis.de (Web-Administrator)
+ Newspapers
+ Government Site Builder
+ 60
+
+ Auftragseingang im Bauhauptgewerbe im August 2026: +23,0 % zum Vormonat
+
+ https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/10/PD26_375_441.html
+ Fri, 23 Oct 2026 08:00:00 +0200
+ Der reale (preisbereinigte) Auftragseingang im Bauhauptgewerbe ist im August 2026 gegenüber Juli 2026 kalender- und saisonbereinigt um 23,0 % gestiegen. Bedingt durch mehrere Großaufträge war dies der höchste saisonbereinigte Anstieg zum Vormonat im Bauhauptgewerbe seit Beginn der Zeitreihe im Jahr 1991. Wie das Statistische Bundesamt (Destatis) weiter mitteilt, nahm der Auftragseingang im Hochbau um 12,4 % und im Tiefbau um 31,6 % zu. Im weniger volatilen Dreimonatsvergleich war der kalender- und saisonbereinigte Auftragseingang von Juni 2026 bis August 2026 um 7,6 % höher als in den drei Monaten zuvor (Hochbau: +0,6 %; Tiefbau: +13,8 %)
+
+
+
+ Deutschland importierte im 1. Halbjahr 2026 gut 96 % weniger Waren aus Russland als im 1. Halbjahr 2021
+
+ https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/10/PD26_N072_51_46.html
+ Wed, 21 Oct 2026 08:00:00 +0200
+ Der deutsch-russische Austausch hat seit dem Beginn des Angriffs Russlands auf die Ukraine im Februar 2022 in vielerlei Hinsicht deutlich abgenommen. Im 1. Halbjahr 2026 hat Deutschland 96,4 % weniger Waren aus der Russischen Föderation importiert als im 1. Halbjahr 2021, dem Vergleichszeitraum vor Kriegsausbruch. Im 1. Halbjahr 2026 wurden Waren im Wert von gut 0,5 Milliarden Euro aus Russland importiert, wie das Statistische Bundesamt (Destatis) mitteilt. Im 1. Halbjahr 2021 beliefen sich die Importe von dort noch auf 15,0 Milliarden Euro. Auch die Exporte nach Russland sind deutlich gesunken: Mit -73,1 % fiel der Rückgang im selben Zeitraum jedoch weniger stark aus als bei den Importen. Deutschland exportierte im zurückliegenden Halbjahr Waren im Wert von 3,4 Milliarden Euro nach Russland. Im 1. Halbjahr 2021 waren es noch gut 12,7 Milliarden Euro.
+
+
+
+ Erzeugerpreise im September 2026: +6,7 % gegenüber September 2025
+
+ https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/10/PD26_373_61241.html
+ Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:00:00 +0200
+ Die Erzeugerpreise gewerblicher Produkte waren im September 2026 um 6,7 % höher als im September 2025. Das war der stärkste Anstieg gegenüber dem Vorjahresmonat seit März 2023 (+7,5 %). Wie das Statistische Bundesamt (Destatis) weiter mitteilt, stiegen die Erzeugerpreise im September 2026 gegenüber dem Vormonat August 2026 um 1,9 %.
+
+
+
+ Rohöl im Wert von 30,0 Milliarden Euro im Zeitraum Januar bis August 2026 importiert
+
+ https://www.destatis.de/DE/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2026/10/PD26_372_51.html
+ Tue, 20 Oct 2026 08:00:00 +0200
+ Im Zeitraum Januar bis August 2026 wurden 49,1 Millionen Tonnen Rohöl im Wert von 30,0 Milliarden Euro nach Deutschland importiert. Im Vorjahreszeitraum 2025 betrug der Import von Rohöl 49,4 Millionen Tonnen im Wert von 24,6 Milliarden Euro. Wie das Statistische Bundesamt (Destatis) weiter mitteilt, nahm der Import damit mengenmäßig um 0,6 % ab, während er wertmäßig um 21,7 % stieg. Grund dafür waren die Preissteigerungen bei Rohöl im Zuge der Konflikte im Nahen Osten.
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/destatis_schedule.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/destatis_schedule.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe3e014
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/destatis_schedule.html
@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+
+
+
+
Preliminary consumer price index
+ — (incl. preliminary harmonised index of consumer prices)
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_cpi.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_cpi.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b9d131
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_cpi.html
@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+
+
+ Euro indicators
+
+ 16 October 2026
+
+ Next release: 18 November 2026
+
+ September 2026
+
+ Annual inflation up to 3.8% in the euro area
+
+
The euro area annual inflation rate was 3.8% in September 2026, up from 3.2% in August. A year earlier, the rate was 2.2%. EuropeanUnion annual inflation was 3.8% in September 2026, up from 3.2% in August. A year earlier, the rate was 2.6%. These figures are published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.
The lowest annual rates were registered in Sweden (1.0%), Hungary and Denmark (both 2.1%). The highest annual rates were recorded in Romania (6.5%), Lithuania (6.1%) and Bulgaria (5.6%). Compared with August 2026, annual inflation fell in one Member State, remained stable in three and rose in twenty-three.
In September 2026, energy (+1.71 percentage points, pp), services (+1.52 percentage points, pp), non-energy industrial goods (+0.29 percentage points, pp) and food, alcohol & tobacco (+0.25 percentage points, pp) contributed positively to the annual euro area inflation rate.
The next flash estimate of euro area inflation with data for October 2026 is scheduled for 4 November 2026.
Annual inflation is the price change of consumer goods and services between the current month and the same month of the previous year. Monthly inflation is the price change between the current month and the previous month.
A contribution shows how much of the annual inflation rate comes from a particular component of the HICP. The contributions are calculated according to a method which ensures their additivity (allowing for rounding).
Up to December 31, 2025, the euro area included Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland (EA20). From 1 January 2026, the euro area also includes Bulgaria (EA21).
The European Union includes Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden (EU27).
The aggregate data series published in this Euro indicator release refer to the evolving composition of the euro area and the European Union. Thus, Euro indicator data for months up to December 2025 represent EA20 series, while Euro indicator data for January 2026 onwards represent EA21 series. Changes in the composition of the euro area are incorporated using a chain index formula.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_flash.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_flash.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91b86c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_flash.html
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
+
+
+ Euro indicators
+
+ 2 October 2026
+
+ Next release: 4 November 2026
+
+ Flash estimate - September 2026
+
+ Euro area annual inflation up to 3.8%
+
+
Euro area annual inflation is expected to be 3.8% in September 2026, up from 3.2% in August according to a flash estimate from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.
Looking at the main components of euro area inflation, energy is expected to have the highest annual rate in September (18.8%, compared with 14.3% in August), followed by services (3.2%, compared with 3.0% in August), food, alcohol & tobacco (1.4%, compared with 1.1% in August) and non-energy industrial goods (1.1%, compared with 1.2% in August).
The euro area inflation flash estimate is issued at the end of each reference month.
The complete set of harmonised indices of consumer prices (HICP) for the euro area, EU and Member States is released around the middle of the month following the reference month.
The next release with full data for September 2026 is scheduled for 16 October 2026.
Annual inflation is the price change of consumer goods and services between the current month and the same month of the previous year. Monthly inflation is the price change between the current month and the previous month.
Up to December 31, 2025, the euro area included Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland (EA20). From 1 January 2026, the euro area also includes Bulgaria (EA21).
The aggregate data series published in this Euro indicator release refer to the evolving composition of the euro area. Thus, Euro indicator data for months up to December 2025 represent EA20 series, while Euro indicator data for January 2026 onwards represent EA21 series. Changes in the composition of the euro area are incorporated using a chain index formula.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b38dfc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+
+
+ Euro indicators
+
+ 30 July 2026
+
+ Next release: 30 October 2026
+
+ Preliminary flash estimate for the second quarter of 2026
+
+ GDP up by 0.4% in the euro area and by 0.5% in the EU
+
+
In the second quarter of 2026, seasonally adjusted GDP increased by 0.4% in the euro area and by 0.5% in the EU, compared with the previous quarter, according to a preliminary flash estimate published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. In the first quarter of 2026, GDP had remained stable in the euro area and had increased by 0.1% in the EU.
These preliminary GDP flash estimates are based on data sources that are incomplete and subject to further revisions.
Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, seasonally adjusted GDP increased by 1.0% in the euro area and by 1.2% in the EU in the second quarter of 2026, after +0.5% in the euro area and +0.8% in the EU in the previous quarter.
Among the Member States for which data are available for the second quarter of 2026, Ireland (+3.9%) recorded the highest increase compared to the previous quarter, followed by Lithuania (+1.7%) and Sweden (+1.4%). The lowest growth rates were recorded in Belgium and Austria (both 0.0%). The year-on-year growth rate was positive for fourteen countries and negative for one country.
+
+
+
Growth rates of GDP in volume
(based on seasonally adjusted* data)
+
+
+
+
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter
+
Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year
+
+
+
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
+
+
Euro area
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
0.4
+
1.2
+
1.1
+
0.5
+
1.0
+
+
+
EU
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
1.5
+
1.3
+
0.8
+
1.2
+
+
+
Belgium
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
1.0
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
0.5
+
+
+
Czechia
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.2
+
0.4
+
2.8
+
2.8
+
2.2
+
2.0
+
+
+
Germany
+
0.0
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
+
+
Estonia
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
1.1
+
0.4
+
1.0
+
1.2
+
2.4
+
2.1
+
+
+
Ireland***
+
1.3
+
-3.6
+
-7.0
+
3.9
+
5.2
+
-0.2
+
-13.2
+
-5.6
+
+
+
Spain
+
0.6
+
0.8
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
+
+
France
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
-0.1
+
0.2
+
0.8
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
0.7
+
+
+
Italy
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.7
+
0.8
+
0.8
+
1.0
+
+
+
Lithuania
+
0.3
+
1.9
+
-0.1
+
1.7
+
2.2
+
3.3
+
2.8
+
3.8
+
+
+
Hungary
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
1.7
+
1.6
+
+
+
Netherlands**
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
1.4
+
1.6
+
1.4
+
1.3
+
+
+
Austria
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
1.3
+
1.1
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
+
+
Portugal
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
0.8
+
2.2
+
1.9
+
2.4
+
2.5
+
+
+
Finland**
+
-0.1
+
0.5
+
0.9
+
0.9
+
0.4
+
0.6
+
1.3
+
2.5
+
+
+
Sweden**
+
0.5
+
0.9
+
0.0
+
1.4
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
2.0
+
2.8
+
+
+
: Data not available
* Growth rates to the previous quarter and to the same quarter of the previous year presented in this table are both based on seasonally and calendar adjusted figures, except where indicated. Unadjusted data are not available for all Member States which are included in GDP flash estimates.
** Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year calculated from calendar adjusted data.
*** Irish GDP flash estimate is categorised as a CSO Frontier Series Output. Particular care must be taken when interpreting the statistics as it may use new methods which are under development and/or data sources which may be incomplete, for example new administrative data sources.
The next estimates for the second quarter of 2026 will be released on 14 August 2026.
Revisionsof quarterly GDP estimates are continuously monitored. Further information can be found on Eurostat website.
With this preliminary flash estimate, euro area and EU GDP figures for earlier quarters are not revised.
All figures presented in this release may be revised with the GDP t+45 flash estimate scheduled for 14 August 2026 and subsequently by Eurostat’s regular estimates of GDP and main aggregates (including employment) scheduled for 7 September 2026 and 20 October 2026.
The preliminary flash estimate of GDP growth for the second quarter of 2026 presented in this release is based on the data of 19 Member States, covering 96% of euro area GDP and 94% of EU GDP.
Comprehensive estimates of European main aggregates (including GDP and employment) are based on countries regular transmissions and published around 65 and 110 days after the end of each quarter. To improve the timeliness of key indicators, Eurostat also publishes flash estimates for GDP (after around 30 and 45 days) and employment (after around 45 days). Their compilation is based on estimates provided by EU Member States on a voluntary basis.
This news release presents preliminary flash estimates for euro area and EU after around 30 days.
European quarterly national accounts are compiled in accordance with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010).
Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices measures the production activity of resident production units. Growth rates are based on chain-linked volumes.
The method used for compilation of European GDP is the same as for previous releases.
Euro area (EA21): Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
European Union (EU 27): Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp_final.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp_final.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dbe508e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp_final.html
@@ -0,0 +1,1228 @@
+
+
+ Euro indicators
+
+ 7 September 2026
+
+ Next release: 7 December 2026
+
+ GDP main components and employment estimates for the second quarter of 2026
+
+ GDP up by 0.6% and employment up by 0.1% in the euro area
+
+
In the second quarter of 2026, seasonally adjusted GDP increased by 0.6% in the euro area and by 0.7% in the EU, compared with the previous quarter, according to an estimate published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. In the first quarter of 2026, GDP had remained stable in the euro area and had increased by 0.1% in the EU.
Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, seasonally adjusted GDP increased by 1.2% in the euro area and by 1.4% in the EU in the second quarter of 2026, after +0.6% in the euro area and +0.9% in the EU in the previous quarter.
During the second quarter of 2026, GDP in the United States increased by 0.4% compared to the previous quarter (after +0.5% in the first quarter of 2026). Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, GDP increased by 2.1% (after +2.7% in the previous quarter).
In the second quarter of 2026, Ireland (+10.2%) recorded the highest increase compared to the previous quarter, followed by Slovenia (+1.8%) and Lithuania (+1.7%). Austria (-0.1%) was the only Member State that recorded a decrease compared to the previous quarter.
In the second quarter of 2026, the contribution to GDP growth to the previous quarter from:
household final consumption expenditure was positive for both the euro area and the EU (+0.2 percentage points – pp for both),
government final consumption expenditure was negligible for both the euro area and the EU,
gross fixed capital formation was negligible for the euro area and positive for the EU (+0.1 pp),
changes in inventories was negative for the euro area and the EU (-0.5 pp for both), and
exports less imports was positive for both the euro area (+0.9 pp) and the EU (+0.8 pp).
Based on seasonally adjusted figures, Eurostat estimates that, in the second quarter of 2026, 221.4 million people were employed in the EU, of which 176.4 million were in the euro area.
The number of employed persons increased by 0.1% in both the euro area and the EU, compared with the previous quarter. In the first quarter of 2026, employment had increased by 0.1% in the euro area and had remained stable in the EU.
Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, employment increased by 0.5% in the euro area and by 0.4% in the EU in the second quarter of 2026, after +0.5% in both areas in the first quarter of 2026.
Hours worked increased by 0.1% in both the euro area and the EU in the second quarter of 2026, compared with the previous quarter. Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, hours worked increased by 0.7% in the euro area and by 0.8% in the EU.
These data provide a picture of labour input consistent with the output and income measure of national accounts.
In the second quarter of 2026, Portugal (+1.0%), Czechia and Malta (both +0.9%) recorded the highest increase of employment in persons compared to the previous quarter. The highest declines of employment were recorded in Finland (-0.8%) and Greece (-0.4%).
+
+
+
Growth rates of GDP in volume
(based on seasonally adjusted* data)
+
+
+
+
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter
+
Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year
+
+
+
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
+
+
Euro area
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
0.6
+
1.2
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
1.2
+
+
+
EU
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
0.7
+
1.4
+
1.3
+
0.9
+
1.4
+
+
+
Belgium
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
1.0
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
0.5
+
+
+
Bulgaria
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
3.1
+
2.9
+
3.0
+
2.8
+
+
+
Czechia
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.2
+
0.4
+
2.8
+
2.8
+
2.2
+
1.9
+
+
+
Denmark
+
2.3
+
0.4
+
1.5
+
0.3
+
4.6
+
3.2
+
6.1
+
4.6
+
+
+
Germany
+
0.0
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.7
+
1.0
+
+
+
Estonia
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
1.0
+
0.3
+
1.5
+
1.6
+
2.7
+
1.8
+
+
+
Ireland
+
1.4
+
-3.3
+
-7.8
+
10.2
+
5.1
+
-0.1
+
-13.4
+
-0.4
+
+
+
Greece
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
2.1
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
1.9
+
+
+
Spain
+
0.6
+
0.8
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
+
+
France
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
-0.2
+
0.0
+
0.8
+
1.1
+
0.7
+
0.5
+
+
+
Croatia
+
0.3
+
1.2
+
-0.1
+
0.4
+
2.9
+
3.4
+
2.3
+
1.7
+
+
+
Italy
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.7
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
1.0
+
+
+
Cyprus
+
0.8
+
1.2
+
0.5
+
0.8
+
3.5
+
4.2
+
3.0
+
3.3
+
+
+
Latvia
+
0.9
+
0.7
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
2.3
+
2.7
+
2.6
+
3.0
+
+
+
Lithuania
+
0.3
+
1.9
+
-0.1
+
1.7
+
2.2
+
3.3
+
2.8
+
3.8
+
+
+
Luxembourg
+
1.2
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
:
+
3.2
+
2.1
+
1.6
+
:
+
+
+
Hungary
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.8
+
0.5
+
0.8
+
0.8
+
1.8
+
1.7
+
+
+
Malta
+
1.5
+
1.8
+
0.5
+
1.1
+
4.7
+
6.2
+
4.6
+
5.0
+
+
+
Netherlands**
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
1.4
+
1.6
+
1.4
+
1.3
+
+
+
Austria
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
-0.1
+
1.3
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
Poland
+
1.1
+
1.0
+
0.6
+
1.0
+
4.1
+
3.8
+
3.5
+
3.8
+
+
+
Portugal
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
0.8
+
2.2
+
1.9
+
2.4
+
2.5
+
+
+
Romania
+
0.0
+
-1.9
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
1.4
+
-1.4
+
-1.1
+
-2.0
+
+
+
Slovenia
+
1.2
+
0.7
+
1.1
+
1.8
+
1.7
+
1.7
+
3.5
+
4.8
+
+
+
Slovakia
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
0.9
+
0.9
+
+
+
Finland**
+
0.0
+
0.4
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
1.2
+
1.6
+
+
+
Sweden**
+
0.6
+
1.1
+
-0.1
+
1.6
+
2.2
+
2.2
+
2.0
+
3.3
+
+
+
Iceland
+
0.7
+
-0.9
+
3.7
+
-3.0
+
1.0
+
2.3
+
3.7
+
0.3
+
+
+
Norway
+
1.2
+
-0.6
+
0.4
+
0.7
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
1.9
+
1.6
+
+
+
Switzerland
+
-0.4
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
1.9
+
0.9
+
1.0
+
0.7
+
2.6
+
+
+
United States
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
2.7
+
2.1
+
+
+
: Data not available
* Growth rates to the previous quarter and to the same quarter of the previous year presented in this table are both based on seasonally and calendar adjusted figures, except where indicated. Unadjusted data are not available for all Member States which are included in GDP flash estimates.
** Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year calculated from calendar adjusted data.
GDP and expenditure components seasonally adjusted, chain-linked volumes
+
+
+
+
+
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter
+
Percentage change compared with the same quarter of
the previous year
+
+
+
+
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
+
+
GDP
+
2025 Q3
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
1.2
+
1.4
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
1.1
+
1.3
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.0
+
0.1
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
1.2
+
1.4
+
+
+
Household & NPISH final consumption expenditure
+
2025 Q3
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
1.3
+
1.5
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
1.2
+
1.4
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
1.0
+
1.1
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
1.2
+
1.2
+
+
+
Government final consumption expenditure
+
2025 Q3
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
1.4
+
1.6
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
1.6
+
1.8
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.5
+
0.5
+
2.3
+
2.6
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
1.9
+
2.0
+
+
+
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
+
2025 Q3
+
1.0
+
1.2
+
3.0
+
3.0
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.7
+
0.9
+
2.9
+
2.8
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
-0.2
+
-0.3
+
0.3
+
0.7
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
-0.1
+
0.5
+
1.4
+
2.3
+
+
+
Exports
+
2025 Q3
+
0.6
+
0.8
+
2.3
+
2.7
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.4
+
0.5
+
2.2
+
2.6
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
-0.6
+
-0.3
+
-0.1
+
0.7
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
3.4
+
3.2
+
3.9
+
4.2
+
+
+
Imports
+
2025 Q3
+
1.1
+
1.1
+
3.6
+
3.7
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
3.6
+
3.6
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
1.9
+
2.4
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
1.5
+
1.6
+
3.6
+
3.9
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Contribution of expenditure components to change of GDP
seasonally adjusted, chain-linked volumes
+
+
+
+
Contribution in percentage points to GDP change compared with the previous quarter
+
Contribution in percentage points to GDP change compared with the same quarter of the previous year
+
+
+
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
+
+
Household & NPISH final consumption expenditure
+
2025 Q3
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.7
+
0.8
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
+
+
Government final consumption expenditure
+
2025 Q3
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
+
+
Gross Fixed Capital Formation
+
2025 Q3
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.6
+
0.6
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.6
+
0.6
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.0
+
-0.1
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
0.0
+
0.1
+
0.3
+
0.5
+
+
+
Changes in Inventories*
+
2025 Q3
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
-0.4
+
-0.4
+
0.0
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
-0.5
+
-0.5
+
-0.4
+
-0.5
+
+
+
Exports
+
2025 Q3
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
1.1
+
1.4
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
1.1
+
1.3
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
-0.3
+
-0.1
+
-0.1
+
0.4
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
1.6
+
1.6
+
1.9
+
2.1
+
+
+
Imports
+
2025 Q3
+
-0.5
+
-0.5
+
-1.6
+
-1.7
+
+
+
2025 Q4
+
-0.2
+
-0.2
+
-1.6
+
-1.7
+
+
+
2026 Q1
+
-0.3
+
-0.3
+
-0.8
+
-1.1
+
+
+
2026 Q2
+
-0.7
+
-0.7
+
-1.6
+
-1.8
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Growth rates of employment in persons*
+
+
+
+
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter
+
Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year
+
+
+
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
+
+
Euro area
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
0.5
+
0.5
+
+
+
EU
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
+
+
Belgium
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
Bulgaria
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
-0.1
+
-0.2
+
2.3
+
2.5
+
1.2
+
-0.4
+
+
+
Czechia
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
0.9
+
1.4
+
1.4
+
1.1
+
1.5
+
+
+
Denmark
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
1.0
+
1.0
+
0.9
+
1.0
+
+
+
Germany
+
-0.1
+
-0.1
+
-0.1
+
-0.1
+
-0.2
+
-0.3
+
-0.4
+
-0.5
+
+
+
Estonia
+
0.6
+
-1.8
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
1.0
+
-1.1
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
Ireland
+
-0.1
+
1.0
+
-0.6
+
0.3
+
0.9
+
1.9
+
0.0
+
0.7
+
+
+
Greece
+
0.0
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
-0.4
+
1.1
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
0.1
+
+
+
Spain
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.3
+
0.5
+
2.7
+
2.6
+
2.6
+
2.3
+
+
+
France
+
-0.1
+
0.1
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
0.1
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
+
+
Croatia
+
1.2
+
0.2
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
1.6
+
1.8
+
1.2
+
1.1
+
+
+
Italy
+
0.2
+
0.4
+
0.5
+
0.3
+
0.6
+
1.2
+
1.2
+
1.4
+
+
+
Cyprus
+
0.5
+
0.7
+
0.0
+
0.5
+
1.4
+
2.0
+
2.0
+
1.6
+
+
+
Latvia
+
0.6
+
0.6
+
0.1
+
-0.1
+
-0.5
+
1.3
+
1.3
+
1.1
+
+
+
Lithuania
+
1.0
+
-2.3
+
1.8
+
-0.1
+
-0.3
+
-1.9
+
-0.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
Luxembourg**
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
0.6
+
1.4
+
1.5
+
1.6
+
1.8
+
+
+
Hungary
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
+
+
Malta
+
1.0
+
1.0
+
1.3
+
0.9
+
3.7
+
4.3
+
4.7
+
4.4
+
+
+
Netherlands
+
0.2
+
-0.3
+
0.1
+
-0.1
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
0.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
Austria
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
-0.2
+
0.0
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
-0.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
Poland
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
-0.2
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
1.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
Portugal
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
-0.2
+
1.0
+
2.7
+
2.8
+
1.9
+
2.2
+
+
+
Romania
+
-1.2
+
1.3
+
-1.1
+
-0.2
+
-2.5
+
-2.5
+
-1.2
+
-1.3
+
+
+
Slovenia
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
-0.4
+
-0.2
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
+
+
Slovakia
+
-0.1
+
0.1
+
-0.1
+
0.1
+
-0.2
+
-0.2
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
+
+
Finland
+
0.0
+
0.2
+
-0.2
+
-0.8
+
-0.8
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
-0.9
+
+
+
Sweden
+
0.0
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.0
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
0.5
+
+
+
Iceland
+
0.3
+
-0.1
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.6
+
0.1
+
0.7
+
0.8
+
+
+
Norway
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.6
+
0.6
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
+
+
Switzerland
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
0.3
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.8
+
+
+
: Data not available
* Percentage change in the number of persons employed in resident production units compared with the previous quarter based on seasonally adjusted data. Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year based on non-seasonally adjusted data.
Source dataset: namq_10_a10_e (including breakdowns by industry)
+
+
+
Flash estimates of employment and GDP growth were published in the Euro indicators release issued on 14 August 2026. They were based on a more limited data set than the one used for the present release and additionally, on preliminary estimates that have now been revised by some Member States. Revisions for the last quarter are highlighted in bold in the table below:
+
+
+
Growth rates
Estimates
+
To the previous quarter (Q/Q-1)
+
To the previous year (Q/Q-4)
+
+
+
Previous
+
Current
+
Previous
+
Current
+
+
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
Euro area
+
EU
+
+
+
GDP
+
0.4
+
0.5
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
1.0
+
1.2
+
1.2
+
1.4
+
+
+
Employment
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
0.5
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
+
+
With this release, euro area and EU employment and GDP figures for earlier quarters are also revised.
All estimates presented in this release may be revised with the database update scheduled for 20 October 2026.
Revisions of quarterly GDP estimates are continuously monitored. Further information can be found on Eurostat website.
This news release presents estimates for euro area and EU GDP and employment based on national accounts transmissions from all Member States due after t+2 months.
A further estimation is done at around t+110 days after some countries transmit updated estimates.
To increase the timeliness of key indicators, Eurostat also publishes flash estimates for GDP (after around 30 and 45 days) and employment (after around 45 days). The flash estimates are based on estimates provided by most EU Member States on a voluntary basis.
European quarterly national accounts are compiled in accordance with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010). They include key policy indicators on GDP and employment.
Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices measures the production activity of resident producer units. Growth rates are based on chain-linked volumes.
Employment covers employees and self-employed working in resident production units (domestic concept). Employment flash estimates are limited to total employment in persons, but regular estimates also cover hours worked and industry breakdowns.
Euro area (EA21): Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
European Union (EU27): Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp_flash.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp_flash.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cbead9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_gdp_flash.html
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+
+
+ Euro indicators
+
+ 14 August 2026
+
+ Next release: 13 November 2026
+
+ GDP and employment flash estimates for the second quarter of 2026
+
+ GDP up by 0.4% and employment up by 0.1% in the euro area
+
+
In the second quarter of 2026, seasonally adjusted GDP increased by 0.4% in the euroarea and by 0.5% in the EU, compared with the previous quarter, according to a flash estimate published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. In the first quarter of 2026, GDP had remained stable in the euroarea and had increased by 0.1% in the EU.
Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, seasonally adjusted GDP increased by 1.0% in the euro area and by 1.2% in the EU in the second quarter of 2026, after +0.5% in the euro area and +0.8% in the EU in the previous quarter.
During the second quarter of 2026, GDP in the United States increased by 0.4% compared to the previous quarter (after +0.5% in the first quarter of 2026). Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, GDP increased by 2.1% (after +2.7% in the previous quarter).
The number of employed persons increased by 0.1% in both the euro area and the EU in the second quarter of 2026, compared with the previous quarter. In the first quarter of 2026, employment had increased by 0.1% in the euro area and had remained stable in the EU.
Compared with the same quarter of the previous year, employment increased by 0.5% in both the euro area and the EU in the second quarter of 2026, after +0.5% in the euro area and +0.6% in the EU in the first quarter of 2026.
These data provide a picture of labour input consistent with the output and income measures of national accounts.
+
+
+
Growth rates of employment in persons
+
+
+
+
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter (based on seasonally adjusted data)
+
Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year (based on unadjusted data)
Percentage change compared with the previous quarter
+
Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year
+
+
+
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
2025Q3
+
2025Q4
+
2026Q1
+
2026Q2
+
+
+
Euro area
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
0.4
+
1.2
+
1.1
+
0.5
+
1.0
+
+
+
EU
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
1.5
+
1.3
+
0.8
+
1.2
+
+
+
Belgium
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
1.0
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
0.5
+
+
+
Bulgaria
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.6
+
3.1
+
2.9
+
2.9
+
2.7
+
+
+
Czechia
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.2
+
0.4
+
2.8
+
2.8
+
2.2
+
2.0
+
+
+
Denmark
+
2.5
+
0.5
+
1.5
+
:
+
4.6
+
3.2
+
6.2
+
:
+
+
+
Germany
+
0.0
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
+
+
Estonia
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
1.1
+
0.4
+
1.0
+
1.2
+
2.4
+
2.1
+
+
+
Ireland***
+
1.3
+
-3.6
+
-7.0
+
3.9
+
5.2
+
-0.2
+
-13.2
+
-5.6
+
+
+
Greece
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
0.2
+
:
+
2.1
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
:
+
+
+
Spain
+
0.6
+
0.8
+
0.6
+
0.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
2.7
+
+
+
France
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
-0.1
+
0.2
+
0.8
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
0.7
+
+
+
Croatia
+
0.5
+
1.2
+
0.0
+
:
+
2.9
+
3.5
+
2.4
+
:
+
+
+
Italy
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.7
+
0.8
+
0.8
+
1.0
+
+
+
Cyprus
+
0.8
+
1.2
+
0.5
+
0.8
+
3.5
+
4.2
+
3.0
+
3.3
+
+
+
Latvia
+
0.8
+
0.7
+
0.6
+
:
+
2.3
+
2.6
+
2.5
+
:
+
+
+
Lithuania
+
0.3
+
1.9
+
-0.1
+
1.7
+
2.2
+
3.3
+
2.8
+
3.8
+
+
+
Luxembourg
+
1.2
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
:
+
3.2
+
2.1
+
1.6
+
:
+
+
+
Hungary
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
1.7
+
1.6
+
+
+
Malta
+
0.9
+
1.1
+
1.1
+
:
+
3.6
+
4.9
+
4.3
+
:
+
+
+
Netherlands**
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
1.4
+
1.6
+
1.4
+
1.3
+
+
+
Austria
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
1.3
+
1.1
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
+
+
Poland
+
1.1
+
1.0
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
4.1
+
3.8
+
3.5
+
3.7
+
+
+
Portugal
+
0.6
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
0.8
+
2.2
+
1.9
+
2.4
+
2.5
+
+
+
Romania
+
0.0
+
-1.9
+
-0.1
+
0.0
+
1.4
+
-1.4
+
-1.1
+
-2.0
+
+
+
Slovenia
+
1.2
+
0.7
+
1.1
+
1.8
+
1.7
+
1.7
+
3.5
+
4.8
+
+
+
Slovakia
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
0.9
+
0.8
+
+
+
Finland**
+
-0.1
+
0.5
+
0.9
+
0.9
+
0.4
+
0.6
+
1.3
+
2.5
+
+
+
Sweden**
+
0.5
+
0.9
+
0.0
+
1.4
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
2.0
+
2.8
+
+
+
Iceland
+
1.2
+
-0.8
+
3.7
+
:
+
1.1
+
2.5
+
3.1
+
:
+
+
+
Norway
+
1.3
+
-0.6
+
0.4
+
:
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
2.0
+
:
+
+
+
Switzerland
+
-0.4
+
0.2
+
0.7
+
1.9
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.6
+
2.3
+
+
+
United States
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
2.3
+
2.0
+
2.7
+
2.1
+
+
+
: Data not available
* Growth rates to the previous quarter and to the same quarter of the previous year presented in this table are both based on seasonally and calendar adjusted figures, except where indicated. Unadjusted data are not available for all Member States which are included in GDP flash estimates.
** Percentage change compared with the same quarter of the previous year calculated from calendar adjusted data.
*** Irish GDP flash estimate is categorised as a CSO Frontier Series Output. Particular care must be taken when interpreting the statistics as it may use new methods which are under development and/or data sources which may be incomplete, for example new administrative data sources.
Revisions of quarterly GDP estimates are continuously monitored. Further information can be found on Eurostat website.
With these flash estimates, euro area and EU employment and GDP figures for earlier quarters are not revised.
The flash GDP estimates of the second quarter 2026 are based on Member States’ data covering 99% of the euro area and the EU GDP, while flash employment estimates are based on Member States’ data covering 95% of the euro area and 92% of the EU total employment.
A preliminary flash estimate of GDP growth was published in the Euro indicators release issued on 30 July 2026. This was based on GDP estimates for 19 Member States.
The euro area and EU estimates for the last quarter werenot revised.
All figures presented in this release may be revised with Eurostat’s regular estimates of GDP and main aggregates (including employment) scheduled for 7 September 2026 and 20 October 2026.
Comprehensive estimates of European main aggregates (including GDP and employment) are based on countries regular transmissions and published around 65 and 110 days after the end of each quarter. To improve the timeliness of key indicators, Eurostat also publishes flash estimates for GDP (after around 30 and 45 days) and employment (after around 45 days). Their compilation is based on estimates provided by EU Member States on a voluntary basis.
This release presents flash estimates for euro area and EU GDP and employment growth after around 45 days.
European quarterly national accounts are compiled in accordance with the European System of Accounts 2010 (ESA 2010). They include key policy indicators of GDP and employment.
Gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices measures the production activity of resident production units. Growth rates are based on chain-linked volumes.
Employment covers employees and self-employed working in resident production units (domestic concept). While employment flash estimates are limited to total employment in persons, regular estimates also cover hours worked and industry breakdowns.
The method used for compilation of European GDP and employment estimates is the same as for previous releases.
Euro area (EA21): Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
European Union (EU 27): Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_jobs.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_jobs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c39f58e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ea_jobs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,1370 @@
+
+
+ Euro indicators
+
+ 1 October 2026
+
+ Next release: 30 October 2026
+
+ August 2026
+
+ Euro area unemployment at 6.4%
+
+
In August 2026, the euro area seasonally adjusted unemployment rate was 6.4%, stable compared with July 2026 and up from 6.3% in August 2025. The EU unemployment rate was 6.1% in August 2026, also stable compared with July 2026 and up from 6.0% in August 2025. These figures are published by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union.
Eurostat estimates that 13.600 million persons in the EU, of whom 11.357 million in the euro area, were unemployed in August 2026.
Compared with July 2026, unemployment increased by 12 thousand in the EU and by 26 thousand in the euro area.
Compared with August 2025, unemployment increased by 348 thousand in the EU and by 267 thousand in the euro area.
In August 2026, 2.973 million young persons (under 25) were unemployed in the EU, of whom 2.391 million were in the euro area. In August 2026, the youth unemployment rate was 15.4% in the EU, up from 15.3% in the previous month,and 15.0% in the euro area, down from 15.1% in July 2026.
Compared with July 2026, youth unemployment increased by 13 thousand in the EU and decreased by 9 thousand in the euro area.
Compared with August 2025, youth unemployment increased by 19 thousand in the EU and by 38 thousand in the euro area.
In August 2026, the unemployment rate for women was 6.4% in the EU and the unemployment rate for men was 5.9%, both stable compared with the previous month. In the euro area, the unemployment rate for women was 6.7% and the unemployment rate for men was 6.2%, both also stable compared with July 2026.
The estimates in this News Release are based on the globally used International Labour Organisation (ILO) standard definition of unemployment, which counts as unemployed people without a job who have been actively seeking work in the last four weeks and are available to start work within the next two weeks.
To capture in full the labour market situation, the data on unemployment have been complemented by additional indicators, e.g. underemployed part-time workers, persons seeking work but not immediately available and persons available to work but not seeking, released together with EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) data for the second quarter of 2026.
EU-LFS data for the third quarter of 2026 will be released on 11 December 2026.
+
+
+
Seasonally adjusted unemployment, totals
+
+
+
+
Rates (%)
+
Number of persons (in thousands)
+
+
+
Aug-25
+
May-26
+
Jun-26
+
Jul-26
+
Aug-26
+
Aug-25
+
May-26
+
Jun-26
+
Jul-26
+
Aug-26
+
+
+
Euro area
+
6.3
+
6.4
+
6.4
+
6.4
+
6.4
+
11 090
+
11 235
+
11 318
+
11 331
+
11 357
+
+
+
EU
+
6.0
+
6.1
+
6.1
+
6.1
+
6.1
+
13 252
+
13 502
+
13 613
+
13 588
+
13 600
+
+
+
Belgium
+
6.1
+
6.3
+
6.3
+
6.0
+
5.9
+
334
+
349
+
344
+
329
+
324
+
+
+
Bulgaria
+
3.7
+
3.4
+
3.5
+
3.5
+
3.5
+
113
+
102
+
106
+
107
+
106
+
+
+
Czechia
+
3.1
+
2.9
+
3.2
+
3.3
+
3.2
+
166
+
159
+
176
+
180
+
173
+
+
+
Denmark
+
6.5
+
6.9
+
6.6
+
6.7
+
5.9
+
215
+
230
+
221
+
223
+
197
+
+
+
Germany
+
3.8
+
3.9
+
4.0
+
4.0
+
4.0
+
1 667
+
1 723
+
1 738
+
1 751
+
1 760
+
+
+
Estonia
+
7.2
+
6.6
+
6.9
+
7.9
+
8.0
+
54
+
49
+
51
+
59
+
60
+
+
+
Ireland
+
4.9
+
4.9
+
4.9
+
5.0
+
5.0
+
145
+
145
+
145
+
148
+
147
+
+
+
Greece
+
8.8
+
7.8
+
8.1
+
7.9
+
7.4
+
418
+
370
+
384
+
376
+
351
+
+
+
Spain
+
10.5
+
10.2
+
10.1
+
10.0
+
10.0
+
2 611
+
2 571
+
2 550
+
2 546
+
2 552
+
+
+
France
+
7.8
+
8.4
+
8.3
+
8.3
+
8.2
+
2 476
+
2 683
+
2 660
+
2 653
+
2 637
+
+
+
Croatia
+
4.9
+
4.4
+
4.4
+
4.3
+
4.3
+
87
+
79
+
78
+
77
+
76
+
+
+
Italy
+
5.7
+
5.6
+
6.0
+
6.0
+
6.2
+
1 463
+
1 432
+
1 555
+
1 543
+
1 591
+
+
+
Cyprus
+
4.2
+
3.8
+
3.9
+
4.0
+
4.1
+
22
+
20
+
21
+
21
+
22
+
+
+
Latvia
+
7.2
+
6.9
+
7.1
+
7.3
+
7.3
+
68
+
66
+
68
+
70
+
70
+
+
+
Lithuania
+
6.9
+
6.4
+
6.2
+
6.2
+
6.1
+
108
+
100
+
97
+
97
+
96
+
+
+
Luxembourg
+
6.4
+
7.0
+
7.2
+
7.1
+
7.3
+
22
+
25
+
25
+
25
+
26
+
+
+
Hungary
+
4.3
+
4.4
+
4.5
+
4.5
+
4.7
+
211
+
212
+
217
+
221
+
231
+
+
+
Malta
+
2.5
+
3.5
+
3.5
+
3.4
+
3.4
+
8
+
12
+
12
+
12
+
12
+
+
+
Netherlands
+
3.9
+
3.9
+
3.8
+
4.0
+
4.0
+
401
+
399
+
393
+
404
+
408
+
+
+
Austria
+
6.0
+
6.0
+
5.8
+
6.2
+
6.7
+
284
+
285
+
278
+
295
+
319
+
+
+
Poland
+
3.2
+
3.4
+
3.4
+
3.4
+
3.4
+
571
+
605
+
611
+
603
+
597
+
+
+
Portugal
+
5.9
+
5.6
+
5.7
+
5.7
+
5.7
+
328
+
316
+
323
+
321
+
325
+
+
+
Romania
+
6.1
+
6.7
+
6.8
+
6.4
+
6.4
+
495
+
550
+
555
+
527
+
523
+
+
+
Slovenia
+
4.0
+
4.0
+
3.8
+
3.5
+
3.4
+
42
+
42
+
39
+
36
+
35
+
+
+
Slovakia
+
5.4
+
5.7
+
5.7
+
5.7
+
5.7
+
150
+
158
+
157
+
158
+
156
+
+
+
Finland
+
9.9
+
10.4
+
10.4
+
10.3
+
10.3
+
285
+
300
+
299
+
298
+
297
+
+
+
Sweden
+
8.8
+
8.7
+
8.7
+
8.7
+
8.7
+
507
+
506
+
507
+
508
+
509
+
+
+
Iceland
+
4.5
+
5.7
+
5.7
+
5.8
+
5.8
+
11
+
13
+
13
+
13
+
13
+
+
+
Norway
+
4.6
+
4.5
+
4.5
+
4.5
+
4.5
+
141
+
139
+
137
+
137
+
136
+
+
+
Switzerland
+
4.9
+
5.1
+
5.1
+
:
+
:
+
253
+
266
+
264
+
:
+
:
+
+
+
United States
+
4.3
+
4.3
+
4.2
+
4.1
+
4.1
+
7 409
+
7 300
+
7 088
+
6 904
+
7 057
+
+
+
: Data not available
Source datasets: une_rt_m (rates) and une_rt_m (in 1 000 persons)
The data in this News Release can be subject to revisions, caused by updates to the seasonally adjusted series whenever new monthly data are added; the inclusion of the most recent EU-LFS data in the calculation process; update of seasonal adjustment models with complete annual data.
Compared with the rates published in the News Release of 1 September 2026, the July 2026 unemployment rate for the EU and the unemployment rate for the euro area remained unchanged. Among EU Member States, the rate has been revised by more than 0.1 percentage points (pp) downwards for Finland (by 0.2 pp). The rate has been revised by more than 0.1 percentage points (pp) upwards for Estonia (by 1.0 pp) and Italy (by 0.2 pp).
Germany, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden as well as Iceland and Norway: the trend component is used instead of the more volatile seasonally adjusted data.
Estonia and Portugal: 3-month moving averages of EU-LFS data are used instead of pure monthly indicators.
Eurostat publishes harmonised unemployment rates for individual EU Member States, the euro area and the EU. These unemployment rates are based on the definition recommended by the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The measurement is based on a harmonised data source, the European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS).
Based on the ILO definition, Eurostat defines unemployed persons as persons aged 15 to 74 who:
are without work;
are available to start work within the next two weeks;
and have actively sought employment at some time during the previous four weeks.
The unemployment rate is the number of people unemployed as a percentage of the labour force.
The labour force is the total number of people employed plus unemployed. In this news release unemployment rates are based on employment and unemployment data covering persons aged 15 to 74.
The youth unemployment rate is the number of people aged 15 to 24 unemployed as a percentage of the labour force of the same age. Therefore, the youth unemployment rate should not be interpreted as the share of jobless people in the overall youth population.
When data for the most recent month are not available for a Member State, EU and EA aggregates are calculated using the latest data available for that Member State.
Euro area (EA21): Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and Finland.
European Union (EU 27): Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechia, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland and Sweden.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_feed.xml b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_feed.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08abd0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_feed.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+
+ ECB - European Central Bankhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu/Latest releases on the ECB website - Press releases, speeches and interviews, press conferences.enCopyright 2026, European Central Bank
+ webmaster@ecb.europa.eu (ECB Webmaster)Sat, 24 Oct 2026 07:59:06 +0200
+ Press
+ Automatic
+ http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/tech/rss Piero Cipollone: Interview with Milano Finanzahttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/inter/date/2026/html/ecb.in261024~ee2ba73cf3.en.htmlhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/inter/date/2026/html/ecb.in261024~ee2ba73cf3.en.htmlSat, 24 Oct 2026 08:00:00 +0200 ECB Consumer Expectations Survey results – September 2026https://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.pr261023~a3d201c97c.en.htmlhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/pr/date/2026/html/ecb.pr261023~a3d201c97c.en.htmlFri, 23 Oct 2026 10:00:00 +0200 Piero Cipollone: Pontes and Appia: unlocking opportunities for bankshttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp261021_1~d190f2c349.en.pdfhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp261021_1~d190f2c349.en.pdfWed, 21 Oct 2026 10:00:00 +0200 Philip R. Lane: Euro liquidity lines and the international monetary systemhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp261021~401d6c4b70.en.htmlhttps://www.ecb.europa.eu//press/key/date/2026/html/ecb.sp261021~401d6c4b70.en.htmlWed, 21 Oct 2026 06:15:00 +0200
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_hold.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_hold.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7d31420
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_hold.html
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+
You may also be interested in:
Monetary policy decisions
18 December 2025
The Governing Council today decided to keep the three key ECB interest rates unchanged. Its updated assessment reconfirms that inflation should stabilise at the 2% target in the medium term.
The new Eurosystem staff projections show headline inflation averaging 2.1% in 2025, 1.9% in 2026, 1.8% in 2027 and 2.0% in 2028. For inflation excluding energy and food, staff project an average of 2.4% in 2025, 2.2% in 2026, 1.9% in 2027 and 2.0% in 2028. Inflation has been revised up for 2026, mainly because staff now expect services inflation to decline more slowly. Economic growth is expected to be stronger than in the September projections, driven especially by domestic demand. Growth has been revised up to 1.4% in 2025, 1.2% in 2026 and 1.4% in 2027 and is expected to remain at 1.4% in 2028.
The Governing Council is determined to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term. It will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions will be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The Governing Council is not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
Key ECB interest rates
The interest rates on the deposit facility, the main refinancing operations and the marginal lending facility will remain unchanged at 2.00%, 2.15% and 2.40% respectively.
Asset purchase programme (APP) and pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP)
The APP and PEPP portfolios are declining at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.
***
The Governing Council stands ready to adjust all of its instruments within its mandate to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. Moreover, the Transmission Protection Instrument is available to counter unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics that pose a serious threat to the transmission of monetary policy across all euro area countries, thus allowing the Governing Council to more effectively deliver on its price stability mandate.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 14:45 CET today.
Disclaimer
+ Please note that related topic tags are currently available for selected content only.
European Central Bank
Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
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diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_rate.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_rate.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2813257
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_rate.html
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+
Monetary policy decisions
10 September 2026
The Governing Council today decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. The conflict in the Middle East continues to generate inflation pressures, and inflation is set to remain well above target for an extended period. Today’s decision underscores the Governing Council’s commitment to setting monetary policy to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term.
The baseline of the new ECB staff projections sees headline inflation averaging 3.0% in 2026, 2.5% in 2027 and 2.1% in 2028. For inflation excluding energy and food, the baseline foresees 2.5% in 2026, 2.6% in 2027 and 2.3% in 2028. Compared with June, the baseline projection for inflation in 2026 is unchanged, while it has been revised up for 2027 and 2028. The baseline projection for economic growth is 0.9% for 2026, 1.4% for 2027 and 1.5% for 2028. This is an upward revision for both 2026 and 2027, mainly reflecting the greater than expected resilience of the euro area economy.
The outlook remains highly uncertain, with risks to the upside for inflation and to the downside for economic growth. In relation to the energy shock, the updated scenarios put together by staff illustrate the broad range of outcomes for how growth and inflation would evolve under different assumptions about its intensity and duration, as well as its indirect and second-round effects.
With today’s decision, the Governing Council remains well positioned to navigate the uncertainty caused by the conflict. It will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determining the appropriate monetary policy stance. In particular, the Governing Council’s interest rate decisions will be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook and the risks surrounding it, in light of the incoming economic and financial data, as well as the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. The Governing Council is not pre-committing to a particular rate path.
The Governing Council decided to raise the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. Accordingly, the interest rates on the deposit facility, the main refinancing operations and the marginal lending facility will be increased to 2.50%, 2.65% and 2.90% respectively, with effect from 16 September 2026.
The APP and PEPP portfolios are declining at a measured and predictable pace, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.
***
The Governing Council stands ready to adjust all of its instruments within its mandate to ensure that inflation stabilises at its 2% target in the medium term and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission. Moreover, the Transmission Protection Instrument is available to counter unwarranted, disorderly market dynamics that pose a serious threat to the transmission of monetary policy across all euro area countries, thus allowing the Governing Council to more effectively deliver on its price stability mandate.
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press conference starting at 14:45 CET today.
Disclaimer
+ Please note that related topic tags are currently available for selected content only.
Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_schedule.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_schedule.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7925ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/ecb_schedule.html
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+
+
+28/10/2026
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+29/10/2026
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+29/10/2026
+
+
+Press conference following the Governing Council meeting of the ECB in Frankfurt
+
+
+25/11/2026
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (in Frankfurt)
+
+
+26/11/2026
+
+
+General Council meeting of the ECB in Frankfurt
+
+
+16/12/2026
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+17/12/2026
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+03/02/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+04/02/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+24/02/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+17/03/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+18/03/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+07/04/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+28/04/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+29/04/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+19/05/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+09/06/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+10/06/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+23/06/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+24/06/2027
+
+
+General Council meeting of the ECB (virtual)
+
+
+21/07/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+22/07/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+08/09/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+09/09/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+29/09/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+27/10/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+28/10/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+24/11/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt
+
+
+25/11/2027
+
+
+General Council meeting of the ECB in Frankfurt
+
+
+15/12/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+16/12/2027
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+02/02/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+03/02/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+23/02/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+22/03/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+23/03/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+05/04/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+03/05/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+04/05/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+24/05/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+07/06/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+08/06/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+21/06/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+22/06/2028
+
+
+General Council meeting of the ECB (virtual)
+
+
+19/07/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+20/07/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+06/09/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+07/09/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+27/09/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting (virtual)
+
+
+11/10/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt
+
+
+12/10/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
+22/11/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: non-monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt
+
+
+23/11/2028
+
+
+General Council meeting of the ECB in Frankfurt
+
+
+06/12/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 1)
+
+
+07/12/2028
+
+
+Governing Council of the ECB: monetary policy meeting in Frankfurt (Day 2), followed by press conference
+
+
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/eurostat_feed.xml b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/eurostat_feed.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3838614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/eurostat_feed.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+
+
+ Eurostat - Custom RSS Feed
+
+
+
+
+ This feed has been created based on your search query. For more information, please consult the related help page.
+ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/news/euro-indicators?p_p_id=estatsearchportlet_WAR_estatsearchportlet_INSTANCE_OaTpFrwlabNK&p_p_lifecycle=2&p_p_resource_id=atom&_estatsearchportlet_WAR_estatsearchportlet_INSTANCE_OaTpFrwlabNK_pageSize=100&_estatsearchportlet_WAR_estatsearchportlet_INSTANCE_OaTpFrwlabNK_collection=CAT_PREREL
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+
+ Seasonally adjusted government deficit at 3.3% of GDP in the euro area
+
+
+ Eurostat
+ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
+
+ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=2-21102026-cp
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+ In the second quarter of 2026, the seasonally adjusted general government deficit to GDP ratio stood at 3.3% in the euro area (EA21) and at 3.5% in the EU. The euro area deficit to GDP ratio increased slightly compared to 3.2% in the first quarter of 2026, while the EU deficit to GDP ratio increa...
+
+
+ Government debt at 88.8% of GDP in euro area
+
+
+ Eurostat
+ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
+
+ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=2-21102026-bp
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+ At the end of the second quarter of 2026, the general government gross debt to GDP ratio in the euro area (EA21) stood at 88.8%, an increase compared with 88.4% at the end of the first quarter of 2026. In the EU, the ratio also increased from 82.5% to 82.9%.
+
+
+ Euro area government deficit at 3.0% and EU at 3.1% of GDP
+
+
+ Eurostat
+ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
+
+ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=2-21102026-ap
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+ 2026-10-21T09:00:00Z
+ In the euro area (EA20) the government deficit to GDP ratio remained unchanged at 3.0% in 2024 and 2025. In the EU, it also remained unchanged at 3.1%, the same level as in 2024. In the euro area the government debt to GDP ratio increased from 86.6% at the end of 2024 to 87.7% at the end of 2025,...
+
+
+ Production in construction up by 1.8% in the euro area and by 2.0% in the EU
+
+
+ Eurostat
+ http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat
+
+ https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/product?code=4-20102026-ap
+ 2026-10-20T09:00:00Z
+ 2026-10-20T09:00:00Z
+ In August 2026, compared with July 2026, seasonally adjusted production in construction increased by 1.8% in the euro area and by 2.0% in the EU, according to first estimates from Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. In July 2026, production in construction grew by 0.2% in the ...
+
+
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/eurostat_schedule.json b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/eurostat_schedule.json
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c9d16c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/eurostat_schedule.json
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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Informations Rapides ·
+ 15 octobre 2026 · n° 247
En septembre 2026, les prix à la consommation augmentent de 3,1 % sur un anIndice des prix à la consommation - résultats définitifs (IPC) - septembre 2026
Paru le :Paru le15/10/2026
Prochaine parution le :
+ 13/11/2026 à 08h45 - octobre 2026
En septembre 2026, l’indice des prix à la consommation (IPC) se replie de 0,3 % sur
+ un mois, après +0,7 % en août. Cette baisse s’explique par le recul saisonnier des
+ prix des services (‑1,4 % après ‑0,1 %), en particulier ceux des services d’hébergement
+ (‑15,0 % après +0,9 %) et de transport (‑9,8 % après ‑4,5 %). Les prix de l’énergie
+ augmentent pour le troisième mois consécutif (+3,9 % après +3,4 % en août et +2,3 %
+ en juillet). Ceux des produits manufacturés ralentissent (+0,5 % après +1,6 %) comme
+ ceux de l’alimentation (+0,1 % après +0,4 %). Les prix du tabac sont stables, comme
+ au mois précédent.
Corrigés des variations saisonnières, les prix à la consommation augmentent sur un
+ mois de 0,8 % en septembre 2026, après +0,2 % en août.
Sur un an, les prix à la consommation augmentent de 3,1 % en septembre 2026, après
+ +2,4 % en août. La hausse de l’inflation s’explique par la nouvelle accélération des
+ prix de l’énergie (+21,3 % après +16,7 % en août et +12,6 % en juillet). Ceux des
+ services (+2,4 % après +1,9 %) et de l’alimentation accélèrent également sur un an
+ (+1,4 % après +1,1 %). La baisse des prix des produits manufacturés s’atténue de nouveau
+ (‑0,3 % après ‑0,4 % en août et ‑0,7 % en juillet). Ceux du tabac augmentent sur un
+ an au même rythme qu’au mois précédent (+3,3 %).
L’inflation sous-jacente (glissement annuel de l’indice sur un an) s’établit à +1,5 %
+ en septembre 2026, après +1,1 % en août.
L’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) se replie de 0,3 % sur un mois,
+ après +0,7 % en août. Sur un an, il est en hausse de 3,4 %, après +2,6 % en août.
Ce mois-ci, l’écart entre les glissements annuels de l’IPCH et l’IPC est de 0,34 point,
+ après 0,27 point en août : il est dû pour 0,33 point aux différences de pondération
+ entre les deux indices et pour 0,01 point aux différences d’évolution entre prix nets
+ et prix bruts.
+
Glissements annuels de l'indice des prix à la consommation (IPC), de l'inflation sous-jacente (ISJ)
+ et de l'indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH)
+
+
+
+
IPC
+
ISJ
+
IPCH
+
+
+
+
+
2026-09
+
3.1
+
1.5
+
3.4
+
+
+
2026-08
+
2.4
+
1.1
+
2.6
+
+
+
2026-07
+
2.1
+
1.3
+
2.4
+
+
+
2026-06
+
1.8
+
1.0
+
2.0
+
+
+
2026-05
+
2.4
+
1.5
+
2.8
+
+
+
2026-04
+
2.2
+
1.2
+
2.5
+
+
+
2026-03
+
1.7
+
1.1
+
2.0
+
+
+
2026-02
+
0.9
+
0.9
+
1.1
+
+
+
2026-01
+
0.3
+
0.7
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-12
+
0.8
+
1.1
+
0.7
+
+
+
2025-11
+
0.9
+
1.0
+
0.8
+
+
+
2025-10
+
0.9
+
1.2
+
0.8
+
+
+
2025-09
+
1.2
+
1.3
+
1.1
+
+
+
2025-08
+
0.9
+
1.2
+
0.8
+
+
+
2025-07
+
1.0
+
1.4
+
0.9
+
+
+
2025-06
+
1.0
+
1.2
+
0.9
+
+
+
2025-05
+
0.7
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2025-04
+
0.8
+
1.3
+
0.9
+
+
+
2025-03
+
0.8
+
1.3
+
0.9
+
+
+
2025-02
+
0.8
+
1.3
+
0.9
+
+
+
2025-01
+
1.6
+
1.4
+
1.8
+
+
+
2024-12
+
1.3
+
1.3
+
1.8
+
+
+
2024-11
+
1.3
+
1.5
+
1.7
+
+
+
2024-10
+
1.2
+
1.4
+
1.6
+
+
+
2024-09
+
1.1
+
1.4
+
1.4
+
+
+
2024-08
+
1.8
+
1.7
+
2.2
+
+
+
2024-07
+
2.3
+
1.5
+
2.7
+
+
+
2024-06
+
2.2
+
1.8
+
2.5
+
+
+
2024-05
+
2.3
+
1.8
+
2.6
+
+
+
2024-04
+
2.2
+
1.9
+
2.4
+
+
+
2024-03
+
2.3
+
2.2
+
2.4
+
+
+
2024-02
+
3.0
+
2.6
+
3.2
+
+
+
2024-01
+
3.1
+
3.0
+
3.4
+
+
+
2023-12
+
3.7
+
3.5
+
4.1
+
+
+
2023-11
+
3.5
+
3.5
+
3.9
+
+
+
2023-10
+
4.0
+
4.2
+
4.5
+
+
+
2023-09
+
4.9
+
4.6
+
5.7
+
+
+
2023-08
+
4.9
+
5.0
+
5.7
+
+
+
2023-07
+
4.3
+
5.4
+
5.1
+
+
+
2023-06
+
4.5
+
5.7
+
5.3
+
+
+
2023-05
+
5.1
+
5.7
+
6.0
+
+
+
2023-04
+
5.9
+
6.1
+
6.9
+
+
+
2023-03
+
5.7
+
6.0
+
6.7
+
+
+
2023-02
+
6.3
+
5.8
+
7.3
+
+
+
2023-01
+
6.0
+
5.5
+
7.0
+
+
+
2022-12
+
5.8
+
5.4
+
6.7
+
+
+
2022-11
+
6.1
+
5.3
+
7.1
+
+
+
2022-10
+
6.2
+
5.0
+
7.1
+
+
+
2022-09
+
5.5
+
4.6
+
6.2
+
+
+
2022-08
+
5.9
+
4.7
+
6.6
+
+
+
2022-07
+
6.1
+
4.3
+
6.8
+
+
+
2022-06
+
5.8
+
3.7
+
6.5
+
+
+
2022-05
+
5.2
+
3.6
+
5.8
+
+
+
2022-04
+
4.8
+
3.1
+
5.4
+
+
+
2022-03
+
4.5
+
2.6
+
5.1
+
+
+
2022-02
+
3.6
+
2.3
+
4.2
+
+
+
2022-01
+
2.9
+
1.6
+
3.3
+
+
+
2021-12
+
2.8
+
2.0
+
3.4
+
+
+
2021-11
+
2.8
+
1.9
+
3.4
+
+
+
2021-10
+
2.6
+
1.5
+
3.2
+
+
+
2021-09
+
2.2
+
1.4
+
2.7
+
+
+
2021-08
+
1.9
+
1.0
+
2.4
+
+
+
2021-07
+
1.1
+
0.0
+
1.5
+
+
+
2021-06
+
1.5
+
1.0
+
1.9
+
+
+
2021-05
+
1.4
+
0.9
+
1.8
+
+
+
2021-04
+
1.2
+
1.0
+
1.6
+
+
+
2021-03
+
1.1
+
1.0
+
1.4
+
+
+
2021-02
+
0.6
+
0.5
+
0.8
+
+
+
2021-01
+
0.6
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
+
+
2020-12
+
0.0
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-11
+
0.2
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-10
+
0.1
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-09
+
0.0
+
0.5
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-08
+
0.2
+
0.5
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-07
+
0.8
+
1.3
+
0.8
+
+
+
2020-06
+
0.2
+
0.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-05
+
0.4
+
0.6
+
0.4
+
+
+
2020-04
+
0.3
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
+
+
2020-03
+
0.7
+
0.7
+
0.8
+
+
+
2020-02
+
1.4
+
1.2
+
1.6
+
+
+
2020-01
+
1.5
+
1.0
+
1.7
+
+
+
2019-12
+
1.4
+
1.1
+
1.6
+
+
+
2019-11
+
1.0
+
1.0
+
1.2
+
+
+
2019-10
+
0.8
+
1.0
+
0.9
+
+
+
2019-09
+
0.9
+
0.9
+
1.1
+
+
+
2019-08
+
1.0
+
0.7
+
1.3
+
+
+
2019-07
+
1.1
+
0.9
+
1.3
+
+
+
2019-06
+
1.2
+
0.9
+
1.4
+
+
+
2019-05
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
1.1
+
+
+
2019-04
+
1.3
+
0.8
+
1.4
+
+
+
2019-03
+
1.1
+
0.5
+
1.3
+
+
+
2019-02
+
1.3
+
0.6
+
1.5
+
+
+
2019-01
+
1.2
+
0.7
+
1.4
+
+
+
2018-12
+
1.6
+
0.7
+
1.9
+
+
+
2018-11
+
1.9
+
0.7
+
2.2
+
+
+
2018-10
+
2.2
+
0.8
+
2.5
+
+
+
2018-09
+
2.2
+
0.7
+
2.5
+
+
+
2018-08
+
2.3
+
0.9
+
2.6
+
+
+
2018-07
+
2.3
+
0.8
+
2.6
+
+
+
2018-06
+
2.0
+
0.8
+
2.3
+
+
+
2018-05
+
2.0
+
1.0
+
2.3
+
+
+
2018-04
+
1.6
+
0.8
+
1.8
+
+
+
2018-03
+
1.6
+
0.9
+
1.7
+
+
+
2018-02
+
1.2
+
0.7
+
1.3
+
+
+
2018-01
+
1.3
+
0.8
+
1.5
+
+
+
2017-12
+
1.2
+
0.6
+
1.2
+
+
+
2017-11
+
1.2
+
0.5
+
1.2
+
+
+
2017-10
+
1.1
+
0.5
+
1.2
+
+
+
2017-09
+
1.0
+
0.5
+
1.1
+
+
+
2017-08
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
1.0
+
+
+
2017-07
+
0.7
+
0.5
+
0.8
+
+
+
2017-06
+
0.7
+
0.4
+
0.8
+
+
+
2017-05
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
0.9
+
+
+
2017-04
+
1.2
+
0.5
+
1.4
+
+
+
2017-03
+
1.1
+
0.4
+
1.4
+
+
+
2017-02
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
1.4
+
+
+
2017-01
+
1.3
+
0.6
+
1.6
+
+
+
2016-12
+
0.6
+
0.4
+
0.8
+
+
+
2016-11
+
0.5
+
0.5
+
0.7
+
+
+
2016-10
+
0.4
+
0.5
+
0.5
+
+
+
2016-09
+
0.4
+
0.6
+
0.5
+
+
+
2016-08
+
0.2
+
0.4
+
0.4
+
+
+
2016-07
+
0.2
+
0.5
+
0.4
+
+
+
2016-06
+
0.2
+
0.6
+
0.3
+
+
+
2016-05
+
0.0
+
0.6
+
0.1
+
+
+
2016-04
+
-0.2
+
0.6
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2016-03
+
-0.1
+
0.7
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2016-02
+
-0.2
+
0.9
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2016-01
+
0.2
+
0.8
+
0.3
+
+
+
2015-12
+
0.2
+
1.0
+
0.3
+
+
+
2015-11
+
0.0
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
+
+
2015-10
+
0.1
+
0.8
+
0.1
+
+
+
2015-09
+
0.0
+
0.6
+
0.1
+
+
+
2015-08
+
0.0
+
0.4
+
0.1
+
+
+
2015-07
+
0.2
+
0.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2015-06
+
0.3
+
0.5
+
0.3
+
+
+
2015-05
+
0.3
+
0.4
+
0.3
+
+
+
2015-04
+
0.1
+
0.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2015-03
+
-0.1
+
0.2
+
0.0
+
+
+
2015-02
+
-0.3
+
0.2
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2015-01
+
-0.4
+
0.1
+
-0.4
+
+
+
Sur un an, les prix de l’énergie accélèrent de nouveau : +21,3 % en septembre 2026,
+ après +16,7 % en août et +12,6 % en juillet.
Les prix des produits pétroliers accélèrent sur un an (+36,2 % après +28,7 %), tirés
+ par ceux du gazole (+44,1 % après +36,4 %), de l’essence (+25,7 % après +19,1 %) et
+ des combustibles liquides (+64,6 % après +47,8 %).
Les prix du gaz accélèrent également (+19,0 % après +14,3 %), comme ceux de l’électricité
+ (+1,4 % après +1,1 %).
Sur un an, les prix des services accélèrent : +2,4 % en septembre 2026, après +1,9 %
+ en août.
Les prix de services de transport accélèrent nettement sur un an (+5,1 % après +0,8 %).
+ Cette accélération s’explique principalement par celle des prix des transports aériens
+ (+10,0 % après +1,7 %) et, dans une moindre mesure, par celle des transports ferroviaires
+ (+4,6 % après +1,2 %). Les prix des transports routiers, quant à eux, se stabilisent
+ (+0,2 % après ‑1,5 %).
Les prix des « autres services » accélèrent également sur un an (+2,4 % après +2,1 %)
+ portés par ceux de l’hébergement (+4,9 % après +0,7 %), des assurances (+4,4 % après
+ +3,7 %) et, dans une bien moindre mesure, de la protection sociale (services de garde
+ d’enfants, maisons de retraite pour personnes âgées et foyers pour handicapés, aides
+ à domicile ; +3,2 % après +3,1 %). Les prix des services culturels baissent sur un
+ an à un rythme plus faible qu’au mois précédent (‑0,6 % après ‑3,0 %), comme ceux
+ des services récréatifs (‑0,9 % après ‑1,5 %). Quant aux prix des services de restauration,
+ ils augmentent sur un an au même rythme qu’au mois précédent (+2,1 %).
Les prix des services de santé accélèrent légèrement sur un an (+0,8 % après +0,5 %),
+ comme ceux des loyers, eau et enlèvement des ordures ménagères (+2,1 % après +2,0 %).
À l’inverse, les prix des services de communication ralentissent, tout en restant
+ dynamiques, sur un an (+6,2 % après +10,1 %) à l’image de ceux des services de communication
+ mobile (+16,9 % après +27,9 %).
Sur un an, les prix de l’alimentation accélèrent : +1,4 % en septembre 2026 après
+ +1,1 % en août.
Les prix des produits frais accélèrent de nouveau sur un an (+9,5 % après +5,9 % en
+ août et +3,8 % en juillet), notamment sous l’effet des vagues de chaleur, à l’image
+ des légumes frais à fruits (tomates, courgettes, etc. ; +35,8 % après +22,3 %), des
+ « autres légumes frais » (carottes, navets, ail, oignons, poireaux, etc. ; +5,6 %
+ après ‑1,2 %) et des « autres fruits frais » (melons, pastèques, etc. ; +9,9 % après
+ +3,1 %). À l’inverse, les prix des dattes, figues et fruits tropicaux frais ralentissent
+ (+2,5 % après +4,0 %).
Les prix de l’alimentation hors produits frais augmentent sur un an au même rythme
+ qu’au mois précédent (+0,4 %), à l’image de ceux du lait, des autres produits laitiers
+ et des œufs (+0,2 %) et de ceux des boissons alcoolisées (+0,3 %). D’un côté, les
+ prix des boissons non alcoolisées ralentissent sur un an (+0,6 % après +1,1 %), comme
+ ceux de la viande (+1,9 % après +2,1 %), et la baisse de ceux du pain et des céréales
+ s’accentue (‑0,4 % après ‑0,3 %). De l’autre, les prix du sucre, de la confiture,
+ du miel, du chocolat et des confiseries accélèrent légèrement sur un an (+0,9 % après
+ +0,8 %) et la baisse des prix des huiles et graisses s’atténue (‑1,2 % après ‑1,3 %).
+
Variations définitives des indices de prix détaillés (base 100 : année 2025 )
+
+
+
Regroupements conjoncturels
+
Pondérations
+
Indices
+
Variations (en %) au cours
+
+
+
+
2026
+
septembre 2026
+
du dernier mois (1)
+
des 12 derniers mois (2)
+
+
+
+
+
a) Ensemble des ménages
+
+
+
Ensemble
+
10 000
+
103,07
+
-0,3
+
3,1
+
+
+
Ensemble CVS
+
10 000
+
103,34
+
0,8
+
3,1
+
+
+
Alimentation
+
1 485
+
101,83
+
0,1
+
1,4
+
+
+
Produits frais
+
170
+
109,20
+
2,5
+
9,5
+
+
+
Autre alimentation
+
1 315
+
100,87
+
-0,2
+
0,4
+
+
+
Tabac
+
168
+
103,29
+
0,0
+
3,3
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
2 388
+
99,83
+
0,5
+
-0,3
+
+
+
Habillement et chaussures
+
328
+
101,02
+
3,8
+
-0,9
+
+
+
Produits de santé
+
397
+
96,99
+
0,0
+
-2,3
+
+
+
Autres produits manufacturés
+
1 663
+
100,27
+
0,0
+
0,4
+
+
+
Énergie
+
764
+
120,13
+
3,9
+
21,3
+
+
+
dont Produits pétroliers
+
370
+
135,23
+
6,1
+
36,2
+
+
+
Services
+
5 195
+
102,35
+
-1,4
+
2,4
+
+
+
Loyers, eau et enlèvement des ordures ménagères
+
831
+
102,16
+
0,1
+
2,1
+
+
+
Services de santé
+
782
+
100,30
+
0,4
+
0,8
+
+
+
Transports
+
300
+
98,40
+
-9,8
+
5,1
+
+
+
Communications
+
192
+
107,68
+
-0,4
+
6,2
+
+
+
Autres services
+
3 090
+
102,98
+
-1,5
+
2,4
+
+
+
Ensemble hors loyers et hors tabac
+
9 160
+
103,16
+
-0,3
+
3,2
+
+
+
Ensemble hors tabac
+
9 832
+
103,07
+
-0,3
+
3,1
+
+
+
b) Ménages urbains dont le chef est ouvrier ou employé
+
+
+
Ensemble hors tabac
+
9 751
+
103,14
+
-0,1
+
3,1
+
+
+
c) Ménages du 1er quintile de la distribution des niveaux de vie
+
+
+
Ensemble hors tabac
+
9 735
+
103,22
+
-0,2
+
3,3
+
+
+
d) Dans la grande distribution en France métropolitaine
+
+
+
Produits d’alimentation industrielle
+
692
+
100,19
+
-0,4
+
-0,2
+
+
+
Produits d’entretien et d’hygiène-beauté
+
136
+
99,49
+
-0,5
+
-0,4
+
+
+
Produits d’alimentation industrielle, d’entretien et d’hygiène-beauté
+
828
+
100,08
+
-0,4
+
-0,3
+
+
+
Sur un an, la baisse des prix des produits manufacturés s’atténue : ‑0,3 % en septembre
+ 2026, après ‑0,4 % en août et -0,7 % en juillet.
Les prix des « autres produits manufacturés » accélèrent sur un an (+0,4 % après +0,1 %).
+ Ceux des jeux, des jouets et des articles de loisirs baissent sur un an de manière
+ moins soutenue qu’au mois précédent (‑0,4 % après ‑2,0 %), comme ceux des articles
+ de sport, du matériel de camping et du matériel pour activités de plein air (‑1,9
+ % après ‑2,6 %), des « autres accessoires pour véhicules personnels » (‑2,5 % après
+ ‑4,1 %) et du matériel d’information et de communication (‑0,1 % après ‑0,8 %). Les
+ prix des meubles, des articles d’ameublement et des tapis accélèrent (+1,7 % après
+ +1,3 %), comme ceux des articles de bijouterie et d’horlogerie (+12,2 % après +11,4 %).
+ À l’inverse, les prix des « autres appareils, articles et produits pour soins corporels »
+ ralentissent sur un an (+0,1 % après +0,9 %), comme ceux des véhicules (+0,1 % après
+ +0,4 %).
Les prix de l’habillement et des chaussures baissent sur un an à un rythme moins soutenu
+ qu’au mois précédent (‑0,9 % après ‑1,4 %), tandis que ceux des produits de santé
+ reculent sur un an au même rythme qu’en août (‑2,3 %).
Dans la grande distribution, les prix des produits d’alimentation industrielle, d’entretien
+ et d’hygiène-beauté baissent légèrement sur un an en septembre 2026 (‑0,3 % après
+ ‑0,2 % en août). Ceux des produits d’alimentation industrielle reculent au même rythme
+ qu’au mois précédent (‑0,2 %), comme ceux des prix des produits d’entretien et d’hygiène-beauté
+ (‑0,4 %).
+
Évolution des indices d’inflation sous-jacente et de l’IPCH (base 100 : année 2025 )
+
+
+
Regroupements conjoncturels
+
Pondérations
+
Indices
+
Variations (en %) au cours
+
+
+
+
2026
+
septembre 2026
+
du dernier mois (1)
+
des 12 derniers mois (2)
+
+
+
+
+
Ensemble « sous-jacent »
+
6 294
+
101,79
+
0,4
+
1,5
+
+
+
Produits alimentaires hors viandes, produits laitiers et exotiques
+
739
+
99,68
+
0,1
+
-0,5
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
1 951
+
99,66
+
0,1
+
-0,3
+
+
+
Services y compris loyers et eau
+
3 605
+
103,39
+
0,6
+
2,9
+
+
+
Ensemble IPCH
+
10 000
+
103,45
+
-0,3
+
3,4
+
+
+
Par rapport aux estimations provisoires publiées le 30 septembre 2026, l’évolution
+ annuelle de l’IPC est révisée à la hausse de 0,1 point et son évolution mensuelle
+ est confirmée. L’évolution annuelle de l’IPCH est confirmée et son évolution mensuelle
+ est révisée à la hausse de 0,1 point.
Les indices d’inflation sous-jacente (ISJ) excluent les tarifs publics et les produits
+ à prix volatils, et sont corrigés des mesures fiscales et des variations saisonnières.
+ Ils sont calculés pour tous les ménages et la France métropolitaine.
L’IPCH est l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé, utilisé pour les comparaisons
+ entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les ménages, en France.
+ La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses de santé : l’IPCH
+ suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis que l’IPC suit
+ des prix bruts.
Prochaine publication des résultats provisoires (sur le mois d’octobre) : le 30 octobre 2026,
+ à 8h45.
Prochaine publication des résultats définitifs (sur le mois d’octobre) : le 13 novembre 2026,
+ à 8h45.
Les indices d’inflation sous-jacente (ISJ) excluent les tarifs publics et les produits
+ à prix volatils, et sont corrigés des mesures fiscales et des variations saisonnières.
+ Ils sont calculés pour tous les ménages et la France métropolitaine.
L’IPCH est l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé, utilisé pour les comparaisons
+ entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les ménages, en France.
+ La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses de santé : l’IPCH
+ suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis que l’IPC suit
+ des prix bruts.
Prochaine publication des résultats provisoires (sur le mois d’octobre) : le 30 octobre 2026,
+ à 8h45.
Prochaine publication des résultats définitifs (sur le mois d’octobre) : le 13 novembre 2026,
+ à 8h45.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_cpiflash.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_cpiflash.html
new file mode 100644
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--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_cpiflash.html
@@ -0,0 +1,708 @@
+
Informations Rapides ·
+ 30 septembre 2026 · n° 242
En septembre 2026, les prix à la consommation augmenteraient de 3,0 % sur un anIndice des prix à la consommation - résultats provisoires (IPC) - septembre 2026
Paru le :Paru le30/09/2026
Prochaine parution le :
+ 30/10/2026 à 08h45 - octobre 2026
Cette publication s’appuie sur des données provisoires. Les indices qui y figurent
+ sont calculés sur un champ restreint d’observations de prix et à partir d’estimations
+ des évolutions de certains tarifs non encore disponibles. Les résultats définitifs
+ seront publiés le 15 octobre 2026. En conséquence, les indices provisoires ne doivent
+ pas être utilisés pour des revalorisations contractuelles.
Sur un an, selon l’estimation provisoire réalisée en fin de mois, les prix à la consommation
+ augmenteraient de 3,0 % en septembre 2026, après +2,4 % en août. Les prix de l’énergie
+ accéléreraient de nouveau, tirés par ceux des produits pétroliers et du gaz. L’inflation
+ des services augmenterait légèrement, notamment parce que la baisse saisonnière des
+ prix des services d’hébergement et de transport serait moins marquée qu’en septembre
+ 2025. Les prix de l’alimentation accéléreraient également, notamment ceux des produits
+ frais, tandis que la baisse de ceux des produits manufacturés s’atténuerait. Les prix
+ du tabac augmenteraient sur un an au même rythme qu’au mois précédent.
Sur un mois, les prix à la consommation se replieraient de 0,3 %, après +0,7 % en
+ août. Cette baisse s’expliquerait par le recul saisonnier des prix des services après
+ la période estivale, principalement dans les services de transport et les services
+ d’hébergement. Mais elle serait en bonne partie compensée par une nouvelle augmentation
+ des prix de l’énergie, principalement de ceux des produits pétroliers et du gaz. Les
+ prix des produits manufacturés augmenteraient comme chaque année en septembre. Ceux
+ de l’alimentation augmenteraient pour le troisième mois consécutif, une nouvelle fois
+ tirés par ceux des produits frais. Les prix du tabac seraient stables par rapport
+ à août.
Sur un an, l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé augmenterait de 3,4 % en
+ septembre 2026, après +2,6 % en août. Sur un mois, il baisserait de 0,4 %, après +0,7 %
+ le mois précédent.
+
Indices des prix à la consommation (Évolutions annuelles (en %) ; base 100 : année 2025) - *: indice des prix à la consommation.
+ **: indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé.
+
+
+
+
Pondérations 2026
+
septembre 2025
+
août 2026
+
septembre 2026 (p)
+
+
+
+
+
Ensemble IPC*
+
10 000
+
1,2
+
2,4
+
3,0
+
+
+
Alimentation
+
1 485
+
1,7
+
1,1
+
1,5
+
+
+
- Produits frais
+
170
+
1,6
+
5,9
+
9,9
+
+
+
- Autre alimentation
+
1 315
+
1,7
+
0,4
+
0,4
+
+
+
Tabac
+
168
+
4,1
+
3,3
+
3,3
+
+
+
Énergie
+
764
+
-4,4
+
16,7
+
21,2
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
2 388
+
-0,4
+
-0,4
+
-0,3
+
+
+
Services
+
5 195
+
2,4
+
1,9
+
2,2
+
+
+
Ensemble IPCH**
+
10 000
+
1,1
+
2,6
+
3,4
+
+
+
+
Évolutions de l'indice des prix à la consommation
+
+
+
+
Glissement annuel
+
Variation mensuelle
+
+
+
+
+
2026-09
+
3.0
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2026-08
+
2.4
+
0.7
+
+
+
2026-07
+
2.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2026-06
+
1.8
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2026-05
+
2.4
+
0.1
+
+
+
2026-04
+
2.2
+
1.0
+
+
+
2026-03
+
1.7
+
1.0
+
+
+
2026-02
+
0.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2026-01
+
0.3
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2025-12
+
0.8
+
0.1
+
+
+
2025-11
+
0.9
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2025-10
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
+
+
2025-09
+
1.2
+
-1.0
+
+
+
2025-08
+
0.9
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-07
+
1.0
+
0.2
+
+
+
2025-06
+
1.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-05
+
0.7
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2025-04
+
0.8
+
0.6
+
+
+
2025-03
+
0.8
+
0.2
+
+
+
2025-02
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2025-01
+
1.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-12
+
1.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-11
+
1.3
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2024-10
+
1.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2024-09
+
1.1
+
-1.2
+
+
+
2024-08
+
1.8
+
0.5
+
+
+
2024-07
+
2.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-06
+
2.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2024-05
+
2.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2024-04
+
2.2
+
0.5
+
+
+
2024-03
+
2.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-02
+
3.0
+
0.9
+
+
+
2024-01
+
3.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2023-12
+
3.7
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-11
+
3.5
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2023-10
+
4.0
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-09
+
4.9
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2023-08
+
4.9
+
1.0
+
+
+
2023-07
+
4.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-06
+
4.5
+
0.2
+
+
+
2023-05
+
5.1
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2023-04
+
5.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2023-03
+
5.7
+
0.9
+
+
+
2023-02
+
6.3
+
1.0
+
+
+
2023-01
+
6.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-12
+
5.8
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2022-11
+
6.1
+
0.3
+
+
+
2022-10
+
6.2
+
1.0
+
+
+
2022-09
+
5.5
+
-0.6
+
+
+
2022-08
+
5.9
+
0.5
+
+
+
2022-07
+
6.1
+
0.3
+
+
+
2022-06
+
5.8
+
0.8
+
+
+
2022-05
+
5.2
+
0.7
+
+
+
2022-04
+
4.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-03
+
4.5
+
1.4
+
+
+
2022-02
+
3.6
+
0.8
+
+
+
2022-01
+
2.9
+
0.2
+
+
+
2021-12
+
2.8
+
0.2
+
+
+
2021-11
+
2.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2021-10
+
2.6
+
0.4
+
+
+
2021-09
+
2.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2021-08
+
1.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2021-07
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-06
+
1.5
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-05
+
1.4
+
0.3
+
+
+
2021-04
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-03
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2021-02
+
0.6
+
0.0
+
+
+
2021-01
+
0.6
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-12
+
0.0
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-11
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-10
+
0.1
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-09
+
0.0
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2020-08
+
0.2
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2020-07
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2020-06
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-05
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-04
+
0.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-03
+
0.7
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-02
+
1.4
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-01
+
1.5
+
-0.4
+
+
+
2019-12
+
1.4
+
0.4
+
+
+
2019-11
+
1.0
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-10
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2019-09
+
0.9
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2019-08
+
1.0
+
0.5
+
+
+
2019-07
+
1.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2019-06
+
1.2
+
0.2
+
+
+
2019-05
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-04
+
1.3
+
0.3
+
+
+
2019-03
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
+
+
2019-02
+
1.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-01
+
1.2
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2018-12
+
1.6
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-11
+
1.9
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2018-10
+
2.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2018-09
+
2.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2018-08
+
2.3
+
0.5
+
+
+
2018-07
+
2.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2018-06
+
2.0
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-05
+
2.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2018-04
+
1.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2018-03
+
1.6
+
1.0
+
+
+
2018-02
+
1.2
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-01
+
1.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2017-12
+
1.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2017-11
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-10
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-09
+
1.0
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2017-08
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
+
+
2017-07
+
0.7
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2017-06
+
0.7
+
0.0
+
+
+
2017-05
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2017-04
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-03
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2017-02
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-01
+
1.3
+
-0.3
+
+
+
Définition : l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) est utilisé pour
+ les comparaisons entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les
+ ménages, en France. La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses
+ de santé : l’IPCH suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis
+ que l’IPC suit des prix bruts.
Publication des résultats définitifs (septembre 2026) : le 15 octobre 2026, à 8h45.
Prochaine parution (résultats provisoires – octobre 2026) : le 30 octobre 2026, à 8h45.
Définition : l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) est utilisé pour
+ les comparaisons entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les
+ ménages, en France. La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses
+ de santé : l’IPCH suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis
+ que l’IPC suit des prix bruts.
Publication des résultats définitifs (septembre 2026) : le 15 octobre 2026, à 8h45.
Prochaine parution (résultats provisoires – octobre 2026) : le 30 octobre 2026, à 8h45.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_gdp.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_gdp.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a922797
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_gdp.html
@@ -0,0 +1,632 @@
+
Informations Rapides ·
+ 28 août 2026 · n° 212
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le PIB est stable (+0,0 % après -0,2 %) et le pouvoir
+ d’achat des ménages recule nettement (-0,6 % par unité de consommation)Comptes nationaux trimestriels - résultats détaillés - deuxième trimestre 2026
Le produit intérieur brut (PIB) en volume est stable au deuxième trimestre 2026, après
+ -0,2 % au trimestre précédent. L’acquis de croissance pour l’année 2026 est de +0,3 %.
+
Le pouvoir d’achat du revenu disponible brut (RDB) des ménages par unité de consommation
+ recule nettement (-0,6 % après -0,2 %). Le taux d’épargne des ménages se replie fortement ce
+ trimestre : il s’établit ainsi à 17,2 % de leur RDB, après 17,9 % au trimestre précédent.
Le taux de marge des sociétés non financières (SNF) se stabilise au deuxième trimestre
+ 2026 : il se maintient à 31,5 % de leur valeur ajoutée, comme au premier trimestre
+ 2026.
Paru le :Paru le28/08/2026
Prochaine parution le :
+ 27/11/2026 à 08h45 - troisième trimestre 2026
Le produit intérieur brut (PIB) en volume est stable au deuxième trimestre 2026, après
+ -0,2 % au trimestre précédent. L’acquis de croissance pour l’année 2026 est de +0,3 %.
+
Le pouvoir d’achat du revenu disponible brut (RDB) des ménages par unité de consommation
+ recule nettement (-0,6 % après -0,2 %). Le taux d’épargne des ménages se replie fortement ce
+ trimestre : il s’établit ainsi à 17,2 % de leur RDB, après 17,9 % au trimestre précédent.
Le taux de marge des sociétés non financières (SNF) se stabilise au deuxième trimestre
+ 2026 : il se maintient à 31,5 % de leur valeur ajoutée, comme au premier trimestre
+ 2026.
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le PIB en volume* est stable (après -0,2 % au premier
+ trimestre). La consommation des ménages rebondit (+0,3 % après -0,3 %). La formation
+ brute de capital fixe (FBCF) recule légèrement ce trimestre (-0,3 % après -0,8 %),
+ pénalisée par la poursuite de la baisse de la FBCF en services marchands (-0,6 % après
+ +0,3 %) et par le repli de celle en construction (-0,2 % après -2,1 %). Les dépenses
+ de consommation des administrations publiques augmentent un peu plus vite qu’au trimestre
+ précédent (+0,4 % après +0,3 %). Au total, la demande intérieure finale hors stocks
+ contribue légèrement à la croissance du PIB ce trimestre (+0,2 point après -0,3 point).
Les exportations repartent nettement à la hausse ce trimestre (+2,9 % après -3,0 %),
+ en particulier dans l’aéronautique. Les importations, quant à elles, rebondissent
+ plus modérément au deuxième trimestre (+1,1 % après -0,6 %). Au total, la contribution
+ du commerce extérieur à l’évolution du PIB est positive au deuxième trimestre 2026
+ (+0,6 point après -0,9 point).
Enfin, la contribution des variations de stocks à l’évolution du PIB est négative
+ ce trimestre (-0,7 point après +0,9 point au trimestre précédent).
+
Le produit intérieur brut et ses composantes
+
+
+
+
Investissement
+
Commerce extérieur
+
Consommation
+
Variations de stocks
+
PIB
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
-0.06
+
0.57
+
0.25
+
-0.73
+
0.0
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
-0.18
+
-0.86
+
-0.08
+
0.93
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
0.03
+
0.56
+
0.19
+
-0.51
+
0.3
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
0.16
+
0.63
+
0.17
+
-0.53
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
0.1
+
-0.32
+
0.08
+
0.37
+
0.2
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
0.06
+
-0.43
+
-0.04
+
0.58
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
0.02
+
0.22
+
0.03
+
-0.28
+
0.0
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
-0.2
+
-0.47
+
0.48
+
0.62
+
0.4
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
0.09
+
0.35
+
-0.04
+
-0.18
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
-0.14
+
0.35
+
0.26
+
-0.22
+
0.2
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
-0.17
+
0.88
+
0.02
+
-0.22
+
0.5
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
-0.03
+
0.04
+
0.43
+
-0.08
+
0.4
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
0.28
+
0.81
+
0.12
+
-0.28
+
0.9
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
0.02
+
0.4
+
0.13
+
-0.41
+
0.1
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
0.16
+
0.28
+
0.01
+
-0.05
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
0.2
+
-0.69
+
0.49
+
0.51
+
0.5
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
-0.09
+
-0.48
+
0.54
+
0.41
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
-0.04
+
0.37
+
-0.3
+
-0.04
+
0.0
+
+
+
+
Le PIB et ses composantes en volumes chaînés (variations en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
2026 (acquis)
+
+
+
+
+
PIB
+
0,4
+
0,3
+
-0,2
+
0,0
+
0,9
+
0,3
+
+
+
Importations
+
1,0
+
-0,5
+
-0,6
+
1,1
+
3,0
+
0,6
+
+
+
Dép. conso. ménages
+
0,1
+
0,2
+
-0,3
+
0,3
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
+
+
Dép. conso. APU*
+
0,5
+
0,2
+
0,3
+
0,4
+
0,6
+
1,1
+
+
+
FBCF totale
+
0,7
+
0,1
+
-0,8
+
-0,3
+
0,7
+
-0,4
+
+
+
dont ENF**
+
1,0
+
-0,3
+
-0,5
+
0,1
+
0,7
+
0,0
+
+
+
dont Ménages
+
0,5
+
0,6
+
-1,6
+
-0,4
+
0,1
+
-1,2
+
+
+
dont APU*
+
0,5
+
0,3
+
-1,4
+
-1,1
+
2,7
+
-1,4
+
+
+
Exportations
+
2,8
+
1,0
+
-3,0
+
2,9
+
2,4
+
1,3
+
+
+
Contributions :
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Demande intérieure finale hors stocks
+
0,3
+
0,2
+
-0,3
+
0,2
+
0,5
+
0,2
+
+
+
Variations de stocks
+
-0,5
+
-0,5
+
0,9
+
-0,7
+
0,6
+
-0,1
+
+
+
Commerce extérieur
+
0,6
+
0,6
+
-0,9
+
0,6
+
-0,2
+
0,2
+
+
+
+
Production, consommation et FBCF : principales composantes (variations en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
2026 (acquis)
+
+
+
+
+
Production branche
+
0,7
+
0,3
+
0,0
+
0,1
+
1,0
+
0,7
+
+
+
Biens
+
1,4
+
0,0
+
-0,1
+
-0,1
+
1,2
+
0,5
+
+
+
Ind. manufacturière
+
1,0
+
-0,2
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
1,3
+
1,0
+
+
+
Construction
+
0,2
+
0,3
+
-1,7
+
-0,3
+
-1,8
+
-1,7
+
+
+
Services marchands
+
0,5
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
0,3
+
1,5
+
1,0
+
+
+
Services non marchands
+
0,3
+
0,2
+
0,3
+
0,2
+
0,4
+
0,9
+
+
+
Consommation des ménages
+
0,1
+
0,2
+
-0,3
+
0,3
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
+
+
Alimentaire
+
-0,9
+
0,4
+
-0,8
+
0,0
+
0,5
+
-0,6
+
+
+
Énergie
+
0,8
+
0,6
+
-2,4
+
-1,7
+
0,3
+
-3,4
+
+
+
Biens fabriqués
+
0,7
+
0,7
+
0,3
+
1,5
+
-0,5
+
2,2
+
+
+
Services
+
0,2
+
0,2
+
0,1
+
0,2
+
1,2
+
0,6
+
+
+
FBCF
+
0,7
+
0,1
+
-0,8
+
-0,3
+
0,7
+
-0,4
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
0,9
+
-1,2
+
0,0
+
0,2
+
0,8
+
0,1
+
+
+
Construction
+
0,2
+
0,4
+
-2,1
+
-0,2
+
-2,2
+
-1,9
+
+
+
Services marchands
+
1,3
+
0,6
+
0,3
+
-0,6
+
4,6
+
1,1
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le revenu disponible brut (RDB) des ménages en euros courants
+ augmente de nouveau (+0,5 % après +0,5 %). Les prestations sociales ralentissent légèrement
+ ce trimestre (+0,4 % après +0,6 %). La masse salariale reçue par les ménages augmente
+ à un rythme proche de celui du trimestre précédent (+0,3 % après +0,4 %). Les impôts
+ et cotisations accélèrent (+0,9 % après +0,5 %).
Dans le même temps, le prix de la consommation des ménages accélère (+1,0 % après
+ +0,6 %, en CVS-CJO). Ainsi, le pouvoir d’achat du RDB des ménages recule nettement
+ ce trimestre (-0,5 % après -0,1 %). Mesuré par unité de consommation pour être ramené
+ à un niveau individuel, il diminue de nouveau ce trimestre (-0,6 % après -0,2 %).
Le taux d’épargne des ménages fléchit fortement, sous l’effet combiné de l’accélération
+ de leur consommation et du recul de leur pouvoir d’achat : il s’établit ainsi à 17,2 %,
+ après 17,9 % au premier trimestre 2026.
+
Revenu disponible brut et ratios des comptes des ménages (variations t/t-1, en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
2026 (acquis)
+
+
+
+
+
RDB
+
0,0
+
0,5
+
0,5
+
0,5
+
0,5
+
1,3
+
+
+
RDB (pouvoir d'achat)
+
-0,4
+
0,3
+
-0,1
+
-0,5
+
-0,4
+
-0,4
+
+
+
RDB par uc* (pouvoir d'achat)
+
-0,4
+
0,2
+
-0,2
+
-0,6
+
-0,7
+
-0,7
+
+
+
RDB ajusté (pouvoir d'achat)
+
-0,2
+
0,2
+
0,0
+
-0,2
+
-0,1
+
0,0
+
+
+
Taux d'épargne (niveau)
+
17,7
+
17,7
+
17,9
+
17,2
+
17,8
+
nd
+
+
+
Taux d'épargne financière (niveau)
+
8,7
+
8,7
+
9,1
+
8,5
+
8,9
+
nd
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le nombre total d’heures travaillées recule légèrement
+ (-0,1 % après -0,1 %). L’emploi total est stable, après une quasi-stabilité le trimestre
+ précédent. Comme au trimestre précédent, la légère baisse de l’emploi salarié est
+ contrebalancée par une nouvelle hausse de l’emploi non salarié.
Le taux de marge des sociétés non financières (SNF) s’établit à 31,5 %, comme au trimestre
+ précédent. Il est de nouveau fortement pénalisé par les termes de l’échange, avec
+ l’augmentation des prix de l’énergie sur le marché mondial, mais cet effet est contrebalancé
+ par la baisse des salaires réels.
+
Ratios des comptes des sociétés non financières (niveaux en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
+
+
+
+
Taux de marge
+
32,4
+
32,5
+
31,5
+
31,5
+
32,4
+
+
+
Taux d'investissement
+
22,7
+
22,5
+
22,7
+
22,8
+
22,6
+
+
+
Taux d'épargne
+
21,1
+
19,3
+
19,7
+
19,6
+
20,2
+
+
+
Taux d'autofinancement
+
92,8
+
85,4
+
87,1
+
86,1
+
89,4
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le besoin de financement des administrations publiques
+ (APU) est quasi stable : il s’établit à 5,1 % du PIB, comme au premier trimestre 2026.
+ Les recettes publiques augmentent de 2,1 Md€, sous l’effet notamment d’une augmentation
+ des cotisations sociales ainsi que de la TVA. Les dépenses publiques sont également
+ en hausse ce trimestre (+2,5 Md€) soutenues par une nouvelle hausse des intérêts versés
+ ainsi que des prestations sociales.
L’évolution du PIB au deuxième trimestre 2026 est revue à la baisse de 0,2 point après
+ arrondi (-0,13 point avant arrondi), et celle au premier trimestre est revue à la
+ baisse de 0,1 point après arrondi (-0,03 point avant arrondi). Ces révisions s’expliquent
+ par la prise en compte de la situation encore plus dégradée de la production agricole
+ par rapport aux informations disponibles fin juillet, ainsi que des prix dans les
+ services marchands qui n’étaient pas intégralement connus fin juillet et qui se sont
+ avérés plus dynamiques qu’anticipés, en particulier dans les services de transports.
+
Depuis la précédente publication, de nouvelles informations ont été intégrées et les
+ coefficients de correction des variations saisonnières (CVS) et de correction des
+ effets des jours ouvrables (CJO) ont été actualisés.
Dans le cadre de la notification de la dette et du solde des administrations publiques
+ auprès de l’Union européenne, les comptes annuels sont mis à jour chaque année à la
+ fin du mois d’août, afin de tenir compte des dernières données des comptes des administrations
+ de sécurité sociale et des révisions pouvant affecter le compte de l’ensemble des
+ administrations publiques. Les tableaux annuels de finances publiques pour l’année 2025 ont ainsi été actualisés. Cette publication des résultats détaillés intègre la révision
+ de +0,9 Md€ du solde public 2025. En ratio, le solde n’est pas révisé en points de
+ PIB et se maintient à -5,1 % du PIB.
Cette publication est également à jour de la correction des données annuelles concernant
+ l’emploi en personnes physiques. Cette correction n’a pas d’impact sur les années
+ les plus récentes, mais elle revoit la ventilation des niveaux d’emploi par branches
+ sur le passé jusqu’en 2018 inclus.
* Les volumes sont mesurés aux prix de l’année précédente chaînés et corrigés des
+ variations saisonnières et des effets des jours ouvrables (CVS-CJO).
Prochaine publication de la première estimation du troisième trimestre 2026 : le 30
+ octobre 2026, à 7h30.
Prochaine publication des résultats détaillés du troisième trimestre 2026 : le 27
+ novembre 2026, à 8h45.
* Les volumes sont mesurés aux prix de l’année précédente chaînés et corrigés des
+ variations saisonnières et des effets des jours ouvrables (CVS-CJO).
Prochaine publication de la première estimation du troisième trimestre 2026 : le 30
+ octobre 2026, à 7h30.
Prochaine publication des résultats détaillés du troisième trimestre 2026 : le 27
+ novembre 2026, à 8h45.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_initial.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_initial.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a46c3b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_initial.html
@@ -0,0 +1,973 @@
+
Informations Rapides ·
+ 30 juillet 2026 · n° 184
Le PIB rebondit au deuxième trimestre 2026 (+0,2 % après -0,1 %) Comptes nationaux trimestriels - première estimation - deuxième trimestre 2026
Le produit intérieur brut (PIB) en volume* rebondit au deuxième trimestre 2026 (+0,2 %
+ après -0,1 % au premier trimestre 2026).
La demande intérieure finale (hors stocks) repart à la hausse : la consommation des
+ ménages augmente légèrement (+0,2 % après -0,3 %), de même que la consommation des
+ administrations publiques (+0,4 % après +0,3 %). À l’inverse, la formation brute de
+ capital fixe diminue de nouveau (-0,3 % après -0,8 %). Au total, la demande intérieure
+ (hors stocks) contribue à l’évolution du PIB pour +0,1 point après -0,2 point au premier
+ trimestre 2026.
La contribution du commerce extérieur à la croissance est positive ce trimestre (+0,6 point
+ après -0,8 point) : les exportations rebondissent franchement (+2,6 % après -3,1 %),
+ davantage que les importations (+0,8 % après -0,7 %). En miroir, la contribution des
+ variations de stocks à l’évolution du PIB est négative ce trimestre : -0,6 point après
+ +0,9 point au premier trimestre 2026.
Paru le :Paru le30/07/2026
Prochaine parution le :
+ 30/10/2026 à 07h30 - troisième trimestre 2026
Le produit intérieur brut (PIB) en volume* rebondit au deuxième trimestre 2026 (+0,2 %
+ après -0,1 % au premier trimestre 2026).
La demande intérieure finale (hors stocks) repart à la hausse : la consommation des
+ ménages augmente légèrement (+0,2 % après -0,3 %), de même que la consommation des
+ administrations publiques (+0,4 % après +0,3 %). À l’inverse, la formation brute de
+ capital fixe diminue de nouveau (-0,3 % après -0,8 %). Au total, la demande intérieure
+ (hors stocks) contribue à l’évolution du PIB pour +0,1 point après -0,2 point au premier
+ trimestre 2026.
La contribution du commerce extérieur à la croissance est positive ce trimestre (+0,6 point
+ après -0,8 point) : les exportations rebondissent franchement (+2,6 % après -3,1 %),
+ davantage que les importations (+0,8 % après -0,7 %). En miroir, la contribution des
+ variations de stocks à l’évolution du PIB est négative ce trimestre : -0,6 point après
+ +0,9 point au premier trimestre 2026.
+
Produit intérieur brut - Volume aux prix de l'année précédente chaînés - Série CVS-CJO
+
+
+
+
+
PIB
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
665948
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
664856
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
665829
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
664023
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
661119
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
659470
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
658396
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
658584
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
655894
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
654236
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
652665
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
649412
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
647076
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
641012
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
640113
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
637564
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
634341
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
631873
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
631961
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
628754
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
610572
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
603317
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
600623
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
600678
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
521639
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
594327
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
625545
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
628723
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
628476
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
625312
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
619428
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
615025
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
611700
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
610272
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
610620
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
606973
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
602473
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
598038
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
594101
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
590316
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
589245
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
590784
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
588961
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
587324
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
585537
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
585313
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
582006
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
583710
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
579779
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
578454
+
+
+
2013-T4
+
578555
+
+
+
2013-T3
+
575056
+
+
+
2013-T2
+
576231
+
+
+
2013-T1
+
571150
+
+
+
2012-T4
+
570057
+
+
+
2012-T3
+
570407
+
+
+
2012-T2
+
568484
+
+
+
2012-T1
+
570828
+
+
+
2011-T4
+
571045
+
+
+
2011-T3
+
569155
+
+
+
2011-T2
+
567231
+
+
+
2011-T1
+
567169
+
+
+
2010-T4
+
559772
+
+
+
2010-T3
+
556637
+
+
+
2010-T2
+
552881
+
+
+
2010-T1
+
550216
+
+
+
2009-T4
+
548702
+
+
+
2009-T3
+
544757
+
+
+
2009-T2
+
543504
+
+
+
2009-T1
+
542521
+
+
+
2008-T4
+
553036
+
+
+
2008-T3
+
560256
+
+
+
2008-T2
+
561496
+
+
+
2008-T1
+
565751
+
+
+
2007-T4
+
560738
+
+
+
2007-T3
+
560465
+
+
+
2007-T2
+
558572
+
+
+
2007-T1
+
554937
+
+
+
+
Le PIB et ses composantes en volumes chaînés (variations en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
2026 (acquis)
+
+
+
+
+
PIB
+
0,4
+
0,3
+
-0,1
+
0,2
+
0,9
+
0,5
+
+
+
Importations
+
1,1
+
-0,7
+
-0,7
+
0,8
+
3,0
+
0,1
+
+
+
Dép. conso. ménages
+
0,1
+
0,2
+
-0,3
+
0,2
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
+
+
Dép. conso. APU*
+
0,5
+
0,2
+
0,3
+
0,4
+
0,6
+
1,1
+
+
+
FBCF totale
+
0,7
+
0,2
+
-0,8
+
-0,3
+
0,7
+
-0,4
+
+
+
dont ENF**
+
1,0
+
-0,2
+
-0,5
+
0,1
+
0,7
+
0,1
+
+
+
dont Ménages
+
0,6
+
0,6
+
-1,7
+
-0,6
+
0,1
+
-1,4
+
+
+
dont APU*
+
0,5
+
0,4
+
-1,4
+
-1,0
+
2,7
+
-1,2
+
+
+
Exportations
+
2,8
+
1,0
+
-3,1
+
2,6
+
2,4
+
1,0
+
+
+
Contributions :
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Demande intérieure finale hors stocks
+
0,3
+
0,2
+
-0,2
+
0,1
+
0,5
+
0,2
+
+
+
Variations de stocks
+
-0,5
+
-0,6
+
0,9
+
-0,6
+
0,6
+
0,0
+
+
+
Commerce extérieur
+
0,6
+
0,6
+
-0,8
+
0,6
+
-0,2
+
0,3
+
+
+
La production totale (biens et services) se redresse au deuxième trimestre 2026 :
+ elle augmente de 0,3 %, après avoir été stable au trimestre précédent.
La production dans l’industrie manufacturière ralentit franchement ce trimestre (+0,1 %
+ après +0,5 %). Elle continue d’augmenter en matériels de transport (+0,4 % après +1,3 %) :
+ la production d’autres matériels de transport, en particulier dans l’aéronautique,
+ reste soutenue (+2,6 % après +4,0 %), alors que la production dans l’automobile recule
+ pour le quatrième trimestre d’affilée (-3,6 % après -3,5 %). La production de produits
+ pétroliers raffinés se replie (-1,8 % après +0,9 %), avec l’arrêt d’une raffinerie
+ pour maintenance. La production en énergie, eau, déchets est quasi stable ce trimestre
+ (-0,1 % après -1,8 %), suivant la demande. Enfin, la production agricole baisse pour
+ le deuxième trimestre consécutif (-0,9 % après -1,0 %).
La production de services marchands (hors construction) accélère au deuxième trimestre
+ 2026 (+0,6 % après +0,1 %), tirée à la hausse par les services de transport (+1,9 %
+ après +0,3 %), les services en information-communication (+0,5 % après +1,0 %), les
+ services aux entreprises (+0,7 % après +0,4 %) et les services aux ménages (+1,0 %
+ après +0,4 %), alors que l’hébergement-restauration et le commerce sont moins allants.
Enfin, la production continue de reculer dans la construction (-0,5 % après -1,7 %),
+ pénalisée par les travaux publics, tandis que la construction de bâtiments se stabilise.
+
Le produit intérieur brut et ses composantes
+
+
+
+
Investissement
+
Commerce extérieur
+
Consommation
+
Variations de stocks
+
PIB
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
-0.06
+
0.62
+
0.2
+
-0.59
+
0.2
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
-0.18
+
-0.83
+
-0.07
+
0.93
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
0.04
+
0.6
+
0.19
+
-0.55
+
0.3
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
0.17
+
0.57
+
0.17
+
-0.47
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
0.09
+
-0.31
+
0.06
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
0.05
+
-0.39
+
-0.03
+
0.53
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
0.02
+
0.21
+
0.05
+
-0.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
-0.21
+
-0.51
+
0.47
+
0.65
+
0.4
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
0.1
+
0.36
+
-0.05
+
-0.16
+
0.3
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
-0.15
+
0.38
+
0.27
+
-0.26
+
0.2
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
-0.17
+
0.88
+
0.03
+
-0.23
+
0.5
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
-0.03
+
0.01
+
0.43
+
-0.05
+
0.4
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
0.28
+
0.81
+
0.11
+
-0.26
+
0.9
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
0.02
+
0.41
+
0.14
+
-0.43
+
0.1
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
0.16
+
0.29
+
0.01
+
-0.07
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
0.2
+
-0.7
+
0.5
+
0.51
+
0.5
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
-0.09
+
-0.49
+
0.52
+
0.45
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
-0.04
+
0.36
+
-0.29
+
-0.05
+
0.0
+
+
+
+
Production, consommation et FBCF : principales composantes (variations en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
2026 (acquis)
+
+
+
+
+
Production branche
+
0,7
+
0,3
+
0,0
+
0,3
+
1,0
+
0,8
+
+
+
Biens
+
1,5
+
0,0
+
0,0
+
0,0
+
1,2
+
0,7
+
+
+
Ind. manufacturière
+
1,0
+
-0,2
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
1,3
+
1,0
+
+
+
Construction
+
0,3
+
0,3
+
-1,7
+
-0,5
+
-1,8
+
-1,7
+
+
+
Services marchands
+
0,5
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
0,6
+
1,5
+
1,3
+
+
+
Services non marchands
+
0,3
+
0,2
+
0,4
+
0,3
+
0,4
+
0,9
+
+
+
Consommation des ménages
+
0,1
+
0,2
+
-0,3
+
0,2
+
0,5
+
0,1
+
+
+
Alimentaire
+
-0,8
+
0,2
+
-0,6
+
-0,3
+
0,5
+
-0,8
+
+
+
Énergie
+
1,0
+
0,4
+
-2,5
+
-1,7
+
0,3
+
-3,5
+
+
+
Biens fabriqués
+
0,6
+
0,8
+
0,1
+
1,0
+
-0,5
+
1,7
+
+
+
Services
+
0,2
+
0,2
+
0,1
+
0,2
+
1,2
+
0,6
+
+
+
FBCF
+
0,7
+
0,2
+
-0,8
+
-0,3
+
0,7
+
-0,4
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
0,8
+
-1,1
+
0,0
+
-0,2
+
0,8
+
-0,3
+
+
+
Construction
+
0,3
+
0,4
+
-2,1
+
-0,5
+
-2,2
+
-2,1
+
+
+
Services marchands
+
1,3
+
0,7
+
0,4
+
0,0
+
4,6
+
1,7
+
+
+
La consommation des ménages rebondit légèrement au deuxième trimestre 2026 (+0,2 %
+ après -0,3 %). Les dépenses de consommation des ménages en biens sont quasi stables
+ ce trimestre (-0,1 % après -0,7 %). La consommation alimentaire (y compris tabac)
+ recule de nouveau légèrement (-0,3 % après -0,6 %), que ce soit en produits agricoles
+ ou en produits agro-alimentaires. La consommation en produits pétroliers raffinés
+ continue de baisser nettement (-3,5 % après -2,6 %), tout comme la consommation en
+ énergie, eau, déchets (-0,5 % après -2,4 %). Cette dernière est tirée à la baisse
+ par un mois d'avril marqué par des températures exceptionnellement élevées qui fait
+ plus que compenser le rebond en mai et la hausse de la consommation d'éléctricité
+ en juin générée par la canicule. La consommation en matériels de transport accélère
+ (+2,4 % après +0,9 %), en particulier les achats de voiture.
La consommation des ménages en services augmente de nouveau légèrement ce trimestre
+ (+0,2 % après +0,1 %). Elle est soutenue par l’accélération de la consommation des
+ services aux ménages (+1,7 % après +0,5 %), ainsi que par le léger rebond de la consommation
+ en hébergement-restauration (+0,2 % après -0,7 %). En revanche, elle est pénalisée
+ par les services de transport (-0,3 % après -0,8 %), notamment par les transports
+ aériens, et par l’information-communication (-0,6 % après 0,0 %).
La FBCF totale recule de nouveau au deuxième trimestre 2026 (-0,3 % après -0,8 %),
+ du fait d’une nouvelle baisse de la FBCF en construction (-0,5 % après -2,1 %), dans
+ un contexte de hausse des coûts. Elle est plombée par le génie civil, alors que le
+ bâtiment se stabilise après une forte chute au premier trimestre 2026.
L’investissement en produits manufacturés repart un peu à la baisse ce trimestre (-0,2 %
+ après 0,0 %) sous l’effet du recul de la FBCF en biens d’équipement (-1,1 % après
+ +1,3 %) et de celle en autres biens manufacturés (-2,0 % après -0,4 %). À l’inverse,
+ l’investissement en matériels de transport rebondit nettement (+2,4 % après -0,9 %),
+ en raison de la livraison d’un voilier de croisière.
Enfin, l’investissement en services marchands hors construction marque le pas (0,0 %
+ après +0,4 %). D’un côté, l’investissement en services aux entreprises recule de nouveau
+ (-0,2 % après -1,1 %), comme l’investissement en services immobiliers (-4,0 % après
+ -2,5 %) avec des transactions qui diminuent de nouveau dans l’ancien. De l’autre,
+ l’investissement en information-communication est en hausse, mais il ralentit (+0,5 %
+ après +2,2 %), notamment en services informatiques.
La contribution du commerce extérieur à la croissance du PIB est positive au deuxième
+ trimestre 2026 (+0,6 point, après -0,8 point au trimestre précédent).
Les exportations rebondissent franchement au deuxième trimestre 2026 (+2,6 % après
+ -3,1 %). Côté biens, les exportations de matériels de transport s’envolent (+20,1 %
+ après -18,8 %). Celles-ci sont principalement portées par les autres matériels de
+ transport (+33,6 % après -28,3 %), en particulier l’aéronautique, après un premier
+ trimestre dégradé. Les exportations de biens d’équipement sont également dynamiques
+ (+3,5 % après +1,2 %). Les exportations de produits agroalimentaires se replient (-1,3 %
+ après +1,8 %), tandis que les exportations de produits agricoles repartent légèrement
+ à la hausse ce trimestre (+1,1 % après -1,7 %). Enfin, les exportations en services
+ accélèrent (+1,5 % après +0,5 %), stimulées par les exportations de services aux entreprises.
Les importations rebondissent au deuxième trimestre 2026 (+0,8 % après -0,7 %). Les
+ importations de produits manufacturés repartent à la hausse (+0,7 % après -1,3 %),
+ dopées par les importations d’aéronautique et de naval (+15,5 % après -10,5 %) et
+ de biens d’équipement (+2,7 % après +1,5 %).
Les importations d’énergie, eau et déchets reculent de nouveau (-0,4 % après -0,9 %).
Enfin, côté services, les importations rebondissent (+1,2 % après -0,1 %), en particulier
+ dans les services aux entreprises (+1,8 % après -1,4 %), de concert avec les exportations.
La contribution des variations de stocks à l’évolution du PIB est négative au deuxième
+ trimestre 2026 (-0,6 point après +0,9 point), portées essentiellement par les produits
+ aéronautiques, après un fort stockage le trimestre précédent.
+
Revenu disponible brut et ratios des comptes des ménages (variations t/t-1, en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
2026 (acquis)
+
+
+
+
+
RDB
+
0,1
+
0,5
+
0,5
+
nd
+
0,5
+
1,0
+
+
+
RDB (pouvoir d'achat)
+
-0,3
+
0,3
+
0,0
+
nd
+
-0,4
+
0,1
+
+
+
RDB par uc* (pouvoir d'achat)
+
-0,4
+
0,2
+
-0,1
+
nd
+
-0,7
+
-0,1
+
+
+
RDB ajusté (pouvoir d'achat)
+
-0,1
+
0,3
+
0,0
+
nd
+
-0,1
+
0,2
+
+
+
Taux d'épargne (niveau)
+
17,7
+
17,7
+
17,9
+
nd
+
17,8
+
nd
+
+
+
Taux d'épargne financière (niveau)
+
8,7
+
8,8
+
9,1
+
nd
+
8,9
+
nd
+
+
+
+
Ratios des comptes des sociétés non financières (niveaux en %, données CVS-CJO)
+
+
+
+
2025T3
+
2025T4
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2025
+
+
+
+
+
Taux de marge
+
32,3
+
32,6
+
31,8
+
nd
+
32,4
+
+
+
Taux d'investissement
+
22,7
+
22,5
+
22,6
+
nd
+
22,6
+
+
+
Taux d'épargne
+
21,0
+
19,3
+
20,1
+
nd
+
20,2
+
+
+
Taux d'autofinancement
+
92,6
+
85,7
+
88,6
+
nd
+
89,4
+
+
+
L’estimation de la croissance du PIB au premier trimestre 2026 n’est pas révisée (après
+ arrondi). Toutefois, la contribution du commerce extérieur est revue à la hausse (à
+ -0,8 point au lieu de -0,9 point) tandis que celle des variations de stocks, en miroir,
+ est revue à la baisse (à +0,9 point au lieu de +1,0 point).
Depuis la précédente publication, de nouvelles informations ont été intégrées et les
+ coefficients de correction des variations saisonnières (CVS) et de correction des
+ effets des jours ouvrables (CJO) ont été actualisés.
* Les volumes sont mesurés aux prix de l’année précédente chaînés et corrigés des
+ variations saisonnières et des effets des jours ouvrables (CVS-CJO).
Prochaine publication des résultats détaillés du deuxième trimestre 2026 : le 28 août
+ 2026, à 8h45.
Prochaine publication de la première estimation du troisième trimestre 2026 : le 30
+ octobre 2026, à 7h30.
* Les volumes sont mesurés aux prix de l’année précédente chaînés et corrigés des
+ variations saisonnières et des effets des jours ouvrables (CVS-CJO).
Prochaine publication des résultats détaillés du deuxième trimestre 2026 : le 28 août
+ 2026, à 8h45.
Prochaine publication de la première estimation du troisième trimestre 2026 : le 30
+ octobre 2026, à 7h30.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_jobs.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_jobs.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6450c83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_jobs.html
@@ -0,0 +1,3358 @@
+
Informations Rapides ·
+ 7 août 2026 · n° 192
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le taux de chômage augmente de 0,2 point et atteint 8,3 %Chômage au sens du BIT et indicateurs sur le marché du travail (résultats de l'enquête
+ Emploi) - deuxième trimestre 2026
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le nombre de chômeurs en France au sens du Bureau international
+ du travail (BIT) augmente de 62 000 par rapport au trimestre précédent, à 2,7 millions
+ de personnes. Le taux de chômage s’établit à 8,3 % de la population active, supérieur
+ de 0,2 point à son niveau du premier trimestre 2026 et de 0,7 point à celui du deuxième
+ trimestre 2025 (+261 000 chômeurs). Le taux de chômage est à son plus haut niveau
+ depuis le troisième trimestre 2020 qui était affecté par la crise sanitaire, et depuis
+ le troisième trimestre 2019 auparavant. Il demeure toutefois nettement au-dessous
+ de son pic de mi-2015 (-2,2 points).
Paru le :Paru le07/08/2026
Prochaine parution le :
+ 10/11/2026 à 07h30 - troisième trimestre 2026
À partir de cette publication, le champ des principaux indicateurs conjoncturels du
+ marché du travail porte sur le champ « France », étendant ainsi le champ précédent
+ « France hors Mayotte ». Toutes les séries ont été rétropolées sur ce champ étendu
+ afin de permettre la comparaison entre toutes les périodes.
En effet, la collecte de l’enquête Emploi en continu couvre Mayotte depuis 2024, en
+ se substituant aux enquêtes annuelles qui la précédait. Des travaux méthodologiques
+ ont été nécessaires pour étendre le champ et rétropoler à fréquence annuelle puis
+ trimestrielle l’ensemble des indicateurs publiés, avec la même profondeur temporelle
+ qu’auparavant ; ces travaux sont détaillés dans la note méthodologique associée à
+ cette publication.
L’intégration de Mayotte modifie à la marge les niveaux des principaux indicateurs
+ conjoncturels du marché du travail et leurs évolutions. Ainsi, au deuxième trimestre
+ 2026, par rapport au champ hors Mayotte, le taux de chômage en France est rehaussé
+ de 0,06 point, tandis que le taux d’emploi des 15-64 ans est abaissé de 0,17 point ;
+ après arrondis, ce trimestre, les évolutions trimestrielles du taux de chômage (+0,2
+ point) et du taux d’emploi (-0,3 point) sont identiques sur les deux champs.
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le nombre de chômeurs en France au sens du Bureau international
+ du travail (BIT) augmente de 62 000 par rapport au trimestre précédent, à 2,7 millions
+ de personnes. Le taux de chômage s’établit à 8,3 % de la population active, supérieur
+ de 0,2 point à son niveau du premier trimestre 2026 et de 0,7 point à celui du deuxième
+ trimestre 2025 (+261 000 chômeurs). Le taux de chômage est à son plus haut niveau
+ depuis le troisième trimestre 2020 qui était affecté par la crise sanitaire, et depuis
+ le troisième trimestre 2019 auparavant. Il demeure toutefois nettement au-dessous
+ de son pic de mi-2015 (-2,2 points).
Sur le trimestre, le taux de chômage des 15-24 ans rebondit : +0,4 point, à 21,6 %.
+ Parmi les 25-49 ans, il augmente de 0,2 point, à 7,5 %, son plus haut niveau depuis
+ le premier trimestre 2021. Parmi les 50 ans et plus, il est également en hausse :
+ +0,3 point, à 5,5 %, son plus haut niveau depuis le premier trimestre 2022. Sur un
+ an aussi, le taux de chômage augmente pour toutes les tranches d’âge : +2,5 points
+ parmi les 15-24 ans, +0,5 point parmi les 25-49 ans et +0,7 point parmi les 50 ans
+ ou plus.
Le taux de chômage des femmes augmente de 0,4 point sur le trimestre à 8,2 %, tandis
+ que celui des hommes est stable, à 8,5 %. Sur un an, le taux de chômage augmente de
+ manière similaire pour les femmes et les hommes : +0,8 point.
Le deuxième trimestre 2026 est aussi le sixième trimestre de mise en œuvre de la loi
+ pour le plein emploi : sur les six trimestres cumulés, les bénéficiaires du RSA et
+ des jeunes de 15 à 29 ans inscrits à France Travail contribuent pour près de la moitié
+ de la hausse du taux de chômage (cf. infra).
+
Taux de chômage au sens du BIT
+
+
+
+
15 ans ou plus
+
25-49 ans
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
8.3
+
7.5
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
8.1
+
7.3
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
8.0
+
7.0
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
7.8
+
7.1
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
7.6
+
7.0
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
7.5
+
6.8
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
7.4
+
6.7
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
7.4
+
6.6
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
7.4
+
6.7
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
7.5
+
6.9
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
7.6
+
7.1
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
7.4
+
6.8
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
7.3
+
6.7
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
7.2
+
6.5
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
7.2
+
6.5
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
7.2
+
6.5
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
7.5
+
6.7
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
7.4
+
6.7
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
7.5
+
6.8
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
7.9
+
7.1
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
8.0
+
7.1
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
8.2
+
7.5
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
8.1
+
7.4
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
9.0
+
8.3
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
7.2
+
6.4
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
7.9
+
7.1
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
8.2
+
7.3
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
8.4
+
7.6
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
8.5
+
7.7
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
8.8
+
7.8
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
8.8
+
8.0
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
9.0
+
8.2
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
9.1
+
8.4
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
9.3
+
8.5
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
9.0
+
8.2
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
9.5
+
8.8
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
9.6
+
8.7
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
9.7
+
8.8
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
10.1
+
9.2
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
9.9
+
8.7
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
10.1
+
9.2
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
10.3
+
9.4
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
10.3
+
9.4
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
10.4
+
9.5
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
10.5
+
9.6
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
10.3
+
9.5
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
10.5
+
9.7
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
10.3
+
9.6
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
10.2
+
9.4
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
10.2
+
9.3
+
+
+
2013-T4
+
10.2
+
9.4
+
+
+
2013-T3
+
10.3
+
9.4
+
+
+
2013-T2
+
10.5
+
9.5
+
+
+
2013-T1
+
10.3
+
9.3
+
+
+
2012-T4
+
10.2
+
9.0
+
+
+
2012-T3
+
9.8
+
8.9
+
+
+
2012-T2
+
9.7
+
8.9
+
+
+
2012-T1
+
9.5
+
8.8
+
+
+
2011-T4
+
9.4
+
8.6
+
+
+
2011-T3
+
9.2
+
8.4
+
+
+
2011-T2
+
9.1
+
8.1
+
+
+
2011-T1
+
9.1
+
8.1
+
+
+
2010-T4
+
9.3
+
8.4
+
+
+
2010-T3
+
9.2
+
8.1
+
+
+
2010-T2
+
9.3
+
8.2
+
+
+
2010-T1
+
9.4
+
8.3
+
+
+
2009-T4
+
9.6
+
8.5
+
+
+
2009-T3
+
9.2
+
8.0
+
+
+
2009-T2
+
9.2
+
8.0
+
+
+
2009-T1
+
8.6
+
7.4
+
+
+
2008-T4
+
7.8
+
6.8
+
+
+
2008-T3
+
7.4
+
6.5
+
+
+
2008-T2
+
7.3
+
6.3
+
+
+
2008-T1
+
7.2
+
6.4
+
+
+
2007-T4
+
7.5
+
6.7
+
+
+
2007-T3
+
8.0
+
7.3
+
+
+
2007-T2
+
8.1
+
7.3
+
+
+
2007-T1
+
8.5
+
7.4
+
+
+
2006-T4
+
8.4
+
7.3
+
+
+
2006-T3
+
8.9
+
7.9
+
+
+
2006-T2
+
9.0
+
7.8
+
+
+
2006-T1
+
9.2
+
8.1
+
+
+
2005-T4
+
9.1
+
8.2
+
+
+
2005-T3
+
9.0
+
8.0
+
+
+
2005-T2
+
8.8
+
8.1
+
+
+
2005-T1
+
8.6
+
7.9
+
+
+
2004-T4
+
8.9
+
8.2
+
+
+
2004-T3
+
8.8
+
8.0
+
+
+
2004-T2
+
8.8
+
7.9
+
+
+
2004-T1
+
9.0
+
8.1
+
+
+
2003-T4
+
8.8
+
7.9
+
+
+
2003-T3
+
8.4
+
7.6
+
+
+
2003-T2
+
8.5
+
7.8
+
+
+
2003-T1
+
8.4
+
7.8
+
+
+
+
Taux de chômage BIT (Données CVS, en moyenne trimestrielle)
+
+
+
+
En % de la population active
+
Variation en points depuis
+
Milliers
+
+
+
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2026T1
+
2025T2
+
2019T4
+
2026T2
+
+
+
+
+
Personnes au chômage
+
8,1
+
8,3
+
0,2
+
0,7
+
0,1
+
2 677
+
+
+
15-24 ans
+
21,2
+
21,6
+
0,4
+
2,5
+
-0,3
+
740
+
+
+
25-49 ans
+
7,3
+
7,5
+
0,2
+
0,5
+
0,2
+
1 381
+
+
+
50 ans ou plus
+
5,2
+
5,5
+
0,3
+
0,7
+
-0,3
+
555
+
+
+
Hommes
+
8,5
+
8,5
+
0,0
+
0,8
+
0,2
+
1 398
+
+
+
15-24 ans
+
20,1
+
21,2
+
1,1
+
1,0
+
0,6
+
393
+
+
+
25-49 ans
+
7,7
+
7,5
+
-0,2
+
0,7
+
0,1
+
703
+
+
+
50 ans ou plus
+
5,7
+
5,9
+
0,2
+
1,1
+
-0,1
+
302
+
+
+
Femmes
+
7,8
+
8,2
+
0,4
+
0,8
+
0,1
+
1 279
+
+
+
15-24 ans
+
22,6
+
22,2
+
-0,4
+
4,5
+
-1,2
+
347
+
+
+
25-49 ans
+
7,0
+
7,5
+
0,5
+
0,4
+
0,3
+
678
+
+
+
50 ans ou plus
+
4,7
+
5,0
+
0,3
+
0,2
+
-0,6
+
254
+
+
+
Personnes au chômage de longue durée
+
2,0
+
2,1
+
0,1
+
0,4
+
-0,2
+
671
+
+
+
Parmi les personnes inactives au sens du BIT, 1,9 million souhaitent un emploi sans
+ être considérées au chômage parce qu’elles ne recherchent pas d’emploi ou ne sont
+ pas disponibles : elles constituent le halo autour du chômage. Ce nombre est quasi
+ stable sur le trimestre (+6 000).
La part du halo dans la population des 15-64 ans est stable sur le trimestre et quasi
+ stable sur un an (-0,1 point), à 4,4 %. Sur le trimestre, la part du halo augmente
+ de 0,2 point parmi les 15-24 ans, à 7,3 %, tandis qu’elle est stable parmi les 25-49
+ ans (à 4,3 %) et quasi stable parmi les 50-64 ans (-0,1 point), à 2,7 %.
+
Personnes dans le halo autour du chômage
+
+
+
+
Halo des 15 ans et plus, en milliers (éch. gauche)
+
Part du halo dans la population des 15-64 ans, en % (éch. droite)
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
1865
+
4.4
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
1859
+
4.4
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
1928
+
4.5
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
1933
+
4.5
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
1930
+
4.5
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
1912
+
4.4
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
1998
+
4.7
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
1861
+
4.3
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
1972
+
4.6
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
1942
+
4.5
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
1922
+
4.5
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
2054
+
4.8
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
2000
+
4.7
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
2031
+
4.8
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
1944
+
4.6
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
1885
+
4.4
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
1906
+
4.5
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
1896
+
4.5
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
1958
+
4.6
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
1908
+
4.5
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
2065
+
4.8
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
2086
+
4.9
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
2103
+
5.0
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
2057
+
4.8
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
2899
+
6.9
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
2064
+
4.9
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
2033
+
4.8
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
1979
+
4.7
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
1886
+
4.5
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
1819
+
4.3
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
1921
+
4.5
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
1924
+
4.6
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
1895
+
4.5
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
1916
+
4.5
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
1908
+
4.6
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
1855
+
4.4
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
1901
+
4.6
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
1927
+
4.6
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
1891
+
4.5
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
1915
+
4.6
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
1911
+
4.6
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
1856
+
4.5
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
1813
+
4.4
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
1827
+
4.4
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
1846
+
4.4
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
1889
+
4.5
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
1814
+
4.3
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
1824
+
4.4
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
1725
+
4.1
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
1768
+
4.2
+
+
+
2013-T4
+
1732
+
4.1
+
+
+
2013-T3
+
1723
+
4.1
+
+
+
2013-T2
+
1660
+
4.0
+
+
+
2013-T1
+
1616
+
3.9
+
+
+
2012-T4
+
1629
+
3.9
+
+
+
2012-T3
+
1627
+
3.9
+
+
+
2012-T2
+
1572
+
3.8
+
+
+
2012-T1
+
1608
+
3.9
+
+
+
2011-T4
+
1619
+
3.9
+
+
+
2011-T3
+
1611
+
3.9
+
+
+
2011-T2
+
1621
+
3.9
+
+
+
2011-T1
+
1620
+
3.9
+
+
+
2010-T4
+
1573
+
3.8
+
+
+
2010-T3
+
1610
+
3.9
+
+
+
2010-T2
+
1637
+
3.9
+
+
+
2010-T1
+
1597
+
3.8
+
+
+
2009-T4
+
1639
+
4.0
+
+
+
2009-T3
+
1596
+
3.8
+
+
+
2009-T2
+
1564
+
3.8
+
+
+
2009-T1
+
1530
+
3.7
+
+
+
2008-T4
+
1486
+
3.6
+
+
+
2008-T3
+
1507
+
3.6
+
+
+
2008-T2
+
1461
+
3.5
+
+
+
2008-T1
+
1508
+
3.7
+
+
+
2007-T4
+
1478
+
3.6
+
+
+
2007-T3
+
1467
+
3.6
+
+
+
2007-T2
+
1551
+
3.8
+
+
+
2007-T1
+
1525
+
3.7
+
+
+
2006-T4
+
1616
+
4.0
+
+
+
2006-T3
+
1532
+
3.7
+
+
+
2006-T2
+
1553
+
3.8
+
+
+
2006-T1
+
1553
+
3.8
+
+
+
2005-T4
+
1523
+
3.7
+
+
+
2005-T3
+
1510
+
3.7
+
+
+
2005-T2
+
1546
+
3.8
+
+
+
2005-T1
+
1545
+
3.8
+
+
+
2004-T4
+
1572
+
3.9
+
+
+
2004-T3
+
1603
+
4.0
+
+
+
2004-T2
+
1594
+
4.0
+
+
+
2004-T1
+
1585
+
4.0
+
+
+
2003-T4
+
1560
+
3.9
+
+
+
2003-T3
+
1554
+
3.9
+
+
+
2003-T2
+
1455
+
3.6
+
+
+
2003-T1
+
1521
+
3.8
+
+
+
Parmi les chômeurs, 671 000 personnes en moyenne déclarent au deuxième trimestre 2026
+ être sans emploi et en rechercher un depuis au moins un an, soit 36 000 de plus qu’au
+ trimestre précédent et 116 000 de plus qu’il y a un an. Le taux de chômage de longue
+ durée augmente ainsi très légèrement sur le trimestre : +0,1 point, portant la hausse
+ à +0,4 point sur un an. Il atteint 2,1 % de la population active, son plus haut niveau
+ depuis le deuxième trimestre 2022. La hausse sur un an est un peu plus prononcée pour
+ les hommes (+0,4 point) que pour les femmes (+0,2 point).
En moyenne au deuxième trimestre 2026, le taux d’emploi des 15-64 ans baisse de 0,3
+ point, à 69,0 %, portant le repli sur un an à -0,5 point.
Le taux d’emploi baisse sur le trimestre pour toutes les grandes tranches d’âge :
+ -0,3 point parmi les 15-24 ans, à 33,8 %, ainsi que parmi les 25-49 ans, à 82,4 %,
+ et -0,2 point parmi les 50-64 ans à 69,1 %. Il recule aussi sur un an pour chacune
+ d’entre elles : -1,0 point parmi les 15-24 ans, -0,5 point parmi les 25-49 ans et
+ -0,2 point parmi les 50-64 ans. Parmi les seniors, seul le taux d’emploi des 60-64
+ ans continue d’augmenter : +0,3 point sur le trimestre (+1,2 point sur un an), à 45,8 %.
Sur le trimestre, le recul du taux d’emploi des femmes (-0,3 point) est comparable
+ à celui des hommes (-0,2 point). Sur un an, le taux d’emploi des hommes diminue davantage
+ (-0,7 point) que celui des femmes (-0,2 point).
+
Taux d'emploi par âge
+
+
+
+
15-24 ans
+
15-64 ans
+
25-49 ans
+
50-64 ans
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
33.8
+
69.0
+
82.4
+
69.1
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
34.1
+
69.3
+
82.7
+
69.3
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
34.1
+
69.3
+
82.7
+
69.3
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
34.5
+
69.3
+
82.7
+
69.2
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
34.8
+
69.5
+
82.9
+
69.3
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
34.7
+
69.4
+
82.8
+
69.2
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
33.7
+
69.0
+
82.7
+
68.9
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
34.3
+
69.2
+
82.8
+
68.8
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
34.7
+
69.0
+
82.7
+
68.2
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
34.9
+
68.8
+
82.6
+
67.7
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
35.2
+
68.5
+
82.2
+
67.2
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
34.9
+
68.3
+
82.1
+
66.9
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
34.7
+
68.5
+
82.5
+
66.8
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
34.9
+
68.5
+
82.7
+
66.5
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
35.0
+
68.4
+
82.6
+
66.2
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
34.7
+
68.3
+
82.5
+
66.2
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
34.6
+
68.0
+
82.1
+
65.9
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
34.3
+
67.9
+
82.2
+
65.5
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
33.8
+
67.8
+
82.2
+
65.6
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
33.1
+
67.5
+
82.0
+
65.3
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
31.6
+
67.0
+
81.6
+
65.1
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
30.3
+
66.6
+
81.2
+
65.2
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
29.4
+
66.4
+
81.4
+
64.9
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
28.9
+
65.7
+
80.6
+
64.2
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
26.8
+
65.1
+
80.1
+
64.2
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
30.1
+
66.7
+
81.8
+
64.6
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
29.7
+
66.7
+
81.9
+
64.5
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
29.7
+
65.9
+
81.0
+
63.4
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
30.0
+
66.2
+
81.2
+
63.6
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
30.3
+
66.2
+
81.1
+
63.5
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
30.7
+
66.2
+
81.1
+
63.4
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
30.1
+
66.1
+
81.0
+
63.4
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
29.8
+
65.9
+
80.9
+
63.0
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
29.6
+
65.9
+
80.8
+
63.1
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
29.6
+
65.9
+
80.9
+
63.0
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
29.2
+
65.4
+
80.5
+
62.2
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
28.8
+
65.5
+
80.7
+
62.4
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
28.5
+
65.0
+
80.1
+
61.7
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
28.4
+
64.9
+
80.1
+
61.6
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
27.9
+
65.0
+
80.4
+
61.6
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
28.4
+
64.9
+
80.1
+
61.3
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
28.4
+
64.9
+
80.1
+
61.3
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
28.3
+
64.7
+
80.0
+
60.8
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
28.5
+
64.7
+
79.9
+
60.9
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
28.1
+
64.5
+
79.8
+
60.6
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
28.4
+
64.5
+
79.9
+
60.3
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
27.5
+
64.4
+
80.1
+
60.1
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
28.0
+
64.3
+
80.0
+
59.7
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
28.0
+
64.5
+
80.4
+
59.5
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
28.4
+
64.6
+
80.6
+
59.1
+
+
+
2013-T4
+
28.5
+
64.4
+
80.5
+
58.8
+
+
+
2013-T3
+
28.3
+
64.4
+
80.7
+
58.6
+
+
+
2013-T2
+
28.1
+
64.2
+
80.5
+
58.4
+
+
+
2013-T1
+
28.1
+
64.2
+
80.4
+
58.3
+
+
+
2012-T4
+
28.1
+
64.4
+
80.7
+
58.6
+
+
+
2012-T3
+
28.3
+
64.3
+
80.7
+
58.1
+
+
+
2012-T2
+
28.4
+
64.3
+
80.9
+
57.6
+
+
+
2012-T1
+
28.7
+
64.2
+
81.0
+
57.1
+
+
+
2011-T4
+
29.0
+
64.2
+
81.1
+
56.6
+
+
+
2011-T3
+
29.6
+
64.1
+
81.3
+
55.9
+
+
+
2011-T2
+
29.8
+
64.2
+
81.7
+
55.3
+
+
+
2011-T1
+
29.4
+
64.2
+
81.9
+
55.3
+
+
+
2010-T4
+
30.0
+
64.2
+
81.8
+
55.1
+
+
+
2010-T3
+
29.5
+
64.3
+
82.1
+
55.3
+
+
+
2010-T2
+
30.1
+
64.3
+
82.0
+
54.9
+
+
+
2010-T1
+
30.3
+
64.3
+
82.1
+
54.6
+
+
+
2009-T4
+
29.9
+
64.0
+
81.9
+
54.2
+
+
+
2009-T3
+
30.0
+
64.2
+
82.1
+
54.2
+
+
+
2009-T2
+
30.5
+
64.5
+
82.2
+
54.8
+
+
+
2009-T1
+
30.9
+
64.7
+
82.7
+
54.5
+
+
+
2008-T4
+
31.1
+
65.2
+
83.4
+
54.6
+
+
+
2008-T3
+
31.2
+
65.1
+
83.5
+
54.1
+
+
+
2008-T2
+
31.2
+
65.3
+
83.7
+
54.0
+
+
+
2008-T1
+
31.9
+
65.3
+
83.6
+
54.0
+
+
+
2007-T4
+
31.9
+
65.1
+
83.0
+
54.2
+
+
+
2007-T3
+
31.4
+
64.7
+
82.5
+
54.3
+
+
+
2007-T2
+
30.6
+
64.5
+
82.4
+
54.3
+
+
+
2007-T1
+
30.3
+
64.3
+
82.1
+
54.1
+
+
+
2006-T4
+
29.9
+
64.3
+
82.0
+
54.6
+
+
+
2006-T3
+
30.1
+
64.2
+
81.9
+
54.1
+
+
+
2006-T2
+
29.9
+
63.9
+
81.5
+
54.0
+
+
+
2006-T1
+
29.6
+
63.8
+
81.3
+
54.3
+
+
+
2005-T4
+
30.3
+
63.9
+
81.3
+
54.0
+
+
+
2005-T3
+
29.9
+
64.0
+
81.3
+
54.5
+
+
+
2005-T2
+
31.1
+
64.3
+
81.1
+
54.9
+
+
+
2005-T1
+
30.0
+
64.2
+
81.2
+
55.2
+
+
+
2004-T4
+
30.6
+
64.2
+
81.0
+
54.9
+
+
+
2004-T3
+
30.8
+
64.2
+
81.0
+
54.7
+
+
+
2004-T2
+
30.3
+
64.2
+
81.5
+
54.0
+
+
+
2004-T1
+
30.5
+
64.1
+
81.0
+
54.2
+
+
+
2003-T4
+
30.5
+
64.2
+
81.2
+
54.1
+
+
+
2003-T3
+
30.9
+
64.2
+
81.1
+
54.1
+
+
+
2003-T2
+
31.1
+
64.3
+
81.1
+
54.3
+
+
+
2003-T1
+
32.0
+
64.6
+
81.1
+
54.7
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le taux d’emploi à temps complet parmi les 15-64 ans baisse
+ de 0,2 point, à 57,3 %. Sur un an, il diminue de 0,4 point. Le taux d’emploi à temps
+ partiel parmi les 15-64 ans est stable tant sur le trimestre que sur l’année, à 11,7 %.
+ La part du temps partiel dans l’emploi est stable sur le trimestre, à 17,8 %, à un
+ niveau quasi identique (+0,1 point) à son niveau du deuxième trimestre 2025. Elle
+ est supérieure de 0,7 point à son précédent point bas de fin 2022, mais inférieure
+ de 1,0 point à son niveau de fin 2019.
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, 4,4 % des personnes en emploi sont en situation de sous-emploi.
+ Cette part est stable sur le trimestre et quasi stable sur un an (-0,1 point). Elle
+ demeure inférieure de 1,5 point à son niveau de fin 2019.
En moyenne sur le trimestre, 17,2 % des participants au marché du travail (personnes
+ actives ou dans le halo autour du chômage) se trouvent contraints dans leur offre
+ de travail, que celle-ci ne soit pas utilisée (au chômage ou dans son halo), ou sous-utilisée
+ (en sous‑emploi). Cette part est en hausse de 0,2 point sur le trimestre et de 0,5 point
+ sur un an, mais demeure nettement au-dessous de son niveau de fin 2019 (-1,8 point).
+
Du chômage à la contrainte sur l’offre de travail : parts parmi les participants (emploi,
+ chômage, halo) au marché du travail
+
+
+
+
Chômage
+
Chômage + halo
+
Contrainte sur l'offre de travail (chômage + halo + sous-emploi)
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
8.0
+
13.5
+
17.2
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
7.8
+
13.2
+
17.0
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
7.6
+
13.2
+
17.1
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
7.4
+
13.1
+
16.9
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
7.2
+
12.8
+
16.7
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
7.1
+
12.7
+
16.4
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
7.0
+
12.9
+
16.7
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
7.1
+
12.6
+
16.3
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
7.0
+
12.9
+
16.6
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
7.2
+
12.9
+
16.6
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
7.3
+
13.0
+
16.8
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
7.0
+
13.1
+
16.9
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
6.9
+
12.9
+
16.8
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
6.8
+
12.9
+
16.7
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
6.8
+
12.7
+
16.6
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
6.9
+
12.6
+
16.4
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
7.1
+
12.9
+
16.9
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
7.1
+
12.8
+
16.9
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
7.1
+
13.0
+
17.3
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
7.5
+
13.3
+
17.9
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
7.5
+
13.8
+
19.9
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
7.8
+
14.1
+
21.0
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
7.7
+
14.1
+
21.0
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
8.5
+
14.8
+
20.9
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
6.6
+
15.6
+
28.8
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
7.5
+
13.8
+
20.1
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
7.8
+
14.0
+
19.0
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
7.9
+
14.0
+
19.1
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
8.1
+
13.9
+
18.9
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
8.4
+
13.9
+
19.0
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
8.4
+
14.2
+
19.7
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
8.5
+
14.4
+
19.8
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
8.7
+
14.5
+
20.1
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
8.8
+
14.7
+
20.4
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
8.6
+
14.5
+
19.9
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
9.0
+
14.8
+
20.8
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
9.1
+
15.0
+
20.8
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
9.1
+
15.2
+
21.0
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
9.5
+
15.5
+
21.4
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
9.4
+
15.4
+
21.5
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
9.5
+
15.5
+
21.8
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
9.7
+
15.5
+
21.7
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
9.8
+
15.4
+
21.8
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
9.8
+
15.6
+
21.9
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
10.0
+
15.7
+
22.1
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
9.8
+
15.6
+
21.9
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
9.9
+
15.6
+
21.8
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
9.8
+
15.5
+
21.7
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
9.7
+
15.1
+
21.1
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
9.6
+
15.2
+
21.3
+
+
+
2013-T4
+
9.7
+
15.1
+
21.2
+
+
+
2013-T3
+
9.8
+
15.2
+
21.4
+
+
+
2013-T2
+
10.0
+
15.2
+
21.3
+
+
+
2013-T1
+
9.9
+
15.0
+
21.4
+
+
+
2012-T4
+
9.7
+
14.9
+
20.8
+
+
+
2012-T3
+
9.3
+
14.5
+
20.4
+
+
+
2012-T2
+
9.3
+
14.3
+
20.3
+
+
+
2012-T1
+
9.0
+
14.2
+
20.0
+
+
+
2011-T4
+
9.0
+
14.2
+
20.1
+
+
+
2011-T3
+
8.8
+
14.0
+
19.9
+
+
+
2011-T2
+
8.6
+
13.9
+
19.7
+
+
+
2011-T1
+
8.7
+
13.9
+
19.4
+
+
+
2010-T4
+
8.8
+
13.9
+
20.4
+
+
+
2010-T3
+
8.8
+
14.0
+
20.3
+
+
+
2010-T2
+
8.8
+
14.1
+
20.3
+
+
+
2010-T1
+
8.9
+
14.0
+
20.7
+
+
+
2009-T4
+
9.1
+
14.4
+
20.6
+
+
+
2009-T3
+
8.7
+
13.9
+
20.0
+
+
+
2009-T2
+
8.7
+
13.8
+
19.8
+
+
+
2009-T1
+
8.2
+
13.1
+
19.1
+
+
+
2008-T4
+
7.4
+
12.3
+
18.1
+
+
+
2008-T3
+
7.1
+
12.0
+
17.6
+
+
+
2008-T2
+
7.0
+
11.8
+
17.4
+
+
+
2008-T1
+
6.8
+
11.8
+
17.1
+
+
+
2007-T4
+
7.2
+
12.0
+
17.6
+
+
+
2007-T3
+
7.6
+
12.4
+
17.9
+
+
+
2007-T2
+
7.7
+
12.8
+
18.2
+
+
+
2007-T1
+
8.1
+
13.1
+
18.4
+
+
+
2006-T4
+
8.0
+
13.3
+
18.5
+
+
+
2006-T3
+
8.5
+
13.5
+
18.8
+
+
+
2006-T2
+
8.5
+
13.7
+
18.7
+
+
+
2006-T1
+
8.7
+
13.9
+
18.8
+
+
+
2005-T4
+
8.7
+
13.7
+
18.7
+
+
+
2005-T3
+
8.6
+
13.6
+
18.5
+
+
+
2005-T2
+
8.4
+
13.5
+
18.5
+
+
+
2005-T1
+
8.2
+
13.4
+
18.5
+
+
+
2004-T4
+
8.5
+
13.7
+
18.8
+
+
+
2004-T3
+
8.4
+
13.8
+
18.9
+
+
+
2004-T2
+
8.3
+
13.7
+
18.7
+
+
+
2004-T1
+
8.5
+
13.8
+
18.7
+
+
+
2003-T4
+
8.3
+
13.6
+
18.6
+
+
+
2003-T3
+
8.0
+
13.2
+
18.0
+
+
+
2003-T2
+
8.1
+
13.0
+
17.6
+
+
+
2003-T1
+
8.0
+
13.1
+
17.7
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le nombre moyen d’heures travaillées par emploi est stable
+ sur le trimestre et quasi stable sur un an, à 31,1 heures par semaine. Depuis mi-2022,
+ le nombre d’heures travaillées fluctue légèrement autour de son niveau d’avant la
+ crise sanitaire (31,3 heures au quatrième trimestre 2019).
+
Nombre moyen d’heures travaillées par semaine et par emploi
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
31.1
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
31.1
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
31.3
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
31.1
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
31.2
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
31.2
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
31.1
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
31.2
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
31.1
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
31.3
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
31.2
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
31.4
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
31.0
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
31.2
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
31.3
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
31.1
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
31.1
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
30.9
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
30.6
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
30.7
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
30.3
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
30.1
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
30.5
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
31.0
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
27.1
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
29.9
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
31.3
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
31.2
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
31.7
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
31.6
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
31.3
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
31.5
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
31.4
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
31.5
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
31.4
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
31.2
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
31.2
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
31.3
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
31.4
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
31.2
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
31.2
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
31.4
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
31.0
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
31.1
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
31.3
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
31.2
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
31.4
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
31.0
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
31.3
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
31.2
+
+
+
Sur le trimestre et sur un an, les taux d’emploi des 15-64 ans en contrat à durée
+ indéterminée (CDI) ou en contrat à durée limitée (CDD et intérim) sont stables. Le
+ taux d’emploi indépendant est stable sur le trimestre et quasi stable sur un an (-0,1
+ point), à 9,0 %. Le taux d’emploi en alternance baisse très légèrement sur le trimestre
+ (-0,1 point), portant à -0,2 point la baisse sur un an, à 2,3 %.
+
Taux d'emploi BIT dans la population des 15-64 ans (Données CVS, en moyenne trimestrielle)
+
+
+
+
En % de l'ensemble de la tranche d'âge
+
Variation en points depuis
+
+
+
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2026T1
+
2025T2
+
2019T4
+
+
+
+
+
Personnes en emploi
+
69,3
+
69,0
+
-0,3
+
-0,5
+
2,3
+
+
+
par sexe
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Hommes
+
71,5
+
71,3
+
-0,2
+
-0,7
+
2,1
+
+
+
Femmes
+
67,1
+
66,8
+
-0,3
+
-0,2
+
2,5
+
+
+
par âge
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
15-24 ans
+
34,1
+
33,8
+
-0,3
+
-1,0
+
4,1
+
+
+
25-49 ans
+
82,7
+
82,4
+
-0,3
+
-0,5
+
0,5
+
+
+
50-64 ans
+
69,3
+
69,1
+
-0,2
+
-0,2
+
4,6
+
+
+
Dont : 55-64 ans
+
62,1
+
62,1
+
0,0
+
0,4
+
6,7
+
+
+
par type de contrat
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
En CDI
+
51,0
+
51,0
+
0,0
+
0,0
+
1,3
+
+
+
En CDD
+
5,2
+
5,2
+
0,0
+
-0,1
+
-0,3
+
+
+
En intérim
+
1,3
+
1,3
+
0,0
+
0,1
+
-0,1
+
+
+
En alternance
+
2,4
+
2,3
+
-0,1
+
-0,2
+
0,7
+
+
+
Indépendant
+
9,0
+
9,0
+
0,0
+
-0,1
+
1,0
+
+
+
Sans contrat ni stage
+
0,4
+
0,4
+
0,0
+
0,1
+
-0,1
+
+
+
par quotité de travail
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Temps complet
+
57,5
+
57,3
+
-0,2
+
-0,4
+
2,8
+
+
+
Temps partiel
+
11,7
+
11,7
+
0,0
+
0,0
+
-0,5
+
+
+
Taux d'emploi en équivalent temps plein
+
64,5
+
64,2
+
-0,3
+
-0,5
+
2,5
+
+
+
Le taux d’activité des 15-64 ans se replie très légèrement, de 0,1 point sur le trimestre :
+ il s’établit à 75,4 % au deuxième trimestre 2026, juste en deçà de son plus haut niveau
+ depuis que l’Insee le mesure (1975) atteint au trimestre précédent (75,5 %). Il demeure
+ plus élevé qu’au deuxième trimestre 2025 (+0,2 point) et excède de 2,7 points son
+ niveau de fin 2019.
Sur le trimestre, le taux d’activité des 15-24 ans diminue de 0,2 point, à 43,1 %,
+ presque à son niveau d’un an auparavant (+0,1 point). Le taux d’activité des 25-49
+ ans baisse également, de 0,3 point, à 89,0 %. En revanche, le taux d’activité des
+ 50-64 ans augmente très légèrement (+0,1 point), portant à +0,3 point sa hausse sur
+ un an : il atteint 73,2 %, son nouveau plus haut niveau depuis que l’Insee le mesure
+ (1975). Parmi eux, le taux d’activité des 55-64 ans atteint 65,9 %, excédant de 0,8
+ point son niveau du deuxième trimestre 2025 et de 6,7 points son niveau de fin 2019.
+ Plus particulièrement, le taux d’activité des 60-64 ans augmente de 1,9 point sur
+ un an, à 48,7 %.
Sur le trimestre et parmi les 15-64 ans, le taux d’activité des femmes est stable
+ à 72,8 %, tandis que celui des hommes diminue de 0,2 point (78,0 %). Sur un an, l’écart
+ de niveau se réduit de 0,6 point : +0,4 point pour les femmes, -0,2 point pour les
+ hommes.
+
Taux d'activité BIT dans la population des 15-64 ans (Données CVS, en moyenne trimestrielle)
+
+
+
+
En % de l'ensemble de la tranche d'âge
+
Variation en points depuis
+
+
+
+
2026T1
+
2026T2
+
2026T1
+
2025T2
+
2019T4
+
+
+
+
+
Personnes actives
+
75,5
+
75,4
+
-0,1
+
0,2
+
2,7
+
+
+
par sexe
+
+
+
Hommes
+
78,2
+
78,0
+
-0,2
+
-0,2
+
2,5
+
+
+
Femmes
+
72,8
+
72,8
+
0,0
+
0,4
+
2,7
+
+
+
par âge
+
+
+
15-24 ans
+
43,3
+
43,1
+
-0,2
+
0,1
+
5,1
+
+
+
25-49 ans
+
89,3
+
89,0
+
-0,3
+
-0,1
+
0,7
+
+
+
50-64 ans
+
73,1
+
73,2
+
0,1
+
0,3
+
4,6
+
+
+
dont : 55-64 ans
+
65,7
+
65,9
+
0,2
+
0,8
+
6,7
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, la part des jeunes de 15 à 29 ans qui ne sont ni en emploi,
+ ni en formation, ni en études (NEET) est stable, à 13,3 %. Cette part se situe 0,3 point
+ au-dessus de son niveau d’un an auparavant et 0,9 point au-dessus de son niveau de
+ fin 2019.
+
Part des jeunes de 15 à 29 ans qui ne sont ni en emploi ni en formation (NEET)
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
2026-T2
+
13.3
+
+
+
2026-T1
+
13.3
+
+
+
2025-T4
+
13.1
+
+
+
2025-T3
+
12.8
+
+
+
2025-T2
+
13.0
+
+
+
2025-T1
+
12.9
+
+
+
2024-T4
+
12.9
+
+
+
2024-T3
+
12.5
+
+
+
2024-T2
+
12.6
+
+
+
2024-T1
+
12.6
+
+
+
2023-T4
+
12.5
+
+
+
2023-T3
+
12.8
+
+
+
2023-T2
+
12.3
+
+
+
2023-T1
+
12.3
+
+
+
2022-T4
+
12.5
+
+
+
2022-T3
+
12.0
+
+
+
2022-T2
+
12.2
+
+
+
2022-T1
+
11.9
+
+
+
2021-T4
+
12.4
+
+
+
2021-T3
+
12.7
+
+
+
2021-T2
+
13.2
+
+
+
2021-T1
+
13.5
+
+
+
2020-T4
+
12.9
+
+
+
2020-T3
+
13.9
+
+
+
2020-T2
+
15.8
+
+
+
2020-T1
+
12.6
+
+
+
2019-T4
+
12.4
+
+
+
2019-T3
+
13.1
+
+
+
2019-T2
+
12.5
+
+
+
2019-T1
+
12.6
+
+
+
2018-T4
+
12.9
+
+
+
2018-T3
+
13.6
+
+
+
2018-T2
+
13.0
+
+
+
2018-T1
+
13.3
+
+
+
2017-T4
+
13.2
+
+
+
2017-T3
+
13.5
+
+
+
2017-T2
+
13.8
+
+
+
2017-T1
+
13.4
+
+
+
2016-T4
+
14.0
+
+
+
2016-T3
+
13.7
+
+
+
2016-T2
+
13.9
+
+
+
2016-T1
+
14.0
+
+
+
2015-T4
+
14.3
+
+
+
2015-T3
+
14.2
+
+
+
2015-T2
+
14.2
+
+
+
2015-T1
+
14.2
+
+
+
2014-T4
+
13.8
+
+
+
2014-T3
+
13.7
+
+
+
2014-T2
+
13.4
+
+
+
2014-T1
+
13.8
+
+
+
La loi pour le plein emploi, votée en décembre 2023, a prévu une inscription systématique
+ auprès de France Travail, à compter de début 2025, des allocataires du RSA, des jeunes
+ accompagnés par les Missions locales et des personnes en situation de handicap accompagnées
+ par Cap emploi. Elle a entraîné de façon mécanique une hausse importante du nombre
+ d’inscrits à France Travail au premier trimestre 2025 (Ouvrir dans un nouvel ongletDares, 2025).
L’Insee a publié une photographie de la situation sur le marché du travail, au sens
+ du BIT, des bénéficiaires du RSA au second semestre 2024, à la veille de la mise en
+ œuvre de la loi (Insee, 2025). Depuis lors, l’Insee suit chaque trimestre dans ses publications conjoncturelles
+ sur le marché du travail, la contribution aux principaux indicateurs des publics concernés
+ par la loi pour le plein emploi. Plus précisément, sont détaillées les contributions
+ des bénéficiaires du RSA (en comptabilisant ici toutes les personnes de 15 ans ou
+ plus vivant dans un ménage dans lequel au moins une personne perçoit le RSA) et des
+ jeunes inscrits à France Travail (voir note méthodologique associée).
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le taux d’activité des bénéficiaires du RSA est quasi
+ stable sur le trimestre (+0,2 point), à 48,3 %. Depuis la mise en œuvre de la loi,
+ il a toutefois augmenté de 2,5 points. Sur six trimestres cumulés, les bénéficiaires
+ du RSA contribuent donc, compte tenu de leur poids, pour +0,13 point à l’évolution
+ du taux d’activité des 15-64 ans (+0,78 point au total).
Parmi les actifs, le taux de chômage des bénéficiaires du RSA atteint 48,6 %, soit
+ +1,7 point par rapport au premier trimestre 2026, portant la hausse à +7,9 points
+ par rapport au quatrième trimestre 2024. Compte-tenu de leur part dans la population
+ active, ils contribuent pour +0,08 point à l’évolution du chômage sur le trimestre
+ (+0,20 point au total) et pour +0,31 point à celle cumulée sur les six derniers trimestres
+ (+0,98 point au total).
S’agissant du taux d’emploi des bénéficiaires du RSA, il baisse de 0,8 point sur le
+ trimestre et de 2,5 points depuis fin 2024, pour atteindre 24,5 %. Depuis fin 2024,
+ les bénéficiaires du RSA contribuent pour -0,13 point à l’évolution globale du taux
+ d’emploi (-0,03 point).
+
Taux de chômage, taux d’emploi et taux d’activité au deuxième trimestre 2026 (Données CVS, en moyenne trimestrielle)
+
+
+
+
Niveau au T2 2026
+
Évolution depuis le T1 2026
+
Évolution cumulée depuis le T4 2024
+
+
+
En %
+
En points de %
+
En points de %
+
+
+
Niveau
+
IC
+
Part dans la population (****)
+
Évolution par rapport au T1 2026
+
Contribution à l'évolution totale (***)
+
Écart-type de la contribution (***)
+
Évolution par rapport au T4 2024
+
Contribution à l'évolution totale (***)
+
+
+
+
+
Taux d'activité des 15-64 ans
+
75,4
+
+/- 0,4
+
100,0
+
-0,1
+
-0,12
+
0,18
+
0,8
+
0,78
+
+
+
Bénéficiaires du RSA (*)
+
48,3
+
+/- 2,0
+
5,1
+
0,2
+
-0,01
+
0,07
+
2,5
+
0,13
+
+
+
Jeunes de 15 à 29 ans inscrits à France Travail (**)
+
78,6
+
+/- 1,7
+
3,8
+
-0,3
+
-0,01
+
0,05
+
1,1
+
0,04
+
+
+
Autres personnes
+
76,7
+
+/- 0,4
+
91,1
+
-0,1
+
-0,10
+
0,16
+
0,7
+
0,61
+
+
+
Taux de chômage
+
8,3
+
+/- 0,3
+
100,0
+
0,2
+
0,20
+
0,18
+
1,0
+
0,98
+
+
+
Bénéficiaires du RSA (*)
+
48,6
+
+/- 2,8
+
3,2
+
1,7
+
0,08
+
0,06
+
7,9
+
0,31
+
+
+
Jeunes de 15 à 29 ans inscrits à France Travail (**)
+
49,8
+
+/- 2,5
+
3,9
+
-0,4
+
-0,02
+
0,05
+
2,8
+
0,11
+
+
+
Autres personnes
+
5,1
+
+/- 0,2
+
92,9
+
0,1
+
0,14
+
0,12
+
0,3
+
0,57
+
+
+
Taux d'emploi des 15-64 ans
+
69,0
+
+/- 0,4
+
100,0
+
-0,3
+
-0,27
+
0,21
+
0,0
+
-0,03
+
+
+
Bénéficiaires du RSA (*)
+
24,5
+
+/- 1,8
+
5,1
+
-0,8
+
-0,07
+
0,08
+
-2,5
+
-0,13
+
+
+
Jeunes de 15 à 29 ans inscrits à France Travail (**)
+
39,4
+
+/- 2,1
+
3,8
+
0,2
+
0,01
+
0,04
+
-1,6
+
-0,06
+
+
+
Autres personnes
+
72,8
+
+/- 0,4
+
91,1
+
-0,2
+
-0,22
+
0,16
+
0,4
+
0,16
+
+
+
Au deuxième trimestre 2026, le taux d’activité des jeunes de 15 à 29 ans inscrits
+ à France Travail diminue de 0,3 point, à 78,6 %. Néanmoins, depuis fin 2024, il a
+ augmenté de 1,1 point. Sa contribution à l’évolution globale cumulée reste faible
+ (+0,04 point, sur +0,78 point au total).
Parmi les actifs, le taux de chômage des jeunes de 15 à 29 ans inscrits à France Travail
+ atteint 49,8 %, en baisse de 0,4 point sur le trimestre, ne contribuant ainsi presque
+ pas (-0,02 point) à l’évolution d’ensemble du taux de chômage sur le trimestre (+0,20
+ point). Depuis fin 2024, il augmente de 2,8 points, contribuant pour +0,11 point à
+ la hausse cumulée du chômage (+0,98 point).
Par ailleurs, le taux d’emploi des 15-29 ans inscrits à France Travail est quasi stable
+ sur le trimestre (+0,2 point à 39,4 %). Depuis fin 2024, il baisse toutefois de 1,6
+ point contribuant ainsi pour -0,06 point à l’évolution globale du taux d’emploi (-0,03
+ point).
Au final, après six trimestres de mise en œuvre de la loi pour le plein emploi, les
+ deux publics cibles de la loi pour le plein emploi contribuent pour près de la moitié
+ de la hausse du taux de chômage depuis fin 2024 (+0,44 point sur +0,98 point au total).
+ Ces contributions doivent toutefois être considérées avec prudence, du fait des aléas
+ d’enquête et de la faible part des populations concernées. Il s’agit par ailleurs
+ de contributions comptables, qui ne permettent pas de distinguer les effets de la
+ loi pour le plein emploi des effets conjoncturels affectant ces publics.
Sur le champ France (y compris Mayotte), en ne considérant donc que les révisions
+ provenant de l’actualisation habituelle des coefficients de variations saisonnières,
+ les taux de chômage, taux d’activité des 15-64 ans et taux d’emploi des 15-64 ans
+ ne sont pas révisés par rapport aux indicateurs mesurés au premier trimestre 2026.
Un chômeur au sens du Bureau international du travail (BIT) est une personne âgée
+ de 15 ans ou plus qui est sans emploi au cours de la semaine de référence, est disponible
+ pour travailler dans les deux semaines à venir et a effectué, au cours des quatre
+ dernières semaines, une démarche active de recherche d’emploi ou a trouvé un emploi
+ qui commence dans les trois mois.
Le nombre d’heures travaillées est à la fois corrigé des variations saisonnières (pour
+ prendre en compte les différences structurelles de temps de travail lors d’une période
+ donnée, par exemple au mois d’août de chaque année), et des effets calendaires (ces
+ derniers prenant en compte la spécificité calendaire de l’année, par exemple la position
+ des jours fériés sur tel ou tel jour de la semaine). Cette correction est effectuée
+ à l’aide d’un modèle économétrique.
Un NEET (neither in employment nor in education or training) est une personne qui
+ n’est ni en emploi, ni en études, ni en formation (formelle ou non formelle).
L’emploi en alternance regroupe ici les contrats d’apprentissage, les contrats de
+ professionnalisation et les stages.
La prochaine publication, portant sur le troisième trimestre 2026, est prévue le 10
+ novembre 2026 à 7h30.
Un chômeur au sens du Bureau international du travail (BIT) est une personne âgée
+ de 15 ans ou plus qui est sans emploi au cours de la semaine de référence, est disponible
+ pour travailler dans les deux semaines à venir et a effectué, au cours des quatre
+ dernières semaines, une démarche active de recherche d’emploi ou a trouvé un emploi
+ qui commence dans les trois mois.
Le nombre d’heures travaillées est à la fois corrigé des variations saisonnières (pour
+ prendre en compte les différences structurelles de temps de travail lors d’une période
+ donnée, par exemple au mois d’août de chaque année), et des effets calendaires (ces
+ derniers prenant en compte la spécificité calendaire de l’année, par exemple la position
+ des jours fériés sur tel ou tel jour de la semaine). Cette correction est effectuée
+ à l’aide d’un modèle économétrique.
Un NEET (neither in employment nor in education or training) est une personne qui
+ n’est ni en emploi, ni en études, ni en formation (formelle ou non formelle).
L’emploi en alternance regroupe ici les contrats d’apprentissage, les contrats de
+ professionnalisation et les stages.
La prochaine publication, portant sur le troisième trimestre 2026, est prévue le 10
+ novembre 2026 à 7h30.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_rebound.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_rebound.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a50abd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_rebound.html
@@ -0,0 +1,671 @@
+
Informations Rapides ·
+ 27 février 2026 · n° 55
En février 2026, les prix à la consommation augmentent de 1,0 % sur un anIndice des prix à la consommation - résultats provisoires (IPC) - février 2026
Paru le :Paru le27/02/2026
Prochaine parution le :
+ 30/10/2026 à 08h45 - octobre 2026
Cette publication s’appuie sur des données provisoires. Les indices qui y figurent
+ sont calculés sur un champ restreint d’observations de prix et à partir d’estimations
+ des évolutions de certains tarifs non encore disponibles. Les résultats définitifs
+ seront publiés le 13 mars 2026. En conséquence, les indices provisoires ne doivent
+ pas être utilisés pour des revalorisations contractuelles.
Sur un an, selon l’estimation provisoire réalisée en fin de mois, les prix à la consommation
+ augmenteraient de 1,0 % en février 2026, après +0,3 % en janvier. Cette hausse de
+ l’inflation s’expliquerait en partie par une baisse moins prononcée des prix de l’énergie,
+ provoquée par un effet de base sur les prix de l’électricité qui avaient fortement
+ reculé en février 2025. Les prix des produits manufacturés baisseraient moins qu’en
+ janvier. Les prix de l’alimentation accéléreraient sur un an, comme ceux des services
+ et du tabac.
Sur un mois, les prix à la consommation augmenteraient de 0,7 % en février, après
+ ‑0,3 % en janvier. Ce rebond des prix s’expliquerait par la hausse des prix des services,
+ tirés par le rebond saisonnier des services de transports, et par la hausse, également
+ saisonnière, des prix des produits manufacturés, du fait de la fin des soldes dans
+ l’habillement et les chaussures. Les prix de l’alimentation augmenteraient légèrement
+ sur un mois, comme ceux de l’énergie et du tabac.
Sur un an, l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé augmenterait de 1,1 % en
+ février 2026, après +0,4 % en janvier. Sur un mois, il rebondirait de 0,8 %, après
+ ‑0,4 % le mois précédent.
+
Indices des prix à la consommation (Évolutions annuelles (en %) ; base 100 : année 2025) - *: indice des prix à la consommation.
+ **: indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé.
+
+
+
+
Pondérations 2026
+
février 2025
+
janvier 2026
+
février 2026 (p)
+
+
+
+
+
Ensemble IPC*
+
10 000
+
0,8
+
0,3
+
1,0
+
+
+
Alimentation
+
1 485
+
0,3
+
1,9
+
2,1
+
+
+
- Produits frais
+
170
+
1,8
+
1,1
+
3,1
+
+
+
- Autre alimentation
+
1 315
+
0,1
+
2,0
+
2,0
+
+
+
Tabac
+
168
+
4,5
+
2,7
+
3,0
+
+
+
Énergie
+
764
+
-5,8
+
-7,6
+
-3,0
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
2 388
+
0,0
+
-1,2
+
-0,3
+
+
+
Services
+
5 195
+
2,2
+
1,7
+
1,8
+
+
+
Ensemble IPCH**
+
10 000
+
0,9
+
0,4
+
1,1
+
+
+
+
Évolutions de l'indice des prix à la consommation
+
+
+
+
Glissement annuel
+
Variation mensuelle observée
+
+
+
+
+
2026-02
+
1.0
+
0.7
+
+
+
2026-01
+
0.3
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2025-12
+
0.8
+
0.1
+
+
+
2025-11
+
0.9
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2025-10
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
+
+
2025-09
+
1.2
+
-1.0
+
+
+
2025-08
+
0.9
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-07
+
1.0
+
0.2
+
+
+
2025-06
+
1.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2025-05
+
0.7
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2025-04
+
0.8
+
0.6
+
+
+
2025-03
+
0.8
+
0.2
+
+
+
2025-02
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2025-01
+
1.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-12
+
1.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-11
+
1.3
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2024-10
+
1.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2024-09
+
1.1
+
-1.2
+
+
+
2024-08
+
1.8
+
0.5
+
+
+
2024-07
+
2.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-06
+
2.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2024-05
+
2.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2024-04
+
2.2
+
0.5
+
+
+
2024-03
+
2.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-02
+
3.0
+
0.9
+
+
+
2024-01
+
3.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2023-12
+
3.7
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-11
+
3.5
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2023-10
+
4.0
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-09
+
4.9
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2023-08
+
4.9
+
1.0
+
+
+
2023-07
+
4.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-06
+
4.5
+
0.2
+
+
+
2023-05
+
5.1
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2023-04
+
5.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2023-03
+
5.7
+
0.9
+
+
+
2023-02
+
6.3
+
1.0
+
+
+
2023-01
+
6.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-12
+
5.8
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2022-11
+
6.1
+
0.3
+
+
+
2022-10
+
6.2
+
1.0
+
+
+
2022-09
+
5.5
+
-0.6
+
+
+
2022-08
+
5.9
+
0.5
+
+
+
2022-07
+
6.1
+
0.3
+
+
+
2022-06
+
5.8
+
0.8
+
+
+
2022-05
+
5.2
+
0.7
+
+
+
2022-04
+
4.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-03
+
4.5
+
1.4
+
+
+
2022-02
+
3.6
+
0.8
+
+
+
2022-01
+
2.9
+
0.2
+
+
+
2021-12
+
2.8
+
0.2
+
+
+
2021-11
+
2.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2021-10
+
2.6
+
0.4
+
+
+
2021-09
+
2.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2021-08
+
1.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2021-07
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-06
+
1.5
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-05
+
1.4
+
0.3
+
+
+
2021-04
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-03
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2021-02
+
0.6
+
0.0
+
+
+
2021-01
+
0.6
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-12
+
0.0
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-11
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-10
+
0.1
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-09
+
0.0
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2020-08
+
0.2
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2020-07
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2020-06
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-05
+
0.4
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-04
+
0.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-03
+
0.7
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-02
+
1.4
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-01
+
1.5
+
-0.4
+
+
+
2019-12
+
1.4
+
0.4
+
+
+
2019-11
+
1.0
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-10
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2019-09
+
0.9
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2019-08
+
1.0
+
0.5
+
+
+
2019-07
+
1.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2019-06
+
1.2
+
0.2
+
+
+
2019-05
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-04
+
1.3
+
0.3
+
+
+
2019-03
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
+
+
2019-02
+
1.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-01
+
1.2
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2018-12
+
1.6
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-11
+
1.9
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2018-10
+
2.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2018-09
+
2.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2018-08
+
2.3
+
0.5
+
+
+
2018-07
+
2.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2018-06
+
2.0
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-05
+
2.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2018-04
+
1.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2018-03
+
1.6
+
1.0
+
+
+
2018-02
+
1.2
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-01
+
1.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2017-12
+
1.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2017-11
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-10
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-09
+
1.0
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2017-08
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
+
+
2017-07
+
0.7
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2017-06
+
0.7
+
0.0
+
+
+
2017-05
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2017-04
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-03
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2017-02
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-01
+
1.3
+
-0.3
+
+
+
Définition : l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) est utilisé pour
+ les comparaisons entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les
+ ménages, en France. La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses
+ de santé : l’IPCH suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis
+ que l’IPC suit des prix bruts.
Publication des résultats définitifs (février 2026) : le 13 mars 2026, à 8h45.
Prochaine parution (résultats provisoires – mars 2026) : le 31 mars 2026, à 8h45.
Définition : l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) est utilisé pour
+ les comparaisons entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les
+ ménages, en France. La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses
+ de santé : l’IPCH suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis
+ que l’IPC suit des prix bruts.
Publication des résultats définitifs (février 2026) : le 13 mars 2026, à 8h45.
Prochaine parution (résultats provisoires – mars 2026) : le 31 mars 2026, à 8h45.
diff --git a/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_stable.html b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_stable.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66ddb66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/backend/tests/fixtures/europe/fr_stable.html
@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+
Informations Rapides ·
+ 28 février 2025 · n° 58
En février 2025, les prix à la consommation augmentent de 0,8 % sur un anIndice des prix à la consommation - résultats provisoires (IPC) - février 2025
Paru le :Paru le28/02/2025
Prochaine parution le :
+ 30/10/2026 à 08h45 - octobre 2026
Cette publication s’appuie sur des données provisoires. Les indices qui y figurent
+ sont calculés sur un champ restreint d’observations de prix et à partir d’estimations
+ des évolutions de certains tarifs non encore disponibles. Les résultats définitifs
+ seront publiés le 14 mars 2025. En conséquence, les indices provisoires ne doivent
+ pas être utilisés pour des revalorisations contractuelles.
Sur un an, selon l’estimation provisoire réalisée en fin de mois, les prix à la consommation
+ augmenteraient de 0,8 % en février 2025, après +1,7 % en janvier. Pour la première
+ fois depuis février 2021, le glissement annuel serait en deçà de 1 %. Le net ralentissement
+ des prix s’expliquerait par un fort repli des prix de l’énergie : les prix de l’électricité
+ baisseraient nettement sur un mois alors qu’ils augmentaient fortement en février
+ 2024. Sur un an, les prix des services ralentiraient. Les prix des produits manufacturés
+ et du tabac ralentiraient aussi mais dans une moindre mesure, tandis que ceux de l’alimentation
+ accéléreraient légèrement.
Sur un mois, les prix à la consommation seraient stables en février 2025 (après +0,2 %
+ en janvier). Le rebond des prix des produits manufacturés après les soldes d’hiver
+ serait compensé par la baisse des prix de l’électricité, notamment les tarifs réglementés
+ qui diminuent de 15 %. Sur un mois, les prix de l’alimentation se replieraient légèrement.
+ À l’inverse, ceux des services accéléreraient un peu.
Sur un an, l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé augmenterait de 0,9 % en
+ février 2025, après +1,8 % en janvier. Sur un mois, il serait stable après ‑0,2 %
+ le mois précédent.
+
Indices des prix à la consommation (Évolutions annuelles (en %) ; base 100 : année 2015) - *: indice des prix à la consommation.
+ **: indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé.
+
+
+
+
Pondérations 2025
+
février 2024
+
janvier 2025
+
février 2025 (p)
+
+
+
+
+
Ensemble IPC*
+
10 000
+
3,0
+
1,7
+
0,8
+
+
+
Alimentation
+
1 464
+
3,6
+
0,1
+
0,3
+
+
+
- Produits frais
+
172
+
0,4
+
0,4
+
1,8
+
+
+
- Autre alimentation
+
1 292
+
4,1
+
0,1
+
0,1
+
+
+
Tabac
+
164
+
18,7
+
6,0
+
4,5
+
+
+
Énergie
+
807
+
4,3
+
2,7
+
-5,7
+
+
+
Produits manufacturés
+
2 284
+
0,4
+
0,2
+
0,0
+
+
+
Services
+
5 281
+
3,2
+
2,5
+
2,1
+
+
+
Ensemble IPCH**
+
10 000
+
3,2
+
1,8
+
0,9
+
+
+
+
Évolutions de l'indice des prix à la consommation
+
+
+
+
Glissement annuel
+
Variation mensuelle observée
+
+
+
+
+
2025-02
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2025-01
+
1.7
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-12
+
1.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-11
+
1.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2024-10
+
1.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2024-09
+
1.1
+
-1.2
+
+
+
2024-08
+
1.8
+
0.5
+
+
+
2024-07
+
2.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-06
+
2.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2024-05
+
2.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2024-04
+
2.2
+
0.5
+
+
+
2024-03
+
2.3
+
0.2
+
+
+
2024-02
+
3.0
+
0.9
+
+
+
2024-01
+
3.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2023-12
+
3.7
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-11
+
3.5
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2023-10
+
4.0
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-09
+
4.9
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2023-08
+
4.9
+
1.0
+
+
+
2023-07
+
4.3
+
0.1
+
+
+
2023-06
+
4.5
+
0.2
+
+
+
2023-05
+
5.1
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2023-04
+
5.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2023-03
+
5.7
+
0.9
+
+
+
2023-02
+
6.3
+
1.0
+
+
+
2023-01
+
6.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-12
+
5.9
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2022-11
+
6.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2022-10
+
6.2
+
1.0
+
+
+
2022-09
+
5.6
+
-0.6
+
+
+
2022-08
+
5.9
+
0.5
+
+
+
2022-07
+
6.1
+
0.3
+
+
+
2022-06
+
5.8
+
0.7
+
+
+
2022-05
+
5.2
+
0.7
+
+
+
2022-04
+
4.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2022-03
+
4.5
+
1.4
+
+
+
2022-02
+
3.6
+
0.8
+
+
+
2022-01
+
2.9
+
0.3
+
+
+
2021-12
+
2.8
+
0.2
+
+
+
2021-11
+
2.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2021-10
+
2.6
+
0.4
+
+
+
2021-09
+
2.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2021-08
+
1.9
+
0.6
+
+
+
2021-07
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-06
+
1.5
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-05
+
1.4
+
0.3
+
+
+
2021-04
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2021-03
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2021-02
+
0.6
+
0.0
+
+
+
2021-01
+
0.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-12
+
0.0
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-11
+
0.2
+
0.2
+
+
+
2020-10
+
0.0
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-09
+
0.0
+
-0.5
+
+
+
2020-08
+
0.2
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2020-07
+
0.8
+
0.4
+
+
+
2020-06
+
0.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-05
+
0.4
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-04
+
0.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-03
+
0.7
+
0.1
+
+
+
2020-02
+
1.4
+
0.0
+
+
+
2020-01
+
1.5
+
-0.4
+
+
+
2019-12
+
1.5
+
0.4
+
+
+
2019-11
+
1.0
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-10
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2019-09
+
0.9
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2019-08
+
1.0
+
0.5
+
+
+
2019-07
+
1.1
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2019-06
+
1.2
+
0.2
+
+
+
2019-05
+
0.9
+
0.1
+
+
+
2019-04
+
1.3
+
0.3
+
+
+
2019-03
+
1.1
+
0.8
+
+
+
2019-02
+
1.3
+
0.0
+
+
+
2019-01
+
1.2
+
-0.4
+
+
+
2018-12
+
1.6
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-11
+
1.9
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2018-10
+
2.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2018-09
+
2.2
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2018-08
+
2.3
+
0.5
+
+
+
2018-07
+
2.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2018-06
+
2.0
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-05
+
2.0
+
0.4
+
+
+
2018-04
+
1.6
+
0.2
+
+
+
2018-03
+
1.6
+
1.0
+
+
+
2018-02
+
1.2
+
0.0
+
+
+
2018-01
+
1.3
+
-0.1
+
+
+
2017-12
+
1.2
+
0.3
+
+
+
2017-11
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-10
+
1.1
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-09
+
1.0
+
-0.2
+
+
+
2017-08
+
0.9
+
0.5
+
+
+
2017-07
+
0.7
+
-0.3
+
+
+
2017-06
+
0.7
+
0.0
+
+
+
2017-05
+
0.8
+
0.0
+
+
+
2017-04
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-03
+
1.1
+
0.6
+
+
+
2017-02
+
1.2
+
0.1
+
+
+
2017-01
+
1.3
+
-0.2
+
+
+
Définition : l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) est utilisé pour
+ les comparaisons entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les
+ ménages, en France. La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses
+ de santé : l’IPCH suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis
+ que l’IPC suit des prix bruts.
Publication des résultats définitifs (février 2025) : le 14 mars 2025, à 8h45.
Prochaine parution (résultats provisoires – mars 2025) : le 28 mars 2025, à 8h45.
Définition : l’indice des prix à la consommation harmonisé (IPCH) est utilisé pour
+ les comparaisons entre membres de l’Union européenne. Il est calculé pour tous les
+ ménages, en France. La principale différence entre l’IPCH et l’IPC porte sur les dépenses
+ de santé : l’IPCH suit des prix nets des remboursements de la sécurité sociale tandis
+ que l’IPC suit des prix bruts.
Publication des résultats définitifs (février 2025) : le 14 mars 2025, à 8h45.
Prochaine parution (résultats provisoires – mars 2025) : le 28 mars 2025, à 8h45.
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 2.8% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 3.0% the previous month.
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.2% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.3% in June 2025.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 2.6% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 2.8% the previous month.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.1% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.3% in June 2025.
Transport, and food and non-alcoholic beverages made the largest downward contributions to the monthly change in both CPIH and CPI annual rates.
Core CPIH (CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) rose by 2.8% in the 12 months to June 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to May; the CPIH goods annual rate slowed from 2.0% to 1.7%, while the CPIH services annual rate was unchanged, at 3.6%.
Core CPI (CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) rose by 2.6% in the 12 months to June 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to May; the CPI goods annual rate slowed from 2.0% to 1.7%, while the CPI services annual rate eased from 3.7% to 3.6%.
+
+
Table 1: CPIH, OOH component and CPI index values, and annual and monthly rates UK, June 2025 to June 2026
+
+
CPIH Index (UK, 2015 = 100)
CPIH 12- month rate (%)
CPIH 1- month rate (%)
CPI Index (UK, 2015=100)
CPI 12- month rate (%)
CPI 1- month rate (%)
OOH Index (UK, 2015=100)
OOH 12- month rate (%)
+
2025
Jun
138.4
4.1
0.3
138.9
3.6
0.3
134.2
6.4
+
Jul
138.5
4.2
0.0
139.0
3.8
0.1
134.0
5.5
+
Aug
138.9
4.1
0.3
139.3
3.8
0.3
134.5
5.3
+
Sep
138.9
4.1
0.1
139.3
3.8
0.0
135.1
5.2
+
Oct
139.5
3.8
0.4
139.8
3.6
0.4
135.7
4.8
+
Nov
139.4
3.5
-0.1
139.5
3.2
-0.2
136.5
4.5
+
Dec
139.9
3.6
0.4
140.1
3.4
0.4
136.8
4.2
+
2026
Jan
139.4
3.2
-0.3
139.5
3.0
-0.5
137.0
3.9
+
Feb
140.0
3.2
0.4
140.1
3.0
0.4
137.4
3.8
+
Mar
140.8
3.4
0.6
141.0
3.3
0.7
137.7
3.6
+
Apr
141.8
3.0
0.8
142.1
2.8
0.7
137.9
3.6
+
May
142.1
3.0
0.2
142.4
2.8
0.2
138.1
3.3
+
Jun
142.3
2.8
0.2
142.5
2.6
0.1
138.6
3.3
+
+
+
+
+
+
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 2.8% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 3.0% the previous month (Figure 1). The 12-month rate for June was the lowest recorded since September 2024, when it was 2.6%.
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.2% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.3% in June 2025.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 2.6% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 2.8% the previous month. The 12-month rate was also 2.6% in March 2025 and it was last lower in December 2024, when it was 2.5%.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.1% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.3% in June 2025.
The main drivers of the annual inflation rate for CPIH and CPI are the same where they are common to both measures. However, the owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs component accounts for approximately 18% of the CPIH and is the main driver for differences between the CPIH and CPI inflation rates.
Table 2: CPIH annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, June 2025, May 2026, and June 2026
+
+
CPIH 12-month rate (%)
CPIH 1-month rate (%)
+
May 2026
June 2026
June 2025
June 2026
+
CPIH All items
3.0
2.8
0.3
0.2
+
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
2.2
1.7
0.3
-0.2
+
Alcohol and tobacco
2.4
2.1
0.5
0.1
+
Clothing and footwear
0.2
-0.5
-0.4
-1.2
+
Housing and household services
2.7
2.7
0.2
0.2
+
of which owner occupiers' housing costs
3.3
3.3
0.3
0.3
+
Furniture and household goods
-0.1
-0.2
0.4
0.3
+
Health
2.4
2.5
0.3
0.4
+
Transport
6.8
5.7
0.7
-0.3
+
Communication
5.1
5.2
0.0
0.1
+
Recreation and culture
1.5
1.7
0.3
0.5
+
Education
5.1
5.1
0.0
0.0
+
Restaurants and hotels
4.2
4.4
0.8
1.0
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.4
2.7
0.0
0.2
+
+
All goods
2.0
1.7
0.0
-0.3
+
All services
3.6
3.6
0.5
0.4
+
CPIH exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPIH)
2.8
2.8
0.3
0.3
+
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 2 shows the contributions from the 12 divisions to the change in the annual Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) inflation rate between May and June 2026. These sum to the change in the annual rate, from 3.0% to 2.8%, between these months.
The decrease in the 12-month rate between May and June 2026 reflected downward contributions from five divisions, partially offset by upward contributions from three divisions. The largest downward contribution came from transport, particularly motor fuels. There were no large, offsetting upward contributions.
Prices in the transport division rose overall by 5.7% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 6.8% the previous month (Figure 3). On a monthly basis, prices fell by 0.3% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.7% a year ago.
+
+
+
+
+
The largest downward effect behind the slowing in the transport annual rate came from motor fuels, particularly diesel.
The average price of diesel fell by 10.7 pence per litre between May and June 2026, compared with a fall of 0.6 pence per litre between May and June 2025. The average price stood at 176.4 pence per litre in June 2026.
Petrol prices fell by 2.1 pence per litre in June 2026, compared with a fall of 0.5 pence per litre in June 2025. The average price stood at 155.3 pence per litre in June 2026. This is the first time petrol prices have eased since the start of the conflict in the Middle East, on 28 February 2026.
These movements resulted in overall motor fuel prices rising by 21.3% in the 12 months to June 2026, compared with a rise of 24.6% in the 12 months to May, which was the highest recorded rate since September 2022.
Within transport, there was a smaller downward effect from vehicle maintenance and repair. Prices fell by 0.2% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 2.0% in June 2025. The movements were caused by price changes for roadside recovery services.
Food and non-alcoholic beverage prices rose by 1.7% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 2.2% the previous month (Figure 4). The annual rate in June was the lowest since August 2024, when it was 1.3%. On a monthly basis, food and non-alcoholic beverage prices fell by 0.2% in June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.3% a year ago.
+
+
+
+
+
There were small downward effects behind the change in the annual rate from 5 of the 11 detailed classes. The largest of these effects came from sugar, jam, syrups, chocolate and confectionery, for which prices of chocolate fell by more in June 2026 than June 2025. This class made a downward contribution of 0.02 percentage points to the change in the CPIH inflation rate.
Other slightly smaller downward effects came from oils and fats (particularly margarine and other vegetable oils), meat (particularly beef), dairy, and vegetables. Prices of oils and fats, and dairy, fell in June 2026, compared with a price rise and little change a year ago, respectively. Meat and vegetable prices rose in June 2026 but by less than in June 2025.
The other six detailed classes within food and non-alcoholic beverages had little effect on the change in the headline rate. These were bread and cereals, fish, fruit, other food products, hot beverages, and soft drinks.
Clothing and footwear prices fell by 0.5% in the 12 months to June 2026, compared with a rise of 0.2% the previous month.
On a monthly basis, prices fell by 1.2% in June 2026, compared with a smaller fall of 0.4% in June 2025. Prices tend to fall in June as the summer sales season begins, and the movements reflect changes in the proportion of discounted prices in the datasets. This proportion rose between May and June this year by more than the rise seen over the same period a year ago.
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 5 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) series for all goods and all services, together with CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (often referred to as core CPIH). The CPIH inflation rate is added for comparison.
The core CPIH annual inflation rate was 2.8% in June 2026, the same rate as in April and May. These are the joint lowest rates since September 2021.
The CPIH all-goods index rose by 1.7% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 2.0% the previous month. There were large downward contributions to the change in the annual rate from energy, particularly motor fuels and domestic heating oil, and from food, alcoholic beverages and tobacco.
The CPIH all-services index rose by 3.6% in the 12 months to June 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to May. The upward and downward contributions to the change in the annual rate were small and offset one another. The largest downward contribution came from services for personal transport equipment, and the largest upward contribution came from package holidays and accommodation.
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 6 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPIH inflation rate over the last two years. The contribution of each category to the annual rate depends on the price movement in that category and its weight, which is updated annually.
The largest positive contribution to the CPIH annual inflation rate came from housing and household services. The division has made the largest contribution for the last 24 months, starting from July 2024. However, its contribution has eased from a recent high in April 2025, and was unchanged between May and June 2026. The contributions in the latest two months were jointly the smallest since June 2024.
The contribution from food and non-alcoholic beverages has also broadly eased over recent months. It was 0.15 percentage points in June 2026, the smallest since August 2024.
Similarly, the contribution from alcohol and tobacco has eased over the last year. It was 0.06 percentage points in June 2026, the smallest since July 2021, when it was also 0.06 percentage points. The contribution was last smaller in March 2020.
In contrast, the contribution from restaurants and hotels has risen to 0.49 percentage points in June 2026, the largest contribution since October 2024.
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 7 shows the contributions from owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax to the annual CPIH inflation rate in the context of wider housing-related costs. The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) differs from the CPIH because it does not include these two components.
The annual contribution from OOH costs rose slightly, to 0.58 percentage points, in June 2026. This was the first rise between months since January 2025 and followed 16 consecutive decreases. Although the current contribution was larger than the previous month's, it was smaller than the recent high of 1.31 percentage points in January 2025.
The annual contribution from electricity, gas and other fuels was negative 0.17 percentage points in June 2026, unchanged from May. An easing in the contribution from domestic heating oil was offset by smaller upward contributions from classes such as electricity.
While the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is our most comprehensive measure of consumer price inflation, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is based on a harmonised methodology developed by Eurostat. This enables international comparisons to be drawn. It is also used to set the operational inflation target for UK monetary policy, and to uprate working-age benefits and tax credits. More information on the use cases for our consumer price inflation statistics can be found in our Measuring changing prices and costs for consumers and households: December 2023 article.
Figure 8 shows annual CPI inflation for the UK compared with the EU average and selected G7 countries. While the UK CPI is produced on a comparable basis with EU countries, the US Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) differs in some respects. More information is available in Note 1 to Figure 8.
The UK's CPI annual inflation rate of 2.6% was lower than the EU rate (2.9%) but higher than that for France (2.0%) and Germany (2.4%) in June 2026.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
Table 3: CPI annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, June 2025, May 2026, and June 2026
+
+
CPI 12-month rate (%)
CPI 1-month rate (%)
+
May 2026
June 2026
June 2025
June 2026
+
CPI All items
2.8
2.6
0.3
0.1
+
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
2.2
1.7
0.3
-0.2
+
Alcohol and tobacco
2.4
2.1
0.5
0.1
+
Clothing and footwear
0.2
-0.5
-0.4
-1.2
+
Housing and household services
1.2
1.2
0.1
0.0
+
Furniture and household goods
-0.1
-0.2
0.4
0.3
+
Health
2.4
2.5
0.3
0.4
+
Transport
6.8
5.7
0.7
-0.3
+
Communication
5.1
5.2
0.0
0.1
+
Recreation and culture
1.5
1.7
0.3
0.5
+
Education
5.1
5.1
0.0
0.0
+
Restaurants and hotels
4.2
4.4
0.8
1.0
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.4
2.7
0.0
0.2
+
+
All goods
2.0
1.7
0.0
-0.3
+
All services
3.7
3.6
0.6
0.5
+
CPI exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPI)
2.6
2.6
0.4
0.3
+
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 9 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the CPI all-goods and all-services series, together with CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (often referred to as core CPI). The headline CPI inflation rate is added for comparison.
The core CPI annual inflation rate was 2.6% in June 2026, unchanged from May.
The CPI all-goods index rose by 1.7% in the 12 months to June 2026, down from 2.0% the previous month.
The CPI all-services index rose by 3.6% in the 12 months to June 2026, down slightly from 3.7% the previous month.
As with the all-items annual inflation rates, the drivers of CPIH and CPI goods and services inflation are the same (except for owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax, which are excluded from CPI). The drivers are discussed in more detail in Section 4: Latest movements in CPIH inflation.
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 10 shows how each of the main groups of goods and services contributed to the change in the CPI annual inflation rate between May and June 2026.
The rate's slowing in June 2026 reflected downward contributions from six divisions, partially offset by upward contributions from three divisions. The largest downward contribution came from transport, particularly motor fuels. There were no large, offsetting upward contributions.
Though the sizes of the contributions differ from CPIH, the main drivers to the change are the same where they are common to both measures.
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Figure 11 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPI inflation rate over the last two years.
The CPIH includes extra housing components not included in the CPI. This can sometimes result in the largest contributions to the annual CPI and CPIH inflation rates coming from different divisions. In June 2026, the largest contributing division to CPI was transport (0.80 percentage point contribution to the CPI rate), while the largest contributing division to CPIH was housing and household services (0.84 percentage point contribution to the CPIH rate). OOH costs made a large upward contribution to housing and household services in CPIH, but these are excluded from CPI.
Consumer price inflation tables Dataset | Released 22 July 2026 Measures of monthly UK inflation data including the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Retail Prices Index (RPI). These tables complement the consumer price inflation time series dataset.
Consumer price inflation time series Dataset MM23 | Released 22 July 2026 Comprehensive database of time series covering measures of inflation data for the UK including CPIH, CPI and RPI.
Consumer price inflation detailed briefing note Dataset | Released 22 July 2026 The consumer price inflation detailed briefing note contains details of the items contributing to the changes in the CPIH, details of any notable movements, a summary of the reconciliation of CPIH and RPI, and the outlook, which looks ahead to next month's release.
Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes Dataset | Released 22 July 2026 Price quote data (for locally collected data only) and consumption segment indices (that underpin consumer price inflation statistics), giving users access to the detailed data that are used in the construction of the UK's inflation figures. From publication in March 2026, this dataset no longer includes price quote data for food and non-alcoholic beverages, and alcohol and tobacco. More information is included in Section 8: Data sources and quality.
Consumer price inflation, historical data, UK, 1950 to 1988 Dataset | Released 18 May 2022 Data tables of historical estimates modelled for the CPIH and CPI over the period 1950 to 1988. Data in these tables are not accredited official statistics and are provided for indicative purposes only.
The most common approach to measuring inflation is the 12-month or annual inflation rate, which compares prices for the latest month with the same month a year ago. In any given month, the annual rate is determined by the balance between upward and downward price movements across the range of goods and services included in the index.
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is the most comprehensive measure of inflation. It extends the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to include a measure of the costs associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home, known as owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs, along with Council Tax. Both are substantial expenses for many households and are not included in the CPI.
The CPI is a measure of consumer price inflation produced to international standards, and it is based on European regulations for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. The CPI is the inflation measure used in the government's target for inflation.
OOH costs are the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home.
The Retail Prices Index (RPI) and its subcomponents do not meet the required standard for designation as accredited official statistics. In recognition that the index continues to be widely used in contracts, we continue to publish the RPI, its subcomponents, and RPI excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX). To view the all-items RPI, please see the data time series section of the Inflation and price indices area of our website. The annual RPI inflation rate was 3.0% in June 2026.
The UK Statistics Authority (The Authority) and HM Treasury launched a consultation in 2020 on The Authority's proposal to address the shortcomings of the RPI. From 2030 (at the earliest), as outlined in The Authority's response to the joint consultation on reforming the methodology of the Retail Prices Index, the CPIH methods and data sources will be introduced into the RPI. Additionally, the supplementary and lower-level indices of the RPI will be discontinued.
The UK Government's Great British Summer Savings scheme, announced on 21 May 2026, took effect on 25 June. This was after the collection period for our June 2026 data and does not affect the indices this month. The scheme potentially affects a small number of low-level items in the inflation baskets, such as attractions and admissions to cultural events, whose prices are being collected for July.
We introduced scanner data for approximately 50% of the grocery market with the February 2026 index, published on 25 March 2026. Instead of collecting 25,000 prices per month directly from shops by price collectors, we are now using approximately 300 million price points derived from sales of over a billion units of products per month, collected directly from supermarket scanners at the checkouts or online. For the remaining 50% of the groceries market, we continue to manually collect prices in-store and online.
For comparison, we produced the all-items headline rates for February 2026 without using scanner data. Based on locally collected grocery data, the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 3.3% in the year to February 2026, and the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.1%. These were slightly above the official rates of 3.2% and 3.0%, respectively.
This followed some changes introduced with the February 2025 consumer price indices in March 2025, as a necessary step towards incorporating scanner data. At that point, the process for aggregating the detailed information changed. Goods and services were allocated into "consumption segments" for different categories of expenditure.
In some cases, we defined these consumption segments to correspond to one "item" for which we track prices over time. However, in cases where more comprehensive source data were going to become available, a consumption segment was set up to include much more than just one item. There is more information on the use of consumption segments in our Introducing alternative data into consumer price statistics: aggregation and weights article. For simplicity, we continue to refer to "items" in our statistical bulletin and detailed briefing note.
Despite the benefits of introducing scanner data into the consumer price indices, we can no longer publish the price quote data for food and non-alcoholic beverages, alcohol and tobacco (Divisions 1 and 2 of the CPIH and CPI), or the equivalent categories of RPI in our Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes dataset. This is because of our data-sharing agreements with retailers.
Instead, we have developed new aggregate output statistics to meet the needs of users. We have improved the granularity and accuracy of our Shopping prices comparison tool. We now provide average prices for more specific product types, such as "Microwave rice" and "Basmati rice". Under the previous, broader definitions (such as "rice, in all forms") we were unable to produce average prices. Units of measurement are also now included, making comparisons more meaningful and easier to interpret.
We are also publishing regional consumption segment indices and weights, and counts of indicator marker codes (for example, sales and recoveries) that are manually collected as part of the traditional data collection. We first published these from March 2026, with the release of the February 2026 indices. Further outputs will be introduced later in 2026.
To assist individuals in understanding how the rise in inflation affects their expenditure, we have produced a personal inflation calculator. The calculator allows users to enter the amount they spend across either a reduced or a wide range of categories, to produce an estimate of their personal inflation based on those spending patterns.
Our Shopping prices comparison tool shows how the average prices of items have changed over time. Please note that the newly introduced consumption segments for food, drink and tobacco will not have data before 2025 in the tool. However, the historical average prices for food, drink and tobacco items, that were in the tool before the update in 2025, can be found in our Shopping prices comparison tool data download before the 2025 update.
Please also note that Table 55 in our historical Consumer price inflation dataset, which provided time series of prices for petrol and diesel, has not been published since 19 February 2025, and the two series have been discontinued. Historical average prices are still available from the time series explorer function on our website, using the four-character identifiers CZMK for petrol and CZML for diesel.
On 28 May 2026, we published our quarterly Household Costs Indices (HCIs) for UK household groups bulletin. The HCIs reflect how different types of households experience changing prices, and they differ from CPIH and CPI. The CPIH and CPI are based on recognised economic principles and provide an aggregate measure of inflation for household spending in the UK.
The HCIs are official statistics in development and this release included new estimates for January to March 2026. This release uses updated 2025 weights. It has not been possible to update to 2026 weights in line with the standard methodology for consumer prices. This is because of delays in processing the underlying survey data and the need for further quality assurance. We will update the weights as soon as the data are available to use.
The latest HCI dataset also includes scanner data for the first time.
The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP) is the classification that underpins some of the main statistics that we produce. To reflect changes in household expenditure patterns since its inception in the late 1990s, the classification was updated in 2018 (PDF, 1,286KB).
In line with usual practice at the start of each year, the expenditure weights used in compiling the CPIH and CPI were calculated using updated spending information. The first update of weights was implemented with the January indices. The second update was introduced, along with the usual basket update, with the February indices released in March. We published our Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2026 article and our Consumer price inflation basket of goods and services: 2026 article on 16 March 2026.
The 2026 weights for CPIH and CPI were calculated using national accounts household final consumption expenditure (HHFCE) data for 2024. They reflect our most comprehensive and complete estimate of the latest household spending at the time of the weights update. This is in line with our standard methodology. More information is available in our Consumer price inflation, updating weights articles.
The weights for the RPI were also updated and introduced with the February 2026 index.
The consumer price indices are based on prices collected manually from outlets around the country, information collected centrally over the internet and by phone, and, from February 2026, data collected from supermarket scanners at the checkouts or online. The traditionally sourced data used in this release were collected on or around 16 June 2026.
The three cases refer firstly to the CPIH as our lead measure of inflation, based on economic principles. They also refer to the HCIs as a set of measures that reflect the change in costs and prices experienced by different households, and the RPI as a legacy measure that is required to meet existing user needs. The issues with the RPI are described in our Shortcomings of the Retail Prices Index as a measure of inflation article.
These accredited official statistics were independently reviewed by the Office for Statistics Regulation in July 2017. They comply with the standards of trustworthiness, quality and value in the Code of Practice for Statistics and should be labelled "accredited official statistics".
Producer price inflation, UK Bulletin | Released 22 July 2026 Changes in the prices of goods bought and sold by UK manufacturers, including price indices of materials and fuels purchased (input prices) and factory gate prices (output prices).
Private rent and house prices, UK Bulletin | Released 22 July 2026 The Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) measures private rent inflation for new and existing tenancies. The UK House Price Index (HPI) measures house price inflation.
Shopping prices comparison tool Interactive | Released 22 July 2026 Search to see how the average prices of hundreds of shopping items are changing.
Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2026 Article | Released 16 March 2026 An overview of the latest annual update of Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) weights.
Household Costs Indices for UK household groups Bulletin | Released 28 May 2026 Household Costs Indices, 12-month growth rates, expenditure shares and contributions for UK household groups and all households. These are official statistics in development.
UK Statistics Authority National Statistician's Advisory Panels on Consumer Price Statistics Web page | Updated when needed Reports, papers and minutes of the two independent advisory panels on consumer price statistics: a technical panel to advise the National Statistician on technical aspects of the statistics, and a stakeholder panel to provide advice on the uses and applications of price indices.
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 3.2% in the 12 months to February 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to January.
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.4% in February 2026, the same rate as in February 2025.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.0% in the 12 months to February 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to January.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.4% in February 2026, the same rate as in February 2025.
Clothing made the largest upward contribution to the monthly change in both CPIH and CPI annual rates; motor fuels made the largest, offsetting, downward contribution.
Core CPIH (CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) rose by 3.4% in the 12 months to February 2026, up from 3.3% in the 12 months to January; the CPIH goods annual rate was unchanged at 1.6%, while the CPIH services annual rate eased slightly from 4.3% to 4.2%.
Core CPI (CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) rose by 3.2% in the 12 months to February 2026, up from 3.1% in the 12 months to January; the CPI goods annual rate was unchanged at 1.6%, while the CPI services annual rate eased slightly from 4.4% to 4.3%.
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Table 1: CPIH, OOH component and CPI index values, and annual and monthly rates UK, February 2025 to February 2026
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CPIH Index (UK, 2015 = 100)
CPIH 12- month rate (%)
CPIH 1- month rate (%)
CPI Index (UK, 2015=100)
CPI 12- month rate (%)
CPI 1- month rate (%)
OOH Index (UK, 2015=100)
OOH 12- month rate (%)
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2025
Feb
135.6
3.7
0.4
136.0
2.8
0.4
132.4
7.5
+
Mar
136.1
3.4
0.3
136.5
2.6
0.3
132.9
7.2
+
Apr
137.7
4.1
1.2
138.2
3.5
1.2
133.2
6.9
+
May
138.0
4.0
0.2
138.4
3.4
0.2
133.7
6.7
+
Jun
138.4
4.1
0.3
138.9
3.6
0.3
134.2
6.4
+
Jul
138.5
4.2
0.0
139.0
3.8
0.1
134.0
5.5
+
Aug
138.9
4.1
0.3
139.3
3.8
0.3
134.5
5.3
+
Sep
138.9
4.1
0.1
139.3
3.8
0.0
135.1
5.2
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Oct
139.5
3.8
0.4
139.8
3.6
0.4
135.7
4.8
+
Nov
139.4
3.5
-0.1
139.5
3.2
-0.2
136.5
4.5
+
Dec
139.9
3.6
0.4
140.1
3.4
0.4
136.8
4.2
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2026
Jan
139.4
3.2
-0.3
139.5
3.0
-0.5
137.0
3.9
+
Feb
140.0
3.2
0.4
140.1
3.0
0.4
137.4
3.8
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The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 3.2% in the 12 months to February 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to January (Figure 1).
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.4% in February 2026, the same rate as in February 2025.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.0% in the 12 months to February 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to January.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.4% in February 2026, the same rate as in February 2025.
The main drivers of the annual inflation rate for CPIH and CPI are the same where they are common to both measures. However, the owner occupiers’ housing (OOH) costs component accounts for approximately 18% of the CPIH and is the main driver for differences between the CPIH and CPI inflation rates. This makes CPIH our most comprehensive measure of inflation. We cover this in more detail in Section 4: Latest movements in CPIH inflation and provide a commentary on the CPI in Section 5: Latest movements in CPI inflation. We also cover both CPIH and CPI in Section 3: Notable movements in prices, though the figures reflect CPIH.
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Table 2: CPIH annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, February 2025, January 2026, and February 2026
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CPIH 12-month rate (%)
CPIH 1-month rate (%)
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January 2026
February 2026
February 2025
February 2026
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CPIH All items
3.2
3.2
0.4
0.4
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Food and non-alcoholic beverages
3.6
3.3
0.2
0.0
+
Alcohol and tobacco
4.6
3.6
1.0
-0.1
+
Clothing and footwear
0.0
0.9
-0.3
0.6
+
Housing and household services
4.2
4.2
0.3
0.2
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of which owner occupiers' housing costs
3.9
3.8
0.4
0.3
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Furniture and household goods
-0.5
0.1
1.1
1.7
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Health
3.1
3.1
0.3
0.3
+
Transport
2.7
2.4
0.8
0.5
+
Communication
4.6
4.3
0.2
-0.1
+
Recreation and culture
2.6
2.5
0.1
0.0
+
Education
5.1
5.1
0.0
0.0
+
Restaurants and hotels
4.1
4.0
1.1
1.0
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.2
2.6
0.3
0.6
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+
All goods
1.6
1.6
0.4
0.3
+
All services
4.3
4.2
0.5
0.4
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CPIH exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPIH)
3.3
3.4
0.4
0.5
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Figure 2 shows the contributions from the 12 divisions to the change in the annual Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) inflation rate between January and February 2026. These sum to the change in the annual rate between the latest two months, that is, no change, with the rate remaining at 3.2%.
The contributions to change offset each other, with upward contributions from three divisions and downward contributions from seven divisions. The largest upward contribution came from clothing and footwear. The largest, offsetting, downward contributions came from alcohol and tobacco, and transport.
Clothing and footwear prices rose by 0.9% in the 12 months to February 2026, compared with no change in the 12 months to January (Figure 3). The February figure was the highest recorded since March 2025, when the rate was 1.1%.
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On a monthly basis, prices rose by 0.6% in February 2026, compared with a fall of 0.3% a year ago. Prices normally rise in February as the spring product ranges start to enter the shops following the new year sales period. The fall into February 2025 was the first fall between January and February since 2021 when sales patterns were affected by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The price movements reflect changes in the proportion of discounted prices in the datasets. The proportion fell between January and February this year, as usual, contrasting with a rise in the same period last year.
The rise in the 12-month rate was the result of small upward effects primarily from children's and women's clothing.
Prices in the alcohol and tobacco division rose by 3.6% in the 12 months to February 2026, down from 4.6% in the 12 months to January. The February 2026 figure was the lowest recorded since February 2022, when the rate was also 3.6%. It was last lower in January 2022. On a monthly basis, prices fell by 0.1% in February 2026, compared with a rise of 1.0% a year ago.
The easing in the 12-month rate reflected a downward effect from alcohol, where prices fell by 1.5% in February this year, compared with a rise of 0.7% in February 2025. Price falls were seen across spirits, wines, and beers this year as a result of price discounting, compared with price rises a year ago.
Prices in the transport division rose overall by 2.4% in the 12 months to February 2026, down from 2.7% in the 12 months to January. On a monthly basis, prices rose by 0.5% in February 2026, compared with a rise of 0.8% a year ago.
The largest downward effect came from motor fuels, where the average price of petrol fell by 1.6 pence per litre between January and February 2026, compared with a rise of 2.0 pence per litre between January and February 2025. The average price stood at 131.6 pence per litre in February 2026, the lowest price since June 2021 when it was 129.7 pence per litre.
Similarly, diesel prices fell by 1.4 pence per litre in February 2026, compared with a rise of 2.3 pence per litre in February 2025. The average price stood at 141.1 pence per litre in February 2026, down from 146.4 pence per litre a year earlier.
These movements resulted in overall motor fuel prices falling by 4.6% in the 12 months to February 2026, compared with a fall of 2.2% in the 12 months to January. All prices were collected before the outbreak of war in the Middle East on 28 February 2026.
Within transport, this downward effect was partially offset by a small upward contribution from air fares. These rose by 9.2% between January and February 2026, compared with a smaller rise of 5.9% a year ago. The rise into February 2026 was the largest increase between January and February since 2013, when it was also 9.2%. The upward effect came from European routes.
Food and non-alcoholic beverages prices rose by 3.3% in the 12 months to February 2026, down from 3.6% in the 12 months to January (Figure 4). The rate in February was the lowest since March 2025, when it was 3.0%. On a monthly basis, food and non-alcoholic beverages prices were unchanged in February 2026, compared with a rise of 0.2% a year ago.
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The main downward effect behind the change in the annual rate came from confectionery, particularly chocolate confectionery, where prices fell in the month to February this year but rose a year ago. This was partially offset by small upward contributions from dairy products and vegetables.
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Figure 5 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH) series for all goods and all services, together with CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (often referred to as core CPIH). The CPIH inflation rate is added for comparison.
The CPIH all-services index rose by 4.2% in the 12 months to February 2026, down slightly from 4.3% in the 12 months to January. The rate is the lowest since April 2022, when it was 4.1%. The largest downward contribution to the change in the annual rate came from other recreational and personal services, particularly cultural services, and restaurants and cafes. The largest, partially offsetting, upward effect came from transport services, particularly air fares.
The CPIH all-goods index rose by 1.6% in the 12 months to February 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to January. The largest upward contribution to change in the annual rate came from non-energy industrial goods, particularly clothing and footwear goods. The largest downward effects came from energy, particularly motor fuels, and food, alcoholic beverages and tobacco.
The core CPIH annual inflation rate was 3.4% in February 2026, up from 3.3% in January.
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Figure 6 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPIH inflation rate over the last two years. The contribution of each category to the annual rate depends on the price movement in that category and its weight, which is updated annually.
The largest positive contribution to the CPIH annual inflation rate came from housing and household services. The division has made the largest contribution for the last 20 months, starting from July 2024. However, the contribution of 1.27 percentage points in February 2026 was down from 1.28 percentage points in January, and the smallest since September 2024.
The contribution from furniture and household goods changed from a small negative to a small positive contribution between January and February 2026. This meant all divisions made positive contributions to the rate in February 2026.
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Figure 7 shows the contributions from owner occupiers’ housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax to the annual CPIH inflation rate in the context of wider housing-related costs. The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) differs from the CPIH because it does not include these two components.
The annual contribution from OOH costs continued to slow and was 0.65 percentage points in February 2026. This contribution was the smallest since December 2022, when it was also 0.65 percentage points. It was last smaller in November 2022, when it was 0.64 percentage points. The contribution has decreased for 13 consecutive months from a recent high of 1.31 percentage points in January 2025.
The annual contribution from rents rose slightly from 0.20 percentage points in January 2026 to 0.21 percentage points in February. This is the first rise since the increase between December 2024 and January 2025.
While the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is our most comprehensive measure of consumer price inflation, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is based on a harmonised methodology developed by Eurostat. This enables international comparisons to be drawn. More information on the use cases for our consumer price inflation statistics can be found in our Measuring changing prices and costs for consumers and households: December 2023 article.
Figure 8 shows annual CPI inflation for the UK compared with the EU average and selected G7 countries. While the UK CPI is produced on a comparable basis with EU countries, the United States Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) differs in some respects. More information is available in Note 1 to Figure 8.
The UK's CPI inflation rate of 3.0% was higher than that of the EU (2.1%), Germany (2.0%) and France (1.1%) in February 2026. The last time the UK rate was lower than the rate for the EU overall was December 2024.
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Table 3: CPI annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, February 2025, January 2026, and February 2026
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CPI 12-month rate (%)
CPI 1-month rate (%)
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January 2026
February 2026
February 2025
February 2026
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CPI All items
3.0
3.0
0.4
0.4
+
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
3.6
3.3
0.2
0.0
+
Alcohol and tobacco
4.6
3.6
1.0
-0.1
+
Clothing and footwear
0.0
0.9
-0.3
0.6
+
Housing and household services
4.5
4.6
0.2
0.2
+
Furniture and household goods
-0.5
0.1
1.1
1.7
+
Health
3.1
3.1
0.3
0.3
+
Transport
2.7
2.4
0.8
0.5
+
Communication
4.6
4.3
0.2
-0.1
+
Recreation and culture
2.6
2.5
0.1
0.0
+
Education
5.1
5.1
0.0
0.0
+
Restaurants and hotels
4.1
4.0
1.1
1.0
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.2
2.6
0.3
0.6
+
+
All goods
1.6
1.6
0.4
0.3
+
All services
4.4
4.3
0.5
0.5
+
CPI exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPI)
3.1
3.2
0.4
0.6
+
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 9 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the CPI all-goods and all-services series, together with CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (often referred to as core CPI). The headline CPI inflation rate is added for comparison.
Core CPI rose by 3.2% in the 12 months to February 2026, up from 3.1% in the 12 months to January.
The CPI all-goods index rose by 1.6% in the 12 months to February 2026, unchanged from the 12 months to January.
The CPI all-services index rose by 4.3% in the 12 months to February 2026, down from 4.4% in the 12 months to January. The rate is the lowest since March 2022, when it was 4.0%.
As with the all-items annual inflation rates, the drivers of CPIH and CPI goods and services inflation are the same (except for owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax, which are excluded from CPI). The drivers are discussed in more detail in Section 4: Latest movements in CPIH inflation.
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Figure 10 shows how each of the main groups of goods and services contributed to the change in the CPI annual inflation rate between January and February 2026.
The contributions to change between the two months offset each other, with upward contributions from three divisions and downward contributions from six divisions. The largest upward contribution came from clothing and footwear. The largest, offsetting, downward contributions came from alcohol and tobacco, and transport.
Though the sizes of the contributions differ from CPIH, the main drivers to the change are the same where they are common to both measures.
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Figure 11 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPI inflation rate over the last two years.
The CPIH includes extra housing components not included in the CPI. This can sometimes result in the largest contributions to the annual CPI and CPIH inflation rates coming from different divisions. However, the housing and household services division made the largest contribution to both measures in February 2026, with a 0.58 percentage point contribution to the CPI rate and a 1.27 percentage point contribution to the CPIH rate. OOH costs made an upward contribution to the housing and household services 12-month rate in the CPIH but are excluded from the CPI.
Consumer price inflation tables Dataset | Released 25 March 2026 Measures of monthly UK inflation data including the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Retail Prices Index (RPI). These tables complement the consumer price inflation time series dataset.
Consumer price inflation time series Dataset MM23 | Released 25 March 2026 Comprehensive database of time series covering measures of inflation data for the UK including CPIH, CPI and RPI.
Consumer price inflation detailed briefing note Dataset | Released 25 March 2026 The consumer price inflation detailed briefing note contains details of the items contributing to the changes in the CPIH, details of any notable movements, a summary of the reconciliation of CPIH and RPI, and the outlook, which looks ahead to next month's release.
Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes Dataset | Released 25 March 2026 Price quote data (for locally collected data only) and consumption segment indices (that underpin consumer price inflation statistics), giving users access to the detailed data that are used in the construction of the UK's inflation figures. From publication in March 2026, this dataset no longer includes price quote data for food and non-alcoholic beverages, and alcohol and tobacco. More information is included in Section 8: Data sources and quality.
Consumer price inflation, historical data, UK, 1950 to 1988 Dataset | Released 18 May 2022 Data tables of historical estimates modelled for the CPIH and CPI over the period 1950 to 1988. Data in these tables are not accredited official statistics and are provided for indicative purposes only.
The most common approach to measuring inflation is the 12-month or annual inflation rate, which compares prices for the latest month with the same month a year ago. In any given month, the annual rate is determined by the balance between upward and downward price movements across the range of goods and services included in the index.
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is the most comprehensive measure of inflation. It extends the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to include a measure of the costs associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home, known as owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs, along with Council Tax. Both are substantial expenses for many households and are not included in the CPI.
The CPI is a measure of consumer price inflation produced to international standards, and is based on European regulations for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. The CPI is the inflation measure used in the government's target for inflation.
OOH costs are the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home.
The Retail Prices Index (RPI) and its subcomponents do not meet the required standard for designation as accredited official statistics. In recognition that the index continues to be widely used in contracts, we continue to publish the RPI, its subcomponents, and RPI excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX). To view the all-items RPI, please see the data time series section of the Inflation and price indices area of our website. The annual RPI inflation rate was 3.6% in February 2026.
The UK Statistics Authority (The Authority) and HM Treasury launched a consultation in 2020 on The Authority's proposal to address the shortcomings of the RPI. From 2030 (at the earliest), as outlined in The Authority's response to the joint consultation on reforming the methodology of the Retail Prices Index, the CPIH methods and data sources will be introduced into the RPI. Additionally, the supplementary and lower-level indices of the RPI will be discontinued.
We have introduced scanner data for approximately 50% of the grocery market with the February 2026 index, published on 25 March 2026. Instead of collecting 25,000 prices per month directly from shops by price collectors, we are using approximately 300 million price points derived from sales of over a billion units of products per month, collected directly from supermarket scanners at the checkouts or online. For the remaining 50% of the groceries market, we continue to manually collect prices in-store and online.
For comparison, we have produced the all-items headline rates for February 2026 without using scanner data. Based on locally collected grocery data, the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 3.3% in the year to February 2026, and the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.1%. These are slightly above the official rates of 3.2% and 3.0%, respectively.
This follows some changes introduced with the February 2025 index released in March 2025, as a necessary step towards incorporating scanner data into the consumer price indices. At that point, the process for aggregating the detailed information changed. Goods and services were allocated into "consumption segments" for different categories of expenditure.
In some cases, we defined these consumption segments to correspond to one "item" for which we track prices over time. However, in cases where more comprehensive source data were going to become available, a consumption segment was set up to include much more than just one item. There is more information on the use of consumption segments in our Introducing alternative data into consumer price statistics: aggregation and weights article. For simplicity, we continue to refer to "items" in our statistical bulletin and detailed briefing note.
Despite the benefits of introducing scanner data into the consumer price indices, we can no longer publish the price quote dataset in its current form in our Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes dataset. This is because of our data-sharing agreements with retailers. Price quote data have been discontinued for food and non-alcoholic beverages, and alcohol and tobacco (divisions 1 and 2 of the CPIH and CPI), and the equivalent categories in RPI.
Instead, we have developed new aggregate output statistics to meet the needs of users. We are publishing regional consumption segment indices and weights, and counts of indicator marker codes (for example, sales and recoveries) that are manually collected as part of the traditional data collection. We are first publishing these from March 2026, with the release of the February 2026 indices. Further outputs will be introduced in summer 2026. More information on the new outputs is available in our Changes to the provision of microdata outputs for consumer price inflation statistics: January 2026 article.
In line with usual practice at the start of each year, the expenditure weights used in compiling the CPIH and CPI have been calculated using updated spending information. The first update of weights was implemented with the January indices. The second update has been introduced, along with the usual basket update, with the February indices. We published our Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2026 and our Consumer price inflation basket of goods and services: 2026 articles on 16 March 2026.
The 2026 weights for CPIH and CPI were calculated using national accounts household final consumption expenditure (HHFCE) data for 2024 and reflect our most comprehensive and complete estimate of the latest household spending at the time of the weights update. This is in line with our standard methodology. More information is available in our Consumer price inflation, updating weights articles.
The weights for the RPI have also been updated and introduced with the February 2026 index.
To assist individuals in understanding how the rise in inflation affects their expenditure, we have produced a personal inflation calculator. The calculator allows users to enter the amount they spend across either a reduced or a wide range of categories, to produce an estimate of their personal inflation based on those spending patterns.
Our Shopping prices comparison tool shows how the average prices of items have changed over time. Please note that the newly introduced consumption segments for food, drink and tobacco will not have data before 2025 in the tool. However, the historical average prices for food, drink and tobacco items, that were in the tool before the update in 2025, can be found in our Shopping prices comparison tool data download before the 2025 update.
Please also note that Table 55 in our historical Consumer price inflation dataset, which provided time series of prices for petrol and diesel, has not been published since 19 February 2025, and the two series have been discontinued. Historical average prices are still available from the time series explorer function on our website, using the four-character identifiers CZMK for petrol and CZML for diesel.
On 26 February 2026, we published our quarterly Household Costs Indices (HCIs) for UK household groups bulletin. The HCIs reflect how different types of households experience changing prices, and differ from CPIH and CPI. The CPIH and CPI are based on recognised economic principles and provide an aggregate measure of inflation for household spending in the UK.
The HCIs are official statistics in development and this release included new estimates for October to December 2025. It was not possible for this latest release to update the weights for 2025 in line with the standard methodology for consumer prices. This is because of delays in processing the underlying survey data and the need for further, ongoing quality assurance. Instead, the most recent estimates have been compiled using the weights for February to December 2024. We will update the weights as soon as the data are available to use.
The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP) is the classification that underpins some of the main statistics that we produce. The classification saw an update (PDF, 1,286KB) in 2018, to reflect changes in household expenditure patterns since its inception in the late 1990s.
The consumer price indices are normally based on prices collected from outlets around the country, supplemented by information collected centrally over the internet and by phone. The figures in this release use data collected on or around 17 February 2026.
An overview of consumer price statistics is given in our Consumer price indices, a brief guide: 2026. The concepts and methodologies underpinning the indices in more detail are covered in our Consumer Prices Indices Technical Manual. This has been rewritten as a series of linked articles and includes the use of alternative data sources more systematically than in the previous version.
A comprehensive source of information on the CPIH, focusing on the approach to measuring owner occupiers' housing costs, is provided in our CPIH Compendium.
The three cases refer firstly to the CPIH as our lead measure of inflation, based on economic principles. They also refer to the HCIs as a set of measures that reflect the change in costs and prices experienced by different households, and the RPI as a legacy measure that is required to meet existing user needs. The issues with the RPI are described in our Shortcomings of the Retail Prices Index as a measure of inflation article.
These accredited official statistics were independently reviewed by the Office for Statistics Regulation in July 2017. They comply with the standards of trustworthiness, quality and value in the Code of Practice for Statistics and should be labelled "accredited official statistics".
Producer price inflation, UK Bulletin | Released 25 March 2026 Changes in the prices of goods bought and sold by UK manufacturers, including price indices of materials and fuels purchased (input prices) and factory gate prices (output prices).
Private rent and house prices, UK Bulletin | Released 25 March 2026 The Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) measures private rent inflation for new and existing tenancies. The UK House Price Index measures house price inflation.
Shopping prices comparison tool Interactive | Released 25 March 2026 Search to see how the average prices of hundreds of shopping items are changing.
Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2026 Article | Released 16 March 2026 An overview of the latest annual update of Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) weights.
UK Statistics Authority National Statistician's Advisory Panels on Consumer Price Statistics Web page | Updated when needed Reports, papers and minutes of the two independent advisory panels on consumer price statistics: a technical panel to advise the National Statistician on technical aspects of the statistics, and a stakeholder panel to provide advice on the uses and applications of price indices.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.5% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 3.1% the previous month.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.4% in September 2026, compared with little change in September 2025.
Core CPIH (CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco) rose by 3.1% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 2.9% in August; the CPIH goods annual rate rose from 2.7% to 3.2%, while the CPIH services annual rate rose from 3.6% to 3.9%.
Core CPI (CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco) rose by 2.8% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 2.6% in August; the CPI goods annual rate rose from 2.7% to 3.2%, while the CPI services annual rate rose from 3.4% to 3.7%.
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Table 1: CPIH, OOH component and CPI index values, and annual and monthly rates UK, September 2025 to September 2026
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CPIH Index (UK, 2015 = 100)
CPIH 12- month rate (%)
CPIH 1- month rate (%)
CPI Index (UK, 2015=100)
CPI 12- month rate (%)
CPI 1- month rate (%)
OOH Index (UK, 2015=100)
OOH 12- month rate (%)
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2025
Sep
138.9
4.1
0.1
139.3
3.8
0.0
135.1
5.2
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Oct
139.5
3.8
0.4
139.8
3.6
0.4
135.7
4.8
+
Nov
139.4
3.5
-0.1
139.5
3.2
-0.2
136.5
4.5
+
Dec
139.9
3.6
0.4
140.1
3.4
0.4
136.8
4.2
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2026
Jan
139.4
3.2
-0.3
139.5
3.0
-0.5
137.0
3.9
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Feb
140.0
3.2
0.4
140.1
3.0
0.4
137.4
3.8
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Mar
140.8
3.4
0.6
141.0
3.3
0.7
137.7
3.6
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Apr
141.8
3.0
0.8
142.1
2.8
0.7
137.9
3.6
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May
142.1
3.0
0.2
142.4
2.8
0.2
138.1
3.3
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Jun
142.3
2.8
0.2
142.5
2.6
0.1
138.6
3.3
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Jul
142.7
3.1
0.3
142.9
2.9
0.3
139.0
3.7
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Aug
143.4
3.3
0.5
143.6
3.1
0.5
139.7
3.9
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Sep
144.0
3.6
0.4
144.1
3.5
0.4
140.5
4.0
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The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 3.6% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 3.3% the previous month (Figure 1).
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.4% in September 2026, compared with a rise of 0.1% in September 2025.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.5% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 3.1% the previous month.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.4% in September 2026, compared with little change in September 2025.
The main drivers of the annual inflation rate for CPIH and CPI are the same where they are common to both measures. However, the owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs component accounts for approximately 18% of the CPIH and is the main driver for differences between the CPIH and CPI inflation rates.
Table 2: CPIH annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, September 2025, August 2026, and September 2026
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CPIH 12-month rate (%)
CPIH 1-month rate (%)
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August 2026
September 2026
September 2025
September 2026
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CPIH All items
3.3
3.6
0.1
0.4
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Food and non-alcoholic beverages
1.3
1.3
-0.2
-0.2
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Alcohol and tobacco
2.7
2.5
0.0
-0.3
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Clothing and footwear
0.2
0.1
2.4
2.2
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Housing and household services
4.3
4.5
0.3
0.5
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of which owner occupiers' housing costs
3.9
4.0
0.5
0.6
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Furniture and household goods
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
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Health
3.7
3.5
0.2
0.0
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Transport
4.6
6.6
-2.3
-0.4
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Communication
5.3
5.8
-0.3
0.2
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Recreation and culture
1.6
2.3
0.0
0.7
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Education
5.1
5.0
1.5
1.4
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Restaurants and hotels
4.1
3.8
0.8
0.5
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Miscellaneous goods and services
2.9
3.1
-0.1
0.2
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All goods
2.7
3.2
0.2
0.8
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All services
3.6
3.9
-0.1
0.1
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CPIH exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPIH)
2.9
3.1
0.1
0.3
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Figure 2 shows the contributions from the 12 divisions to the change in the annual Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH) inflation rate between August and September 2026. These sum to the change in the annual rate, from 3.3% to 3.6%, between these months.
The increase in the 12-month rate between August and September 2026 reflected upward contributions from six divisions, partially offset by downward contributions from three divisions. The largest upward contribution came from transport, particularly motor fuels. The largest offsetting downward contribution came from restaurants and hotels.
Prices in the transport division rose overall by 6.6% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 4.6% the previous month (Figure 3). On a monthly basis, prices fell by 0.4% in September 2026, compared with a fall of 2.3% a year ago.
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The largest upward effect contributing to the rise in the transport annual rate came from motor fuels.
The average price of petrol rose by 8.2 pence per litre between August and September 2026, compared with a fall of 0.2 pence per litre between August and September 2025. The average price stood at 169.5 pence per litre in September 2026. This is the highest price recorded since August 2022.
Diesel prices rose by 10.7 pence per litre in September 2026, compared with a fall of 0.4 pence per litre in September 2025. The average price stood at 192.5 pence per litre in September 2026. This is the highest price recorded since July 2022.
These movements resulted in overall motor fuel prices rising by 29.8% in the 12 months to September 2026, compared with a rise of 23.0% the previous month.
Within transport, there were smaller upward effects from air fares and sea fares, and partially offsetting small downward effects from roadside recovery, and second-hand cars.
Air fares fell by 19.5% between August and September 2026, compared with a fall of 28.8% between August and September 2025. The upward effect came from European routes where fares fell by less in September 2026 than they did in September 2025.
All domestic, European and long-haul flight prices were collected after the outbreak of the conflict in the Middle East on 28 February 2026.
Prices for roadside recovery saw a large fall this year and a large rise a year ago. Second-hand petrol cars and second-hand diesel cars saw a fall in price this year and a rise in price last year.
Recreation and culture prices rose by 0.7% in the month to September 2026, compared with little change a year ago. This led to a 12-month rate of 2.3% in September 2026, up from 1.6% in August.
The largest contribution to the upward effect came from live music where prices rose by 0.9% this year and fell by 8.6% last year. There was also an upward effect from computer game downloads where prices rose by 40.0% this year and 16.1% last year. There were smaller upward contributions from package holidays, cultural events, leisure classes, Blu-ray discs, music downloads, computer software, and televisions.
The 12-month rate for housing and household services was 4.5% in September 2026, up from 4.3% in August. Prices rose by 0.5% in the month to September 2026, compared with a rise of 0.3% a year ago.
The rise in the 12-month rate between August and September 2026 mainly reflected an upward effect from owner occupiers’ housing (OOH) costs. These rose by 4.0% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 3.9% the previous month. On a monthly basis, OOH costs rose by 0.6% in September 2026, compared with a rise of 0.5% a year ago.
There was also an upward effect from kerosene, where prices rose by 22.7%, compared with a fall of 1.4% a year ago.
The 12-month inflation rate for food and non-alcoholic beverages was 1.3% in September 2026, unchanged from August (Figure 4). The rate was last lower in September 2021, when it was 0.8%. On a monthly basis, food and non-alcoholic beverage prices fell by 0.2% in September 2026, the same fall as in September 2025.
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All 11 detailed classes within the food and non-alcoholic beverages division had little effect on the change in the headline rate. However, the consumption segments for other breakfast bakery products; cakes, tarts and sweet pies; tomatoes; and potato crisps had upward effects. The consumption segments for beef, chocolate assortments, and fizzy drinks had downward effects.
Although the annual rate of inflation for food and non-alcoholic beverage prices has remained the same for the last three months, organisations like the Food and Drink Federation expect food inflation to arrive later and persist for longer. This is partly because pressure on household budgets, competition and retailer resistance to price increases have limited manufacturers' ability to pass on higher costs.
Prices in the restaurants and hotels division rose by 3.8% in the 12 months to September 2026, down from 4.1% in the 12 months to August 2026. On a monthly basis, prices rose by 0.5% in September 2026, compared with a rise of 0.8% a year ago.
The downward contribution came from hotels where prices rose by 2.3% compared with a rise of 3.8% a year ago.
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Figure 5 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH) series for all goods and all services, together with CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco (often referred to as core CPIH). The CPIH inflation rate is added for comparison.
The core CPIH annual inflation rate was 3.1% in September 2026, up from 2.9% in August.
The CPIH all-goods index rose by 3.2% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 2.7% the previous month. This was the highest rate since September 2023. The largest upward contribution to the change in the annual rate came from energy, particularly motor fuels and kerosene.
The CPIH all-services index rose by 3.9% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 3.6% in the 12 months to August. The largest upward contribution to the change in the annual rate came from transport services, particularly air fares.
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Figure 6 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPIH inflation rate over the last two years. The contribution of each category to the annual rate depends on the price movement in that category and its weight, which is updated annually.
The contribution from food and non-alcoholic beverages has broadly eased from a recent high of 0.46 percentage points in August 2025. The contribution was 0.11 percentage points in September 2026, the same as August 2026 and the smallest since September 2021.
The largest positive contribution to the CPIH annual inflation rate came from housing and household services. The division has made the largest contribution for the last 27 months, starting from July 2024.
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Figure 7 shows the contributions from owner occupiers’ housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax to the annual CPIH inflation rate in the context of wider housing-related costs. The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) differs from the CPIH because it does not include these two components.
The annual contribution from OOH costs rose to 0.70 percentage points in September 2026. This was the fourth consecutive rise between months and followed 16 consecutive decreases. Although the current contribution was larger than the previous month’s, it was smaller than the recent high of 1.31 percentage points in January 2025.
The contribution from electricity, gas and other fuels also rose, to 0.19 percentage points in September 2026. This was the largest contribution from this category since September 2025.
While the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is our most comprehensive measure of consumer price inflation, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is based on a harmonised methodology developed by Eurostat.
This enables international comparisons to be drawn. It is also used to set the operational inflation target for UK monetary policy, and to uprate working-age benefits and tax credits. More information on the use cases for our consumer price inflation statistics can be found in our Measuring changing prices and costs for consumers and households: December 2023 article.
Figure 8 shows annual CPI inflation for the UK compared with the EU average and selected G7 countries. While the UK CPI is produced on a comparable basis with EU countries, the US Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) differs in some respects. More information is available in Note 1 to Figure 8.
The UK's CPI inflation rate of 3.5% was higher than the inflation rates of France (3.4%) and Germany (3.3%) in September 2026.
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Table 3: CPI annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, September 2025, August 2026, and September 2026
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CPI 12-month rate (%)
CPI 1-month rate (%)
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August 2026
September 2026
September 2025
September 2026
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CPI All items
3.1
3.5
0.0
0.4
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Food and non-alcoholic beverages
1.3
1.3
-0.2
-0.2
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Alcohol and tobacco
2.7
2.5
0.0
-0.3
+
Clothing and footwear
0.2
0.1
2.4
2.2
+
Housing and household services
4.9
5.3
0.2
0.6
+
Furniture and household goods
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
+
Health
3.7
3.5
0.2
0.0
+
Transport
4.6
6.6
-2.3
-0.4
+
Communication
5.3
5.8
-0.3
0.2
+
Recreation and culture
1.6
2.3
0.0
0.7
+
Education
5.1
5.0
1.5
1.4
+
Restaurants and hotels
4.1
3.8
0.8
0.5
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.9
3.1
-0.1
0.2
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All goods
2.7
3.2
0.2
0.8
+
All services
3.4
3.7
-0.3
0.0
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CPI exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPI)
2.6
2.8
0.0
0.2
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Figure 9 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the CPI all-goods and all-services series, together with CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol, and tobacco (often referred to as core CPI). The headline CPI inflation rate is added for comparison.
The core CPI annual inflation rate was 2.8% in September 2026, up from 2.6% in August.
The CPI all-goods index rose by 3.2% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 2.7% the previous month. The rate in September 2026 was the highest since September 2023.
The CPI all-services index rose by 3.7% in the 12 months to September 2026, up from 3.4% in the 12 months to August.
As with the all-items annual inflation rates, the drivers of CPIH and CPI goods and services inflation are the same (except for owner occupiers’ housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax, which are excluded from CPI). The drivers are discussed in more detail in Section 4: Latest movements in CPIH inflation.
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Figure 10 shows how each of the main groups of goods and services contributed to the change in the CPI annual inflation rate between August and September 2026.
The rate’s rise in September 2026 reflected upward contributions from six divisions, partially offset by downward contributions from four divisions. The largest upward contribution came from transport, particularly motor fuels. The largest offsetting downward contribution came from restaurants and hotels.
Though the sizes of the contributions differ from CPIH, the main drivers to the change are the same where they are common to both measures.
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Figure 11 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPI inflation rate over the last two years.
The CPIH includes extra housing components not included in the CPI. This can sometimes result in the largest contributions to the annual CPI and CPIH inflation rates coming from different divisions. In September 2026, the largest contributing division to CPI was transport (0.94 percentage point contribution to the CPI rate), while the largest contributing division to CPIH was housing and household services (1.39 percentage point contribution to the CPIH rate). OOH costs made a large upward contribution to housing and household services in CPIH, but these are excluded from CPI.
Consumer price inflation tables Dataset | Released 21 October 2026 Measures of monthly UK inflation data including the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Retail Prices Index (RPI). These tables complement the consumer price inflation time series dataset.
Consumer price inflation time series Dataset MM23 | Released 21 October 2026 Comprehensive database of time series covering measures of inflation data for the UK including CPIH, CPI and RPI.
Consumer price inflation detailed briefing note Dataset | Released 21 October 2026 The consumer price inflation detailed briefing note contains details of the items contributing to the changes in the CPIH, details of any notable movements, a summary of the reconciliation of CPIH and RPI, and the outlook, which looks ahead to next month's release.
Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes Dataset | Released 21 October 2026 Price quote data (for locally collected data only) and consumption segment indices (that underpin consumer price inflation statistics), giving users access to the detailed data that are used in the construction of the UK's inflation figures. From publication in March 2026, this dataset no longer includes price quote data for food and non-alcoholic beverages, and alcohol and tobacco. More information is included in Section 8: Data sources and quality.
Consumer price inflation, historical data, UK, 1950 to 1988 Dataset | Released 18 May 2022 Data tables of historical estimates modelled for the CPIH and CPI over the period 1950 to 1988. Data in these tables are not accredited official statistics and are provided for indicative purposes only.
The most common approach to measuring inflation is the 12-month or annual inflation rate, which compares prices for the latest month with the same month a year ago. In any given month, the annual rate is determined by the balance between upward and downward price movements across the range of goods and services included in the index.
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is the most comprehensive measure of inflation. It extends the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to include a measure of the costs associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home, known as owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs, along with Council Tax. Both are substantial expenses for many households and are not included in the CPI.
The CPI is a measure of consumer price inflation produced to international standards, and is based on European regulations for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. The CPI is the inflation measure used in the government's target for inflation.
OOH costs are the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home.
The Retail Prices Index (RPI) and its subcomponents do not meet the required standard for designation as accredited official statistics. In recognition that the index continues to be widely used in contracts, we continue to publish the RPI, its subcomponents, and RPI excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX).
The UK Statistics Authority (The Authority) and HM Treasury launched a consultation in 2020 on The Authority's proposal to address the shortcomings of the RPI. From 2030 (at the earliest), as outlined in The Authority's response to the joint consultation on reforming the methodology of the Retail Prices Index, the CPIH methods and data sources will be introduced into the RPI. Additionally, the supplementary and lower-level indices of the RPI will be discontinued.
We continue to work towards publishing a seasonally adjusted Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH). We have completed the first iteration of build work. We are now focusing on testing the outputs to fully assure the quality of the data prior to publication and ensuring that the aggregation method best meets user needs.
We introduced scanner data for approximately 50% of the grocery market with the index, published on 25 March 2026. Instead of collecting 25,000 prices per month directly from shops by price collectors, we are now using approximately 300 million price points derived from sales of over a billion units of products per month, collected directly from supermarket scanners at the checkouts or online. For the remaining 50% of the groceries market, we continue to manually collect prices in-store and online.
For comparison, we produced the all-items headline rates for February 2026 without using scanner data. Based on locally collected grocery data, the CPIH rose by 3.3% in the year to February 2026, and the CPI rose by 3.1%. These were slightly above the official rates of 3.2% and 3.0%, respectively.
This followed some changes introduced with the February 2025 consumer price indices in March 2025, as a necessary step towards incorporating scanner data. At that point, the process for aggregating the detailed information changed. Goods and services were allocated into "consumption segments" for different categories of expenditure.
In some cases, we defined these consumption segments to correspond to one "item" for which we track prices over time. However, in cases where more comprehensive source data were going to become available, a consumption segment was set up to include much more than just one item.
Despite the benefits of introducing scanner data into the consumer price indices, we can no longer publish the price quote data for food and non-alcoholic beverages, alcohol and tobacco (Divisions 1 and 2 of the CPIH and CPI), or the equivalent categories of RPI in our Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes dataset. This is because of our data-sharing agreements with retailers.
Instead, we have developed new aggregate output statistics to meet the needs of users. We have improved the granularity and accuracy of our Shopping prices comparison tool. We now provide average prices for more specific product types, such as "Microwave rice" and "Basmati rice". Under the previous, broader definitions (such as "rice, in all forms"), we were unable to produce average prices. Units of measurement are also now included, making comparisons more meaningful and easier to interpret.
We are also publishing regional consumption segment indices and weights, and counts of indicator marker codes (for example, sales and recoveries) that are manually collected as part of the traditional data collection. We first published these from March 2026, with the release of the February 2026 indices. Further outputs will be introduced later in 2026.
To assist individuals in understanding how the rise in inflation affects their expenditure, we have produced a personal inflation calculator. The calculator allows users to enter the amount they spend across either a reduced or a wide range of categories to produce an estimate of their personal inflation based on those spending patterns.
Our Shopping prices comparison tool shows how the average prices of items have changed over time. Please note that the newly introduced consumption segments for food, drink and tobacco will not have data before 2025 in the tool.
The tool includes average prices for petrol and diesel. As a result of rounding in the calculations used to produce those series, the average prices may occasionally be slightly different from the petrol and diesel prices released in the statistical bulletin.
On 28 August 2026, we published our quarterly Household Costs Indices (HCIs) for UK household groups bulletin. The HCIs reflect how different types of households experience changing prices, and differ from CPIH and CPI. The CPIH and CPI are based on recognised economic principles and provide an aggregate measure of inflation for household spending in the UK.
The HCIs are official statistics in development and this quarterly bulletin included new estimates for April to June 2026. It was not possible for this September 2026 bulletin to update to 2026 weights in line with the standard methodology for consumer prices. This is because of delays in processing the underlying survey data and the need for further quality assurance. We will update the weights as soon as the data are available to use.
The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP) is the classification that underpins some of the main statistics that we produce. To reflect changes in household expenditure patterns since its inception in the late 1990s, the classification was updated in 2018 (PDF, 1,286KB).
In line with usual practice at the start of each year, the expenditure weights used in compiling the CPIH and CPI were calculated using updated spending information.
The 2026 weights for CPIH and CPI were calculated using national accounts household final consumption expenditure (HHFCE) data for 2024. They reflect our most comprehensive and complete estimate of the latest household spending at the time of the weights update. This is in line with our standard methodology. More information is available in our Consumer price inflation, updating weights articles.
The weights for the RPI were also updated and introduced with the February 2026 index.
These include new estimates of CPIH and improved estimates of CPI for 1950 to 1988. These estimates (published in response to user need for a longer series) are indicative and are for analytical purposes only. They are not intended for official use and do not constitute part of the accredited official statistics series.
The consumer price indices are based on prices collected manually from outlets around the country, information collected centrally over the internet and by phone, and, from February 2026, data collected from supermarket scanners at the checkouts or online. The traditionally sourced data used in this release were collected on or around 15 September 2026.
The three cases refer firstly to the CPIH as our lead measure of inflation, based on economic principles. They also refer to the HCIs as a set of measures that reflect the change in costs and prices experienced by different households, and the RPI as a legacy measure that is required to meet existing user needs. The issues with the RPI are described in our Shortcomings of the Retail Prices Index as a measure of inflation article.
These accredited official statistics were independently reviewed by the Office for Statistics Regulation in July 2017. They comply with the standards of trustworthiness, quality and value in the Code of Practice for Statistics and should be labelled "accredited official statistics".
The UK government's Great British Summer Savings scheme, announced on 21 May 2026, ended on 1 September 2026. It is likely that the reversal of the scheme resulted in price rises for cultural events, historic monuments and cinema admissions, but it doesn't appear that this has had a substantial overall impact on headline consumer inflation.
Producer price inflation, UK Bulletin | Monthly Changes in the prices of goods bought and sold by UK manufacturers, including price indices of materials and fuels purchased (input prices) and factory gate prices (output prices).
Private rent and house prices, UK Bulletin | Monthly The Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) measures private rent inflation for new and existing tenancies. The UK House Price Index (HPI) measures house price inflation.
Shopping prices comparison tool Interactive | Released 21 October 2026 Search to see how the average prices of hundreds of shopping items are changing.
Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2026 Article | Released 16 March 2026 An overview of the latest annual update of Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) weights.
Household Costs Indices for UK household groups Bulletin | Quarterly Household Costs Indices, 12-month growth rates, expenditure shares and contributions for UK household groups and all households. These are official statistics in development.
UK Statistics Authority National Statistician's Advisory Panels on Consumer Price Statistics External web page | Updated when needed Reports, papers and minutes of the two independent advisory panels on consumer price statistics: a technical panel to advise the National Statistician on technical aspects of the statistics, and a stakeholder panel to provide advice on the uses and applications of price indices.
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+
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+ ONS Release Calendar RSS Feed.
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releasecalendar
+ Latest ONS releases
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+ Construction statistics, Great Britain: 2025
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/constructionstatisticsgreatbritain2025
+ Statistics on the construction industry, including value of output, new orders by sector, number of firms and total employment, insolvencies and construction Output Price Indices.
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/constructionstatisticsgreatbritain2025
+ Fri, 23 Oct 2026 08:30:00 +0000
+
+
+ Labour demand volumes by Standard Occupation Classification (SOC 2020), UK: January 2017 to September 2026
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/labourdemandvolumesbystandardoccupationclassificationsoc2020ukjanuary2017toseptember2026
+ These tables contain the number of online job adverts split by different geographies and occupation (SOC 2020).
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/labourdemandvolumesbystandardoccupationclassificationsoc2020ukjanuary2017toseptember2026
+ Fri, 23 Oct 2026 08:30:00 +0000
+
+
+ UK trade, quarterly goods and services: April to June 2026
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/uktradequarterlygoodsandservicesapriltojune2026
+ Quarterly estimates of total trade, trade in goods, and trade in services by country.
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/uktradequarterlygoodsandservicesapriltojune2026
+ Fri, 23 Oct 2026 08:30:00 +0000
+
+
+ Estimates of the very old, including centenarians, UK: 2002 to 2025
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/estimatesoftheveryoldincludingcentenariansuk2002to2025
+ Annual mid-year population estimates of people aged 90 years and over by sex and single year of age to 105 years and over, and comparisons between UK countries.
+ https://www.ons.gov.uk/releases/estimatesoftheveryoldincludingcentenariansuk2002to2025
+ Fri, 23 Oct 2026 08:30:00 +0000
+
+
+
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Consumer price inflation, UK: May 2025
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+
+ Price indices, percentage changes, and weights for the different measures of consumer price inflation.
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The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 4.0% in the 12 months to May 2025, compared with 4.1% in the 12 months to April.
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.2% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.4% in May 2024.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.4% in the 12 months to May 2025, compared with 3.5% in the 12 months to April.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.2% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.3% in May 2024.
The largest downward contribution to the monthly change in both CPIH and CPI annual rates came from transport; the largest, partially offsetting, upward contributions came from food, and furniture and household goods.
Core CPIH (CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) rose by 4.2% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 4.5% in the 12 months to April; the CPIH goods annual rate rose from 1.7% to 2.0%, while the CPIH services annual rate slowed from 5.8% to 5.3%.
Core CPI (CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco) rose by 3.5% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 3.8% in the 12 months to April; the CPI goods annual rate rose from 1.7% to 2.0%, while the CPI services annual rate slowed from 5.4% to 4.7%.
The CPIH and CPI inflation rates and indices were each overstated in April 2025 as a result of an error in the Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) component; in line with our revisions policy, the April figures have not been amended but the corrected VED information has been used when producing the May index.
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Table 1: CPIH, OOH component and CPI index values, and annual and monthly rates UK, May 2024 to May 2025
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+
CPIH Index (UK, 2015 = 100)
CPIH 12- month rate (%)
CPIH 1- month rate (%)
CPI Index (UK, 2015=100)
CPI 12- month rate (%)
CPI 1- month rate (%)
OOH Index (UK, 2015=100)
OOH 12- month rate (%)
+
2024
May
132.7
2.8
0.4
133.9
2.0
0.3
125.3
6.7
+
Jun
133.0
2.8
0.2
134.1
2.0
0.1
126.1
6.8
+
Jul
132.9
3.1
0.0
133.8
2.2
-0.2
126.9
7.0
+
Aug
133.4
3.1
0.4
134.3
2.2
0.3
127.7
7.1
+
Sep
133.5
2.6
0.1
134.2
1.7
0.0
128.5
7.2
+
Oct
134.3
3.2
0.6
135.0
2.3
0.6
129.5
7.4
+
Nov
134.6
3.5
0.2
135.1
2.6
0.1
130.5
7.8
+
Dec
135.1
3.5
0.3
135.6
2.5
0.3
131.3
8.0
+
2025
Jan
135.1
3.9
0.0
135.4
3.0
-0.1
131.8
8.0
+
Feb
135.6
3.7
0.4
136.0
2.8
0.4
132.4
7.5
+
Mar
136.1
3.4
0.3
136.5
2.6
0.3
132.9
7.2
+
Apr
137.7
4.1
1.2
138.2
3.5
1.2
133.2
6.9
+
May
138.0
4.0
0.2
138.4
3.4
0.2
133.7
6.7
+
+
+
+
+
+
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) rose by 4.0% in the 12 months to May 2025, compared with 4.1% in the 12 months to April (Figure 1).
On a monthly basis, CPIH rose by 0.2% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.4% in May 2024.
The owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs component of CPIH rose by 6.7% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 6.9% in the 12 months to April. OOH costs rose by 0.4% on the month, compared with a 0.6% increase a year earlier.
The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) rose by 3.4% in the 12 months to May 2025, compared with 3.5% in the 12 months to April.
On a monthly basis, CPI rose by 0.2% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.3% in May 2024.
The CPIH and CPI were each overstated in April as a result of an error in the Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) component. The effect was to add 0.1 percentage points to the headline annual rates. In line with our revisions policy, the April figures have not been amended but the corrected VED information has been used when producing the May index. More information on the error is included in Section 8: Data sources and quality.
The main drivers of the annual inflation rate for CPIH and CPI are the same where they are common to both measures. However, the OOH costs component accounts for approximately 17% of the CPIH and is the main driver for differences between the CPIH and CPI inflation rates. This makes CPIH our most comprehensive measure of inflation. We cover this in more detail in Section 4: Latest movements in CPIH inflation and provide a commentary on the CPI in Section 5: Latest movements in CPI inflation. We also cover both CPIH and CPI in Section 3: Notable movements in prices, though the figures reflect CPIH.
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Table 2: CPIH annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, May 2024, April 2025, and May 2025
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+
CPIH 12-month rate (%)
CPIH 1-month rate (%)
+
Apr 2025
May 2025
May 2024
May 2025
+
CPIH All items [1]
4.1
4.0
0.4
0.2
+
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
3.4
4.4
-0.3
0.7
+
Alcohol and tobacco
5.7
5.4
0.3
0.1
+
Clothing and footwear
-0.4
-0.3
0.6
0.8
+
Housing and household services
7.0
6.9
0.4
0.3
+
of which owner occupiers' housing costs
6.9
6.7
0.6
0.4
+
Furniture and household goods
-0.5
0.8
0.2
1.5
+
Health
4.3
4.5
0.2
0.3
+
Transport [1]
3.3
0.7
0.7
-1.8
+
Communication
5.8
4.5
1.0
-0.2
+
Recreation and culture
3.1
3.2
0.2
0.3
+
Education
7.5
7.5
0.0
0.0
+
Restaurants and hotels
2.7
2.8
0.7
0.8
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.5
2.8
0.1
0.4
+
+
All goods
1.7
2.0
0.0
0.4
+
All services [1]
5.8
5.3
0.6
0.1
+
CPIH exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPIH) [1]
4.5
4.2
0.5
0.2
+
+
+
+
+
+
Individual contributions may not sum to the total because of rounding.
Figure 2 shows the contributions from the 12 divisions to the change in the annual Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) inflation rate between April and May 2025. These sum to the change in the annual rate between the latest two months.
The slight change in the rate into May 2025 reflected downward contributions from four divisions, partially offset by upward contributions from five divisions. The largest downward contributions came from transport, and housing and household services. The largest upward contributions came from food and non-alcoholic beverages, and furniture and household goods.
Overall, prices in the transport division rose by 0.7% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 3.3% in the 12 months to April. On a monthly basis, prices fell by 1.8% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.7% a year ago.
The slowing in the annual rate reflected falls in air fares and the price of motor fuels, together with the correction of an error in the Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) series. The latter was overstated in April and the series corrected from May. As is standard practice, the April figure has not been revised. This means that transport had a contribution of 0.36 percentage points to the published CPIH annual rate in April but, without the error, the contribution would have been 0.26 percentage points. In terms of the contribution to change between April and May, transport has a downward contribution of 0.28 percentage points, which would be downward 0.18 percentage points without the error. More background information is included in Section 8: Data sources and quality.
Air fares fell by 5.0% between April and May 2025, compared with a large rise of 14.9% between the same months in 2024. These movements were influenced by the timing of Easter and the associated school holidays. In 2025, Easter fell in the middle of April, possibly contributing towards relatively high fares, which then fell in May. In 2024, Easter fell in late March, before the April pricing period, which may have contributed to a relatively low April figure, followed by a rise into May.
There were also downward effects, albeit smaller, from sea, rail and road transport, where again the timing of Easter may have influenced price movements.
The average price of petrol fell by 2.1 pence per litre between April and May 2025 to stand at 132.4 pence per litre, down from 148.8 pence per litre in May 2024. Diesel prices fell by 2.6 pence per litre in May 2025 to stand at 139.1 pence per litre, down from 156.3 pence per litre in May 2024. These movements resulted in overall motor fuel prices falling by 10.9% in the 12 months to May 2025, compared with a fall of 9.3% in the 12 months to April.
The 12-month inflation rate for housing and household services was 6.9% in May 2025, down from 7.0% in April. On a monthly basis, prices rose by 0.3% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.4% a year ago.
The easing in the 12-month rate between April and May 2025 principally reflected a downward effect from owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs, which rose by 6.7% in the year to May 2025. This was down from 6.9% in the year to April 2025, and was the lowest 12-month rate seen since May 2024, when the rate was also 6.7%.
The downward contributions from other divisions were partially offset by an upward effect from food and non-alcoholic beverages, where prices rose by 4.4% in the 12 months to May 2025, up from 3.4% in the 12 months to April. The May 2025 figure was the highest recorded since February 2024, when the rate was 5.0% (Figure 3).
On a monthly basis, food and non-alcoholic beverages prices rose by 0.7% in May 2025, compared with a fall of 0.3% a year ago.
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+
+
+
+
There were upward effects to the change in the rate from 7 of the 11 food and non-alcoholic beverages classes, with the largest coming from the sugar, jam, syrups, chocolate and confectionery class. Within this, prices of chocolate, confectionery and ice cream rose between April and May this year but fell between the same two months a year ago. There was also a small upward effect from meat, where, on a monthly basis, prices rose by more in May 2025 than May 2024.
Prices of furniture and household goods overall rose by 0.8% in the 12 months to May 2025. This is the highest rate since December 2023, but it is well below the peaks seen in 2022 (Figure 4). The latest rate compares with a fall of 0.5% in the 12 months to April 2025. On a monthly basis, prices rose by 1.5% in May 2025, compared with a rise of 0.2% a year ago.
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+
+
+
+
The main upward contributions to the rise in the 12-month rate came from household appliances, and furniture and furnishings. In the former class, prices of items such as fridge freezers and vacuum cleaners rose in May 2025 but fell a year ago. The movement relates to the timing of sales, with the prices of some products recovering from sale this year but entering a sales period a year ago. In the furniture class, prices of bedroom furniture rose by more in May 2025 than May 2024. Again, the movement relates to recoveries from sale though there were also some general price rises for these products.
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+
+
+
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Figure 5 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers’ housing costs (CPIH) series for all goods and all services, together with CPIH excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (often referred to as core CPIH). The CPIH inflation rate is added for comparison.
The CPIH all goods index rose by 2.0% in the 12 months to May 2025, up from 1.7% in the 12 months to April. This is the highest rate since November 2023 when it was also 2.0%. It was last higher in October 2023. The largest upward contributions to the change in the annual rate came from non-energy industrial goods (particularly household goods), and processed and non-processed food.
The CPIH all services index rose by 5.3% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 5.8% in the 12 months to April. This is the lowest rate seen since January 2023. The largest downward contributions to the change in the annual rate came from transport services (particularly air fares) and services for personal transport equipment (with the correction of the Vehicle Excise Duty series in May).
The core CPIH annual inflation rate was 4.2% in May 2025, down from 4.5% in April.
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+
+
+
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Figure 6 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPIH inflation rate over the last two years. The contribution of each category to the annual rate depends on the price movement in that category as well as its weight, which is updated annually.
The contributions from all divisions to the annual CPIH inflation rate were positive in May 2025, with the exception of clothing and footwear. By far, the largest positive contribution came from housing and household services, which contributed 2.04 percentage points, down slightly from 2.08 percentage points in April.
The contribution from food and non-alcoholic beverages rose from 0.31 to 0.40 percentage points between April and May 2025. This was the largest contribution from this division since February 2024. The contribution from furniture and household goods, at 0.04 percentage points, was the largest since January 2024, when it was also 0.04 percentage points. The contribution was last larger in December 2023.
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+
+
+
+
Figure 7 shows the contributions from owner occupiers’ housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax to the annual CPIH inflation rate in the context of wider housing-related costs. The Consumer Prices Index (CPI) differs from the CPIH because it does not include these two components.
The annual contribution from OOH costs continued to slow, to 1.11 percentage points in May 2025, following a recent high of 1.31 percentage points in January 2025.
There was a small reduction in the contribution from actual rentals for housing, while other components’ contributions were little changed in May.
While the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is our lead and most comprehensive measure of consumer price inflation, the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) is based on a harmonised methodology developed by Eurostat. This enables international comparisons to be drawn. More information on the use cases for our consumer price inflation statistics can be found in our Measuring changing prices and costs for consumers and households: December 2023 article.
Figure 8 shows annual CPI inflation for the UK compared with the European Union (EU) average and selected Group of Seven (G7) countries. While the UK CPI is produced on a comparable basis with EU countries, the United States Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) differs in some respects (see Footnote 1 to Figure 8). The UK's CPI inflation rate of 3.4% was above the first (or "flash") estimate of inflation for France (0.6%) and Germany (2.1%) in the 12 months to May 2025.
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+
+
+
+
+
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Table 3: CPI annual and monthly inflation rates by division UK, May 2024, April 2025, and May 2025
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+
CPI 12-month rate (%)
CPI 1-month rate (%)
+
Apr 2025
May 2025
May 2024
May 2025
+
CPI All items [1]
3.5
3.4
0.3
0.2
+
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
3.4
4.4
-0.3
0.7
+
Alcohol and tobacco
5.7
5.4
0.3
0.1
+
Clothing and footwear
-0.4
-0.3
0.6
0.8
+
Housing and household services
7.8
7.7
0.2
0.1
+
Furniture and household goods
-0.5
0.8
0.2
1.5
+
Health
4.3
4.5
0.2
0.3
+
Transport [1]
3.3
0.7
0.7
-1.8
+
Communication
5.8
4.5
1.0
-0.2
+
Recreation and culture
3.1
3.2
0.2
0.3
+
Education
7.5
7.5
0.0
0.0
+
Restaurants and hotels
2.7
2.8
0.7
0.8
+
Miscellaneous goods and services
2.5
2.8
0.1
0.4
+
+
All goods
1.7
2.0
0.0
0.4
+
All services [1]
5.4
4.7
0.6
-0.1
+
CPI exc food, energy, alcohol and tobacco (core CPI) [1]
3.8
3.5
0.5
0.2
+
+
+
+
+
+
Figure 9 shows the 12-month inflation rates for the CPI all goods and all services series, together with CPI excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco (often referred to as core CPI). The headline CPI inflation rate is added for comparison.
The CPI all goods index rose by 2.0% in the 12 months to May 2025, up from 1.7% in the 12 months to April. This is the highest rate since November 2023 when it was also 2.0%. It was last higher in October 2023.
The CPI all services index rose by 4.7% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 5.4% in the 12 months to April.
Core CPI rose by 3.5% in the 12 months to May 2025, down from 3.8% in the 12 months to April.
As with the all-items annual inflation rates, the drivers of CPIH and CPI goods and services inflation are the same (with the exception of owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs and Council Tax, which are excluded from CPI). The drivers are discussed in more detail in Section 4: Latest movements in CPIH inflation.
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+
+
+
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Figure 10 shows how each of the main groups of goods and services contributed to the change in the annual CPI inflation rate between April and May 2025.
The slight change in the rate into May 2025 reflected downward contributions from four divisions, partially offset by upward contributions from five divisions. The largest downward contribution came from transport. The largest, partially offsetting, upward contributions came from food and non-alcoholic beverages, and furniture and household goods.
Although the sizes of the contributions differ from CPIH, the main drivers to the change are the same where they are common to both measures.
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Figure 11 shows the extent to which the distinct categories of goods and services have contributed to the overall annual CPI inflation rate over the last two years.
The CPIH includes extra housing components not included in the CPI. This can sometimes result in the largest contributions to the annual CPI and CPIH inflation rates coming from different divisions. However, in May 2025, housing and household services was the largest-contributing division to both measures, with a 0.97 percentage point contribution to the CPI rate and 2.04 percentage points to the CPIH rate. OOH costs had a large upward contribution to housing and household services in the CPIH but are excluded from the CPI.
Consumer price inflation tables Dataset | Released 18 June 2025 Measures of monthly UK inflation data including the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Retail Prices Index (RPI). These tables complement the consumer price inflation time series dataset. Please note that from publication on 26 March 2025, we have published fewer tables to avoid duplication and to remove discontinued series. Tables 39 and 40 detail which tables are no longer published and provide alternative sources for where the content in those tables can be found, if available.
Consumer price inflation time series Dataset MM23 | Released 18 June 2025 Comprehensive database of time series covering measures of inflation data for the UK including the CPIH, CPI and RPI.
Consumer price inflation detailed briefing note Dataset | Released 18 June 2025 The consumer price inflation detailed briefing note contains details of the items contributing to the changes in the CPIH, details of any notable movements, a summary of the reconciliation of CPIH and RPI, and the outlook, which looks ahead to next month's release.
Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes Dataset | Released 18 June 2025 Price quote data (for locally collected data only) and consumption segment indices (that underpin consumer price inflation statistics) are published, giving users access to the detailed data that are used in the construction of the UK's inflation figures. Note that this dataset was previously called the consumer price inflation item indices and price quotes dataset.
The most common approach to measuring inflation is the 12-month or annual inflation rate, which compares prices for the latest month with the same month a year ago. In any given month, the annual rate is determined by the balance between upward and downward price movements across the range of goods and services included in the index.
The Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) is the most comprehensive measure of inflation. It extends the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) to include a measure of the costs associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home, known as owner occupiers' housing (OOH) costs, along with Council Tax. Both are significant expenses for many households and are not included in the CPI.
The CPI is a measure of consumer price inflation produced to international standards, and is based on European regulations for the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices. The CPI is the inflation measure used in the government's target for inflation.
OOH costs are the costs of housing services associated with owning, maintaining and living in one's own home.
The Retail Prices Index (RPI) does not meet the required standard for designation as an accredited official statistic. In recognition that it continues to be widely used in contracts, we continue to publish the RPI, its subcomponents, and RPI excluding mortgage interest payments (RPIX). To view the all-items RPI, please see the data time series section of the Inflation and price indices area of our website. The annual RPI inflation rate was 4.3% in May 2025.
The UK Statistics Authority (The Authority) and HM Treasury launched a consultation in 2020 on The Authority's proposal to address the shortcomings of the RPI. From 2030 (at the earliest), as outlined in The Authority's response to the consultation, the CPIH methods and data sources will be introduced into the RPI. Additionally, the supplementary and lower-level indices of the RPI will be discontinued.
Since publication of the April 2025 figures on 21 May, an error has been discovered in the licensed vehicles data provided by the Department for Transport and used to calculate the April Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) component.
The incorrect data overstated the number of vehicles subject to VED rates applicable in the first year of registration. This had the effect of overstating the headline Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), Consumer Prices Index (CPI) and Retail Prices Index (RPI) 12-month rates for April 2025 by 0.1 percentage points. The correct data have now been used to create the VED index for May.
In line with the established revisions policies for those series, the April figures have not been revised. This means that the monthly rates for May for CPIH, CPI and RPI are each calculated using the published April data and that VED has had a downward effect on the change in the rate between the published April 2025 data and May 2025. More information on the error is included in the correction notice and the Impact of vehicle excise duty on headline UK consumer price inflation, April 2025 table in Consumer price inflation, UK: April 2025.
We are undertaking a programme of transformation across our consumer price statistics, including identifying new sources, improving methods and developing systems. Our Transformation of consumer price statistics: August 2024 article, published on 6 August 2024, contains more information about the project and our ongoing transformation plans. We also published our Consumer prices development plan: updated August 2024 to outline the rationale for our priorities and their potential impact.
As part of the development, from the 26 March 2025 publication of the February 2025 figures, we have introduced improved imputation methods, consumption segments, and improved Northern Ireland private rental price statistics. These changes have also been introduced into the Household Costs Indices from February 2025 (published on 29 May 2025). We have published an Impact analysis on transformation of UK consumer price statistics: January 2025 to provide users with indicative impacts of the improvements from January 2019 to June 2024.
As usual, we welcome your feedback on our work. To contact us, please email cpi@ons.gov.uk.
The "All items" CPI and CPIH series incorporate price information from a wide range of goods and services. From March 2025, the process for aggregating this detailed information has changed, as a necessary step towards incorporating larger and more granular datasets into the consumer price indices.
Goods and services are allocated into "consumption segments" for different categories of expenditure. In some cases, we have currently defined these consumption segments to correspond to one "item" for which the Office for National Statistics (ONS) tracks prices over time. However, in cases where more comprehensive source data are available, or are expected to be available in the future, a consumption segment typically includes much more than just one item. For simplicity, we continue to refer to "items" in the statistical bulletin and detailed briefing note. More detailed methodological information is available in our Consumer Prices Indices Technical Manual, 2019.
Please note that the move from sample items to broader consumption segments means there is an impact on the individual price quotes and lower-level indices published from March 2025 in our Consumer price inflation consumption segment indices and price quotes dataset. These outputs have been updated and presented in an improved format to help users transition to the use of consumption segments and other methodological changes.
To assist individuals in understanding how the rise in inflation affects their expenditure, we have produced a personal inflation calculator. The calculator allows users to enter the amount they spend across either a reduced or a wide range of categories, to produce an estimate of their personal inflation based on those spending patterns.
Our Shopping prices comparison tool shows how the average prices of items have changed over time. Please note that the newly introduced consumption segments for food, drinks and tobacco will not have data before 2025 in the tool. However, the historical average prices for food, drinks and tobacco items, that were on the tool before the update in 2025, can be found in our Shopping prices comparison tool data download before the 2025 update.
Please also note that Table 55 in our Consumer price inflation tables dataset, which provided time series of prices for petrol and diesel, has not been published from 26 March and the two series have been discontinued. Historical average prices are still available from the time series explorer function on our website using the four-character identifiers CZMK for petrol and CZML for diesel.
On 29 May 2025, we published our quarterly Household Costs Indices (HCIs) for UK household groups bulletin. The HCIs reflect how different types of households experience changing prices, and differ from CPIH and CPI. The CPIH and CPI are based on recognised economic principles, and provide an aggregate measure of inflation for household spending in the UK.
The HCIs are official statistics in development and this release included new estimates for January to March 2025. The data in this release have been updated using 2024 weights leading to some minor revisions in previously published comparisons. It was not possible for this latest release to update the weights for 2025 in line with the standard methodology for consumer prices. This is because of delays in processing the underlying survey data and the need for further ongoing quality assurance. Instead, the most recent estimates have been compiled using the weights for February to December 2024. We aim to update the weights in due course.
The Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP) is the classification that underpins some of the main statistics produced by the ONS. The classification has seen a substantial update (PDF, 2.51MB) in recent years, to reflect changes in household expenditure patterns since its inception in the late 1990s. The UK currently uses the version of COICOP introduced in 1999.
We will ensure that the new classification is implemented in a comprehensive and reliable manner that considers other ONS priorities around the transformation of our main statistics. To meet this objective, we will aim to introduce the new classification (COICOP 2018) as soon as possible, as part of our wider plans to implement the updated System of National Accounts (SNA25). However, this is likely to be later than the date for implementation in some other countries. We will share our implementation plan as soon as we can.
In line with usual practice at the start of each year, the expenditure weights used in compiling the CPIH and CPI were calculated using updated spending information. The first update of weights was implemented with the January indices. The second update was introduced, along with the usual basket update, with the February indices released in March. We published Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2025 and Consumer price inflation basket of goods and services: 2025 on 18 March 2025.
The 2025 weights for CPIH and CPI were calculated using national accounts household final consumption expenditure (HHFCE) data for 2023. This is in line with our standard methodology of using data lagged by two years. It differs from the approach used in 2021, 2022 and 2023, when there were large changes seen in spending patterns because of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Over those years, we adjusted the spending data so that the resulting weights were more reflective of the year immediately before use in consumer price inflation. More information is available in our Consumer price inflation, updating weights articles.
The weights for the RPI were also updated for 2025 in line with the practice followed both before and during the pandemic period. This was with no additional adjustment to the spending data because of any coronavirus (COVID-19) effects.
In line with the improvements introduced last year, we now use unrounded weights in compiling CPIH and CPI. The weights prior to 2024 for the CPI and CPIH were rounded to integers as parts per thousand of the all-items indices at the class level (4-digit COICOP). The RPI continues to be based on integer weights.
The consumer price indices are normally based on prices collected from outlets around the country, supplemented by information collected centrally over the internet and by phone. The figures in this publication use data collected on or around 13 May 2025.
The three cases refer firstly to the CPIH as our lead measure of inflation based on economic principles. They also refer to the HCIs as a set of measures that reflect the change in costs and prices experienced by different households, and the RPI as a legacy measure that is required to meet existing user needs. Our Shortcomings of the RPI as a measure of inflation article describes the issues with the RPI.
These accredited official statistics were independently reviewed by the Office for Statistics Regulation in July 2017. They comply with the standards of trustworthiness, quality and value in the Code of Practice for Statistics and should be labelled "accredited official statistics".
Producer price inflation, UK Bulletin | Released 19 February 2025 Changes in the prices of goods bought and sold by UK manufacturers, including price indices of materials and fuels purchased (input prices) and factory gate prices (output prices). The scheduled release of May data on 18 June has been postponed while checks are carried out on the dataset. More information is available in our Pausing of Producer Prices publications statement.
Private rent and house prices, UK Bulletin | Released 18 June 2025 The Price Index of Private Rents (PIPR) measures private rent inflation for new and existing tenancies. The UK House Price Index measures house price inflation.
Shopping prices comparison tool Interactive | Updated 18 June 2025 Search to see how the average prices of hundreds of shopping items are changing.
Consumer price inflation, updating weights: 2025 Article | Released 18 March 2025 An overview of the latest annual update of Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH) weights.
Household Costs Indices for UK household groups Bulletin | Released 29 May 2025 Household Costs Indices, 12-month growth rates, expenditure shares and contributions for UK household groups and all-households. These are official statistics in development.
Consumer price inflation, historical data, UK, 1950 to 1988 Dataset | Released 18 May 2022 Data tables of historical estimates modelled for the CPIH and Consumer Prices Index (CPI) over the period 1950 to 1988. Data in these tables are not accredited official statistics and are provided for indicative purposes only.
UK Statistics Authority National Statistician's Advisory Panels on Consumer Price Statistics Webpage | Updated when needed Reports, papers and minutes of the two independent advisory panels on consumer price statistics: a technical panel to advise the National Statistician on technical aspects of the statistics and a stakeholder panel to provide advice on the uses and applications of price indices.
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GDP first quarterly estimate, UK: April to June 2026
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+ First quarterly estimate of gross domestic product (GDP). Contains current and constant price data on the value of goods and services to indicate the economic performance of the UK.
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UK real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased by 0.4% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, following growth of 0.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026 (Figure 1). GDP is estimated to be 1.2% higher in Quarter 2 2026, compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Our monthly GDP figures published today also show that GDP grew by 0.3% in June 2026, after showing no growth in May 2026 (revised down from a growth of 0.1% in our previous publication) and following an unrevised fall of 0.1% in April 2026.
Early estimates of GDP are subject to revision (positive or negative). Our recently published analysis shows that since Quarter 1 2000 there is a mean revision of positive 0.08 percentage points between the first estimate and the final estimate, which is published three years later. The mean absolute revision between the first and final estimates is 0.27 percentage points.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have increased by 0.4% in Quarter 2 2026, and is up 1.0% compared with the same quarter a year ago. For more information, see Section 6: Real GDP per head.
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Table 1: Headline national accounts indicators for the UK % growth
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+
GDP (Chained volume measures)
GDP per head (Chained volume measures) [Note 3]
GDP (Current market prices)
GDP implied deflator
+
Seasonally adjusted
+
+
2025
1.3
1.0
5.0
3.6
+
+
Q1 2025
0.6
0.5
1.4
0.8
+
Q2 2025
0.2
0.1
1.1
1.0
+
Q3 2025
0.1
0.0
0.9
0.8
+
Q4 2025
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.6
+
Q1 2026
0.6
0.6
1.7
1.1
+
Q2 2026
0.4
0.4
0.8
0.4
+
Nominal GDP is estimated to have increased by 0.8% in Quarter 2 2026 and is now 4.1% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago.
The implied GDP deflator is the broadest measure of inflation in the domestic economy, reflecting changes in the price of all goods and services that make up GDP. The GDP deflator covers the whole of the domestic economy, not just consumer spending. It also reflects the change in the relative price of exports to imports. For more information on the implied GDP deflator, see our Measuring price changes of the UK national accounts: February 2023 article.
Compared with the same quarter a year ago, the GDP implied deflator increased by 2.9% in Quarter 2 2026, mainly caused by household expenditure, exports, and gross capital formation (Figure 2).
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Output is estimated to have increased by 0.4% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, following an increase of 0.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026. Overall, there were increases in 15 out of 20 subsectors of GDP in the latest quarter.
In Quarter 2 2026, the services sector increased by 0.5%, while the construction sector increased by 0.3% and the production sector showed no growth.
Our monthly GDP figures published today also show that GDP grew by 0.3% in June 2026, after showing no growth in May 2026 (revised down from a growth of 0.1% in our previous publication) and following an unrevised fall of 0.1% in April 2026.
Services output increased by 0.5% in Quarter 2 2026, following an increase of 0.8% in Quarter 1 2026. Services output is estimated to be 1.5% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago.
In Quarter 2 2026, non-consumer-facing services (business-facing services) grew by 0.5%, while consumer-facing services grew by 0.3%.
Figure 3 shows that 8 of the 14 services subsectors contributed positively to services growth in Quarter 2 2026. The largest positive contributors to growth were information and communication, and professional, scientific and technical activities.
In Quarter 2 2026, information and communication was up 2.7%, mainly driven by a growth of 3.7% in computer programming, consultancy and related activities. Professional, scientific and technical activities was up 1.7%, driven by growths in advertising and market research (up 4.3%), scientific research and development (up 3.9%), and legal activities (up 2.5%).
The largest negative contributor to growth in Quarter 2 2026 was administrative and support service activities, which fell by 0.9%, mainly because of falls of 2.8% in office administrative, office support, and other business support activities, as well as falls of 7.9% in security and investigation activities.
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+
+
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The production sector is estimated to have shown no growth in Quarter 2 2026, following a 0.2% increase in the previous quarter. Production output is estimated to be 0.3% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago.
Within production, there were increases of 1.0% and 0.2% in manufacturing and mining and quarrying, respectively. These were offset by falls in electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply, which fell by 2.3%, and in water supply; sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities, which fell by 3.7% in Quarter 2 2026.
Looking at the manufacturing sector in more detail, 7 out of 13 manufacturing subsectors contributed positively to manufacturing growth in the latest quarter (Figure 4). The largest positive contribution to the growth was the manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (up 4.2%).
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+
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Construction output is estimated to have increased by 0.3% in Quarter 2 2026, but remains 2.0% lower compared with the same quarter a year ago. Both new work and repair and maintenance grew over the period, increasing by 0.4% and 0.2%, respectively. Within new work, the largest positive contribution came from infrastructure new work, which grew by 1.9%. In repair and maintenance, the largest positive contribution came from public housing repair and maintenance, which grew by 2.5%.
Expenditure is estimated to have grown by 0.4% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, mainly because of increases in gross fixed capital formation and household consumption (Figure 5).
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+
+
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There was a 0.3% increase in real household final consumption expenditure in Quarter 2 2026, and it is now estimated to be up by 1.0% compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Within household consumption in the latest quarter, growth was caused by increases in nearly all main categories, with the largest contributions coming from recreation and culture, and household goods and services.
Net tourism made a negative contribution to growth in household consumption in the latest quarter. Net tourism is offset within trade, so there is no effect on the gross domestic product (GDP) aggregate. Information on how we measure net tourism is provided in our National Accounts articles: Treatment of tourism in the UK National Accounts article. Excluding net tourism, domestic consumption grew by 0.4% in the latest quarter.
Real government consumption expenditure fell by 0.3% in Quarter 2 2026, and is now estimated to be 1.4% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago.
The fall in government consumption in the latest quarter mainly reflects declines in health and education. The decline in education may be because of the closure of some schools during the heatwave conditions seen across much of the UK in June.
Within gross capital formation, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is now estimated to have increased by 1.2% in Quarter 2 2026, and to be 2.7% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago. The main drivers of the growth are increases in information and communication technology, and other machinery and equipment, especially hardware investment.
Within GFCF, business investment is estimated to have increased by 1.7% in the latest quarter and is now estimated to be 0.8% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago.
Excluding the alignment adjustments, early estimates show that chained volume inventories fell by £1,382 million in Quarter 2 2026 (Table 2), mainly because of a reduction in manufacturing inventories.
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Table 2: Change in inventories, including and excluding balancing and alignment adjustments UK, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
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+
Change in Inventories
Of which alignment
Of which balancing
Change in Inventories excluding alignment and balancing
+
Q1 2025
Current price
1529
-562
0
2091
+
Q1 2025
Chained volume measure
1279
-537
0
1816
+
Q2 2025
Current price
1575
1876
0
-301
+
Q2 2025
Chained volume measure
2886
1744
0
1142
+
Q3 2025
Current price
958
750
0
208
+
Q3 2025
Chained volume measure
1050
691
0
359
+
Q4 2025
Current price
-2228
-2064
500
-664
+
Q4 2025
Chained volume measure
-1589
-1898
0
309
+
Q1 2026
Current price
3675
-2113
0
5788
+
Q1 2026
Chained volume measure
1680
-1921
-1000
4601
+
Q2 2026
Current price
1641
3049
500
-1908
+
Q2 2026
Chained volume measure
1880
2762
500
-1382
+
The UK's trade deficit for goods and services is now estimated at 2.1% of nominal GDP in Quarter 2 2026. However, this includes non-monetary gold and other precious metals, which is an erratic series. It can be useful to exclude this from the trade balance.
Excluding non-monetary gold and other precious metals, the trade deficit is now estimated at 1.0% of nominal GDP in Quarter 2 2026 (Figure 6).
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Export volumes increased by 0.5% in the latest quarter and are now 2.4% higher than they were in the same quarter a year ago.
The increase in the latest quarter was mainly caused by a 0.1% growth in goods exports, and a 0.8% increase in services exports. Within goods exports, the growth was mainly caused by increases in chemicals. The growth in services exports was mainly because of other business service activities and transport.
Import volumes are estimated to have increased by 0.5% in the latest quarter and are now 2.9% higher than they were in the same quarter a year ago. Goods imports increased by 0.6%, mainly because of increases in fuels. Services imports increased by 0.3%, mainly because of transportation and intellectual property.
Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 0.8% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 and is up 4.1% compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in nominal GDP in the latest quarter was mainly driven by an increase in gross operating surplus (Figure 7).
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+
+
+
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Compensation of employees increased by 0.2% in the latest quarter and is up 5.3% compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in Quarter 2 2026 was caused by an increase of 0.7% in wages and salaries, which offset a 1.7% fall in employers' social contributions.
Early estimates of private sector wages and salaries are based on estimates of the number of employees in the economy, from our Labour Force Survey (LFS), and average earnings from our average weekly earnings statistics.
Other income is now estimated to have increased by 0.2% in the latest quarter and is 3.8% higher than it was in the same quarter a year ago. Growth in the latest quarter was caused by an increase in household gross operating surplus.
Taxes less subsidies are estimated to have fallen by 1.8% in Quarter 2 2026 and are now 4.0% higher than they were in the same quarter a year ago.
There was a 0.1% fall in taxes and a 15.6% increase in subsidies, which contribute negatively to GDP. The 15.6% increase in subsidies was mainly because of other economic and service subsidies (energy) and housing equity injection.
Total gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations, excluding the alignment adjustment, increased by 1.9% in Quarter 2 2026 (Table 3). This is mainly because of an increase in private non-financial corporations (PNFC).
Estimates of non-financial corporations within the GOS of corporations remains subject to uncertainty. This is because we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years. We rely on contextual data from other sources to inform these quarterly estimates, as outlined in our Profitability of UK companies quality and methodology information (QMI).
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Table 3: Gross operating surplus of corporations, including and excluding alignment adjustments UK, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
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+
Gross operating surplus of corporations
Of which alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
+
Quarter-on-quarter growth
+
Q1 2025
160239
-1104
161343
-0.7
+
Q2 2025
167734
2823
164911
2.2
+
Q3 2025
165079
1163
163916
-0.6
+
Q4 2025
163310
-2882
166192
1.4
+
Q1 2026
164459
-2762
167221
0.6
+
Q2 2026
170760
366
170394
1.9
+
We produce estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) per head (or per capita), which divides UK GDP by the total UK population. This is one proxy indicator of welfare, rather than production, which reflects a country's living standards. It captures the volume of goods and services available to the average person. Further information on this is available in our Trends in UK real GDP per head: 2022 to 2024 article.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have increased by 0.4% in Quarter 2 2026 and is up 1.0% compared with the same quarter a year ago. There have been some small revisions to GDP per head figures from 2021 onwards, reflecting revisions to population estimates.
Population figures for up to mid-2021 are based on our mid-year UK population estimates, published on 26 September 2025. Population figures for mid-2021 to mid-2025 are based on:
Population figures for Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2025 to Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026 are based on an interpolation between mid-year estimates (projection for Northern Ireland) and our 2024-based national population projections, published on 28 April 2026, using the principal variant. Figures for Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 are based on our 2024-based national population projections.
Early estimates of GDP are subject to positive or negative revision, as described in our Why GDP figures are revised article. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article, published on 31 October 2025. The GDP growth vintages to 1 decimal place are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4: Quarter-on-quarter growth for real GDP at different publication vintages Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
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+
Relating to Period
Q1 2025
Q2 2025
Q3 2025
Q4 2025
Q1 2026
Q2 2026
+
May 2025
0.7
+
Jun 2025
0.7
+
Aug 2025
0.7
0.3
+
Sept 2025
0.7
0.3
+
Nov 2025
0.7
0.3
0.1
+
Dec 2025
0.7
0.2
0.1
+
Feb 2026
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
+
Mar 2026
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
+
May 2026
0.6
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.6
+
Jun 2026
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.6
+
Latest estimate: Aug 2026
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.4
+
Total revision between first and latest estimate
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
..
+
+
+
Table 5: Real GDP growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter-on-quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) for 2025 and 2026
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+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual (%)
+
Country
Q1 2025
Q2 2025
Q3 2025
Q4 2025
Q1 2026
Q2 2026
2025
+
Canada
0.7
-0.2
0.5
-0.2
0.0
0.8
1.9
+
France
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.3
-0.1
0.2
0.9
+
Germany
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.3
+
Italy
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.7
+
Japan
0.5
0.3
-0.6
0.2
0.5
..
1.1
+
UK
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.4
1.3
+
United States
-0.2
0.9
1.1
0.1
0.5
0.4
2.1
+
+
+
Table 6: Real GDP per head growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter-on-quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) per head for 2025 and 2026
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+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual (%)
+
Country
2025 Q1
2025 Q2
2025 Q3
2025 Q4
2026 Q1
Q2 2026
2025
+
Canada
0.5
-0.3
0.4
-0.1
0.2
..
0.7
+
France
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.2
-0.2
..
0.6
+
Germany
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.5
..
0.3
+
Italy
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.3
..
0.7
+
Japan
0.6
0.3
-0.5
0.4
..
..
1.6
+
UK
0.5
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.4
1.0
+
United States
-0.3
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.5
0.3
1.6
+
GDP — data tables Dataset | Released 13 August 2026 Annual and quarterly data for UK gross domestic product (GDP) estimates, in chained volume measures and current market prices.
The embedded visualisation below may not display correctly without JavaScript enabled. View it in full screen.
Quarterly GDP is a balanced measure of three approaches. The GDP monthly estimate focuses on gross value added (GVA) and output as a proxy for GDP. This results in data differences, in both levels and growth terms, between our quarterly bulletins (average GDP) and our GDP monthly estimate bulletins (output approach to GDP). Quarterly GDP is the lead measure of GDP because of its higher data content and inclusion of variables that enable the conversion from a GVA concept to a GDP basis.
Alignment adjustments, found in Table M of our GDP data tables, have a target limit of plus or minus £3,000 million on any quarter. However, in periods where the data sources are particularly difficult to balance, larger alignment adjustments are sometimes needed. This is explained in more detail in our Recent challenges of balancing the three approaches of GDP article.
As a standard, we prefer the alignment adjustment to be out of tolerance, rather than to over-adjust individual GDP components to achieve a balance. This is most likely to occur in the latest quarter, where the constraints are larger, and where we must align to the output estimate for the change in GDP, and where the data content is at its lowest.
To achieve a balanced GDP dataset through alignment, we apply balancing adjustments to the components of GDP where data content is particularly weak in each quarter because of a higher level of forecast content. Table 7 shows the balancing adjustments applied to our GDP quarterly dataset.
+
+
Table 7: Balancing adjustments applied to the GDP first quarterly estimate dataset Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
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+
GDP measurement approach and component adjustment applied to
Since the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, arrangements for how the UK trades with the EU changed. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) implemented some data collection changes following Brexit, which affected statistics on UK trade in goods with the EU.
From September 2025 until early 2027, International Trade in Services (ITIS) data (which account for approximately 50% of total Trade in Services) will be processed once each quarterly period. During this period, the data will be based on a robust survey response rate of between approximately 60% and 70%. This will facilitate more focus on improving processing systems and ensuring methods and quality in the future.
ITIS-based data in Trade in Services estimates at first quarterly estimate will be forecast until early 2027.
The International Passenger Survey (IPS), which is the source of travel services estimates (accounting for approximately 8% of total trade), is being transformed as part of our Improving our travel and tourism statistics project. Travel services estimates have been forecast since Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2024. Estimates will be forecast during the period of the travel and tourism transformation.
Our Financial Services Survey (FSS) is undergoing transformation to improve the quality of our financial sector statistics. During the period of transformation, starting from Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024, financial services trade statistics in this publication are based on forecasts.
There are three approaches to measuring gross domestic product (GDP):
the output approach
the expenditure approach
the income approach
The data and data quality are different for each approach, and this dictates the approach taken in balancing quarterly data. There are more data available on output in the UK in the short term than in the other two approaches. To get the best estimate of GDP, our published figure, estimates from all three approaches are balanced to produce an average, except in the latest two quarters, where the output data take the lead because of the larger data content.
The three approaches to measuring GDP allow us to confront our data sources within the national accounts framework. Figure 3 in our GDP quarterly national accounts, UK: January to March 2026 bulletin showed that there are differences in the three approaches at this stage in the production cycle for 2025, with real growth estimated in a range of 1.2% to 1.5%. There will be uncertainty at the component level at this stage in the production cycle for 2024 onwards, until these data have been confronted through the supply and use tables framework (SUTs). This uncertainty may be for various reasons and is further discussed ahead in this section.
In the output approach, we do not currently have final estimates for intermediate consumption (the value of goods and services purchased to be used up in the production of goods and services). This is outlined in our Blue Book 2025: advanced aggregate estimates article. Initially, we use turnover and output as a proxy for changes in gross value added. We assume that the intermediate consumption ratio by industry, calculated in 2023, holds constant into 2024 onwards. More information on this is provided in Section 11: Data sources and quality of our GDP first quarterly estimate, UK: April to June 2024 bulletin.
In the expenditure approach, we currently have lower response rates for areas such as the Living Costs and Food Survey, which is one of many data sources that inform our estimates of household consumption. Therefore, we rely on additional indicators, such as our Monthly Business Survey, to quality-adjust some of our estimates in the short term.
In the income approach, we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years.
The UK National Accounts are drawn together using data from many different sources. This ensures that they are comprehensive and provide different perspectives on the economy, such as sales by retailers and purchases by households. Further information on measuring GDP can be found in our Guide to the UK National Accounts. More quality and methodology information is available in our GDP QMI.
The headline estimates of quarterly GDP are seasonally adjusted. Seasonal adjustment is the process of removing the variations associated with the time of year, or the arrangement of the calendar, from a data time series.
GDP estimates, as for many data time series, are difficult to analyse using raw data because seasonal effects dominate short-term movements. Identifying and removing the seasonal component leaves the trend and irregular components.
We use the X-13-ARIMA-SEATS approach to seasonal adjustment. Seasonal adjustment parameters are monitored closely and regularly reviewed. For more information, please see our seasonal adjustment methodology.
In our quarterly GDP estimates, seasonal adjustment is applied at a low level, and the seasonally adjusted series are aggregated to create estimates by sector and total output. As part of our quality assurance approach, residual seasonality checks are regularly completed by our time series analysis team on both the directly seasonally adjusted series, and the indirectly derived aggregate time series.
There are conceptual differences between indirect and direct seasonal adjustment. Indirect seasonal adjustment is the aggregation of the directly seasonally adjusted component series, typically chosen at an optimal level and depending on user needs. For the National Accounts, GDP aggregates are created with indirect seasonal adjustment. Because of processing, including benchmarking and chain-linking, direct seasonal adjustment of the non-seasonally adjusted GDP aggregate will not give the same results as the indirect seasonally adjusted output.
Based on our combined assessment from the suite of statistical tests, there is no statistically significant residual seasonality in our aggregate outputs from Quarter 1 1955 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, although we continue to monitor this closely.
There are common pitfalls in interpreting data series:
expectations of accuracy and reliability in early estimates are often too high
revisions are an inevitable consequence of the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy
early estimates are often based on incomplete data
Very few statistical revisions arise because of "errors" in the popular sense of the word. All estimates, by definition, are subject to statistical "error".
Many different approaches can be used to summarise revisions. The section on Accuracy and reliability in our GDP QMI analyses the mean average revision and the mean absolute revision for GDP estimates over data publication iterations. For more information, please see our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article, published on 31 October 2025.
GDP monthly estimate, UK: June 2026 Bulletin | Released 13 August 2026 Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the value of goods and services produced in the UK. It estimates the size of and growth in the economy.
GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 Article | Released 31 October 2025 Gross domestic product (GDP) revisions in annual and quarterly national accounts rounds, focusing on revisions in Blue Book 2025.
Communicating the UK Economic Cycle Methodology | Released 11 November 2022 Explanation of movement in gross domestic product (GDP) and wider considerations around technical recessions in the UK.
UK Input-output analysis tool: 2019 to 2023 Interactive tool | Released 5 March 2025 This tool shows which industries are the most notable users of a selected product, and which products are required to make other goods and services in the UK economy.
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GDP first quarterly estimate, UK: January to March 2025
+
+
+ First quarterly estimate of gross domestic product (GDP). Contains current and constant price data on the value of goods and services to indicate the economic performance of the UK.
+
+
UK gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have grown by 0.7% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025, following growth of 0.1% in the previous quarter.
In output terms, growth in Quarter 1 2025 was driven by an increase of 0.7% in the services sector, production also grew, by 1.1%, while the construction sector showed no growth.
In expenditure terms, growth in the latest quarter was driven by increases in gross fixed capital formation, net trade and household consumption.
Nominal GDP is estimated to have increased by 1.6% in Quarter 1 2025, mainly driven by an increase in compensation of employees.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have grown by 0.5% in Quarter 1 2025, following two consecutive quarterly falls.
UK real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased by 0.7% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 (Figure 1). Real GDP is estimated to have increased by 1.3%, compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Monthly GDP is estimated to have grown by 0.2% in March 2025 because of growth in the services and construction sectors, as shown in our GDP monthly estimate, UK: March 2025 bulletin. This follows an unrevised increase of 0.5% in February 2025 and an unrevised no growth in January 2025.
Early estimates of GDP are subject to revision (positive or negative). Previous analysis shows that the revision between the first quarterly GDP estimate and the same quarterly estimate three years later is typically up to plus or minus 0.2 percentage points, when more detailed information becomes available through the comprehensive annual supply and use balancing process, as the data content increases. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2024 article. The GDP growth vintages from 2023 onwards are shown in Table 4. We give more information on uncertainty in Section 11: Data sources and quality.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have grown by 0.5% in Quarter 1 2025 and is up 0.3%, compared with the same quarter a year ago. See Section 6: Real GDP per head for more information.
+
+
Table 1: Headline national accounts indicators for the UK Percentage growth
+
+
GDP (Chained volume measures)
GDP per head (Chained volume measures) [Note 3]
GDP (Current market prices)
GDP implied deflator
+
Seasonally adjusted
+
+
2024
1.1
0.0
5.2
4.0
+
+
Q1 2024
0.9
0.6
2.1
1.2
+
Q2 2024
0.5
0.2
1.2
0.7
+
Q3 2024
0.0
-0.2
1.8
1.8
+
Q4 2024
0.1
-0.1
1.1
1.0
+
Q1 2025
0.7
0.5
1.6
0.8
+
Nominal GDP is estimated to have increased by 1.6% in Quarter 1 2025, mainly driven by an increase in compensation of employees. Nominal GDP is estimated to have increased by 5.8%, compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The implied GDP deflator is the broadest measure of inflation in the domestic economy, reflecting changes in the price of all goods and services that make up GDP. The GDP deflator covers the whole of the domestic economy, not just consumer spending. It also reflects the change in the relative price of exports to imports. For more information on the implied GDP deflator, see our Measuring price changes of the UK national accounts: February 2023 article.
The implied price of GDP rose by 0.8% in Quarter 1 2025, mainly driven by higher prices in household consumption. The GDP implied deflator grew by 4.5%, compared with the same quarter a year ago (Figure 2).
+
+
+
+
+
Output is estimated to have increased by 0.7% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025, following 0.1% growth in the previous quarter.
The services sector increased by 0.7% in the latest quarter and was the largest contributor to overall output growth. Construction output remained unchanged from the previous quarter, while production increased by 1.1% following consecutive falls in the previous 3 quarters. Early estimates show 14 out of 20 of the subsectors grew across Quarter 1 2025, which is up from 13 in the previous quarter.
Services output increased by 0.7% in the latest quarter, following 0.1% growth in the previous quarter. Services output is estimated to have increased by 1.5%, compared with the same quarter a year ago. Non-consumer-facing services (business-facing services) increased by 0.7% in Quarter 1 2025, while consumer-facing services increased by 0.9%.
In the latest quarter, 10 of the 14 services sectors increased. However, as activities of households as employers has a small weight, this means that 9 out of 14 services subsectors contributed positively to growth to two decimal places. The largest positive contributor to growth was administrative and support service activities, which increased by 3.3%. Within this subsector, 5 of the 6 industries contributed positively to growth.
The second largest positive contribution to growth was from wholesale retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles, which increased by 1.6%. Within this subsector, all 3 industries contributed positively to growth, including a 1.5% increase in retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles. More information can be found in our Retail Sales publication.
The largest negative contributor to growth in Quarter 1 2025 was education, which fell by 0.6%.
+
+
+
+
+
The production sector is estimated to have grown by 1.1% in Quarter 1 2025, following falls in the previous three quarters. Production output is estimated to have fallen by 0.2%, compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The growth in production in Quarter 1 2025 was largely driven by a 0.8% increase in manufacturing and a 4.0% increase in water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities. Elsewhere, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply increased by 1.8% while mining and quarrying fell by 0.5%.
Manufacturing output grew by 0.8% in Quarter 1 2025, following a 0.6% fall in the previous quarter. Figure 4 shows there were increases in 10 out of 13 manufacturing subsectors in the latest quarter. The largest positive contributions were from the manufacture of transport equipment, which grew by 2.7%, and the manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c, which grew by 3.8%. The growth in transport equipment was largely driven by manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers, although this industry remains 5.5% below its level a year ago. This is supported by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT: UK Car Manufacturing & Production Data).
The manufacture of basic metals and metal products fell by 3.0% in the latest quarter, driven by a 3.6% decline in the manufacture of fabricated metal products.
+
+
+
+
+
Construction output is estimated to have shown no growth in Quarter 1 2025, following 0.3% growth in the previous quarter. The level of construction output was 0.9% higher in Quarter 1 2025 compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Looking at the expenditure approach to measuring gross domestic product (GDP), growth in the latest quarter was driven by increases in gross fixed capital formation, net trade and household consumption (Figure 5).
+
+
+
+
+
There was an increase of 0.2% in real household expenditure in Quarter 1 2025 and it is now 0.7% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. Within household consumption, growth was driven by higher spending on household goods and services, miscellaneous and housing.
Net tourism contributed negatively to growth in household consumption in the latest quarter. Net tourism is offset within trade, so there is no impact on the GDP aggregate. Information on how we measure net tourism is provided in our National Accounts articles: Treatment of tourism in the UK National Accounts. Excluding net tourism, domestic consumption grew by 0.4% in the latest quarter.
Real government consumption expenditure fell by 0.5% in the latest quarter and is 1.3% higher, compared with the same quarter a year ago. The fall in government consumption in the latest quarter mainly reflects lower expenditure on health and education.
Within gross capital formation, early estimates of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) showed a 2.9% increase in Quarter 1 2025 and is now up 4.4% compared with the same quarter a year ago. The increase in the latest quarter was mainly driven by a large increase in transport (mainly because of increased aircraft imports), as well as increases in ICT equipment and other machinery and equipment, and other buildings and structures.
Within GFCF, business investment is estimated to have increased by 5.9% in Quarter 1 2025 and is up 8.1%, compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Excluding the alignment and balancing adjustments, early estimates show that real inventories increased by £6.7 billion in Quarter 1 2025 (Table 2). This was driven by higher stocks in manufacturing.
+
+
Table 2: Change in inventories, including and excluding balancing and alignment adjustments UK, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 1 2025
+
+
Change in Inventories
Of which alignment
Of which balancing
Change in Inventories excluding alignment and balancing
+
Q1 2024
Current price
-2869
-3003
-1500
1634
+
Q1 2024
Chained volume measure
-4911
-2743
-1000
-1168
+
Q2 2024
Current price
2208
2351
-2000
1857
+
Q2 2024
Chained volume measure
2038
2148
-4000
3890
+
Q3 2024
Current price
3110
-1014
-1500
5624
+
Q3 2024
Chained volume measure
270
-890
-2000
3160
+
Q4 2024
Current price
5418
1666
-1000
4752
+
Q4 2024
Chained volume measure
6716
1485
5231
+
Q1 2025
Current price
8
-3334
3342
+
Q1 2025
Chained volume measure
3866
-2920
6786
+
The UK's trade deficit for goods and services was 1.4% of nominal GDP in Quarter 1 2025. However, this includes non-monetary gold and other precious metals, which is an erratic series. It can be useful to exclude this from the trade balance. Excluding non-monetary gold and other precious metals, the trade deficit was 0.9% of nominal GDP in Quarter 1 2025 estimate (Figure 6).
It is important to note that in the first quarterly estimate of Quarter 1 2025, the International Trade In Services (ITIS) survey figures are forecast using time series data; this forecast is combined with additional data sources to make up trade in services totals. This forecast will be reviewed and replaced at the Quarterly National Accounts using ITIS survey data.
+
+
+
+
+
Export volumes increased by 3.5%, following three consecutive quarterly declines. The increase in the latest quarter was mainly driven by a 5.6% increase in goods exports and a 2.0% increase in services exports. The increase in goods exports was mainly caused by rises in exports of material manufactures, whereas growth in services exports was caused by rises in other business services and travel.
Import volumes increased by 2.1% in the latest quarter, driven by increases of 0.6% and 5.2% in goods and services imports, respectively. The increase in goods imports was driven by large movements in non-monetary gold and other precious metals. However, this series also appears within gross capital formation (GCF) as valuables, so the effect is GDP neutral. The increase in services imports were caused by increases in other business services and travel.
Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 1.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 and is up 5.8% compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in nominal GDP was mainly driven by increases in compensation of employees (Figure 7).
+
+
+
+
+
Compensation of employees increased by 1.4% in the latest quarter and is 7.1% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in the latest quarter was driven by an increase of 1.6% in wages and salaries, and a 0.4% increase in employers' social contributions.
Early estimates of private sector wages and salaries are based on estimates of the number of employees in the economy from our Labour Force Survey (LFS) and average earnings from our average weekly earnings statistics. However, there is some additional uncertainty around the employees estimates used to derive our figures of wages and salaries because of low response rates in the LFS. We have therefore used additional information from ourEarnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information UK to help improve the accuracy of the income measure of GDP.
Other income increased by 0.9% in the latest quarter. This was driven by growth in mixed income, from self-employment and rental income, and other gross operating surplus, from households.
Taxes less subsidies are estimated to have increased by 1.2% in Quarter 1 2025. There was a 1.8% increase in taxes (mainly Value Added Tax), which was partially offset by a 6.5% increase in subsidies, which contribute negatively to GDP.
Total gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations excluding the alignment adjustment fell by 0.2% in Quarter 1 2025 (Table 3). This is mainly because of a decline in private non-financial corporations.
There is uncertainty around estimates of non-financial corporations within GOS of corporations. This is because we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years. We rely on contextual data from other sources to inform these quarterly estimates, as outlined in our Profitability of UK companies Quality and Methodology Information (QMI).
+
+
Table 3: Gross operating surplus of corporations, including and excluding alignment adjustments UK, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 1 2025
+
+
Gross operating surplus of corporations
Of which alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
+
Quarter-on-quarter growth
+
Q1 2024
144665
-576
145241
1.5
+
Q2 2024
146952
2151
144801
-0.3
+
Q3 2024
150372
36
150336
3.8
+
Q4 2024
148024
-1611
149635
-0.5
+
Q1 2025
152043
2744
149299
-0.2
+
We produce estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) per head (or per capita), which divides UK GDP by the total UK population. This is one proxy indicator of welfare, rather than production, which reflects a country's living standards. It captures the volume of goods and services available to the average person. Further information on this is available in our Trends in UK real GDP per head: 2022 to 2024 article.
It is also important to note that early estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) are subject to positive or negative revision, as described in our Why GDP figures are revised article. For more information, please refer to our GDP revision in Blue Book: 2024 article. The GDP growth vintages are shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Quarter-on-quarter growth for real GDP at different publication vintages Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2023 to Quarter 1 2025
+
+
Relating to Period
Q1 2023
Q2 2023
Q3 2023
Q4 2023
Q1 2024
Q2 2024
Q3 2024
Q4 2024
Q1 2025
+
May 23
0.1
+
Jun 23
0.1
+
Aug 23
0.1
0.2
+
Sep 23
0.3
0.2
+
Nov 23
0.3
0.2
0.0
+
Dec 23
0.3
0.0
-0.1
+
Feb 24
0.2
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
+
Mar 24
0.2
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
+
May 24
0.2
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.6
+
Jun 24
0.2
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.7
+
Aug 24
0.2
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.7
0.6
+
Sep 24
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.7
0.5
+
Nov 24
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.7
0.5
0.1
+
Dec 24
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.7
0.4
0.0
+
Feb 25
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.3
0.8
0.4
0.0
0.1
+
Mar 25
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
+
Latest estimate: May 25
0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.7
+
Total revision between first and latest estimate
0.0
-0.2
-0.1
0.1
0.3
-0.1
-0.1
0.0
-
+
+
+
Table 5: Real GDP growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter on quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) for 2024 to 2025
+
+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual growth (%)
+
Country
Q1 2024
Q2 2024
Q3 2024
Q4 2024
Q1 2025
2024
+
Canada
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.4
1.5
+
France
0.1
0.3
0.4
-0.1
0.1
1.1
+
Germany
0.2
-0.3
0.1
-0.2
0.2
-0.2
+
Italy
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.5
+
Japan
-0.5
0.8
0.4
0.6
..
0.1
+
UK
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.7
1.1
+
United States
0.4
0.7
0.8
0.6
-0.1
2.8
+
+
+
Table 6: Real GDP per head growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter-on-quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP)
+
+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual (%)
+
Country
Q1 2024
Q2 2024
Q3 2024
Q4 2024
Q1 2025
2024
+
Canada
-0.2
0.1
-0.1
0.2
..
-1.4
+
France
0.0
0.2
0.3
-0.2
..
0.8
+
Germany
0.2
-0.4
0.1
-0.2
..
-0.4
+
Italy
0.2
0.2
0.0
0.1
..
0.5
+
Japan
-0.4
0.8
0.5
0.7
..
0.5
+
UK
0.6
0.2
-0.2
-0.1
0.5
0.0
+
United States
0.2
0.5
0.6
0.5
-0.2
1.9
+
GDP - data tables Dataset | Released 15 May 2025 Annual and quarterly data for UK gross domestic product (GDP) estimates, in chained volume measures and current market prices.
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There is different data content and quality of the three approaches: the output approach, the expenditure approach and the income approach. This dictates the approach taken in balancing quarterly data. There are more data available on output in the UK in the short term than in the other two approaches. To get the best estimate of GDP (gross domestic product), our published figure, estimates from all three approaches are balanced to produce an average, except in the latest two quarters where the output data take the lead because of the larger data content.
The three approaches to measuring GDP allow us to confront our data sources within the national accounts framework. Figure 9 showed that the three approaches to measuring GDP are closely aligned. However, there can still be uncertainty at the component level at this stage in the production cycle for 2023 and 2024 until these data have been confronted through the supply and use tables (SUTs) framework. This uncertainty may be for various reasons and is further discussed in this section.
In the output approach, we do not currently have final estimates for intermediate consumption (the value of goods and services purchased to be used up in the production of goods and services). This is outlined in our Blue Book 2024: advanced aggregate estimates release. Initially, we use turnover and output as a proxy for changes in gross value added. We assume that the intermediate consumption ratio by industry, calculated in 2022, holds constant into 2023 onwards. More information on this is provided in Section 11: Data sources and quality of our GDP quarterly national accounts, UK: April to June 2024 bulletin.
In the expenditure approach, we currently have lower response rates for areas, such as the Living Costs and Food Survey, which is one of many data sources that inform our estimates of household consumption. We therefore rely on additional indicators, such as our Monthly Business Survey, to quality adjust some of our estimates in the short term.
Quarterly GDP is a balanced measure of the three approaches. The GDP monthly estimate focuses on gross value added (GVA) and output as a proxy for GDP. This results in data differences, in both levels and growth terms, between our quarterly bulletins (average GDP) and our GDP monthly estimate bulletins (output approach to GDP). Quarterly GDP is the lead measure of GDP because of its higher data content and inclusion of variables, which enable the conversion from a GVA concept to a GDP basis.
Alignment adjustments, found in Table M of our GDP data tables, have a target limit of plus or minus £3,000 million on any quarter. However, in periods where the data sources are particularly difficult to balance, larger alignment adjustments are sometimes needed, as explained in our Recent challenges of balancing the three approaches of GDP article. Our standard practice is to prefer that the alignment adjustment be out of tolerance rather than over-adjust individual GDP components to achieve a balance. This is most likely to occur in the latest quarter where the constraints are larger, where we must align to the output estimate for the change in GDP, and where the data content is at its lowest.
To achieve a balanced GDP dataset through alignment, we apply balancing adjustments to the components of GDP where data content is particularly weak in each quarter because of a higher level of forecast content. The balancing adjustments applied in this estimate are shown in Table 7. The resulting series should be considered accordingly.
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Table 7: Balancing adjustments applied to the GDP first quarterly estimate dataset Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025
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GDP measurement approach and component adjustment applied to
Since the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, the arrangements for how the UK trades with the EU changed. HMRC implemented some data collection changes following Brexit, which affected statistics on UK trade in goods with the EU. We have made adjustments to our estimates of goods imports from the EU in 2021 and 2022 to account for these changes. However, a structural break remains in the full time series for goods imports from and exports to the EU from January 2021.
Producer prices publications are being paused while work is in progress to improve the systems used to create the Producer Price Index (PPI) and the Services Producer Price Indices (SPPI), as explained in our Producer prices publications update. This is because our quality assurance identified a problem with the chain-linking methods used to calculate the PPI and SPPI indices.
Our investigations so far have concluded that the problem affects the period from December 2008 onwards. However, investigations suggest that the main impact on annual producer price inflation rates occurred in 2022 and 2023, because of the large movements in relative prices during that period.
As these detailed price data are used within our GDP calculations, this may lead to impacts on the level of some industries, with revisions to estimates for services, production and construction particularly likely in 2022 and 2023. At an aggregate level for GDP, these revisions should be offsetting to an extent, while taken alongside regular data deliveries. Early indications suggest that there will not be a notable change in the recent economic trends seen in these data, but we will update users once more information becomes available. We do not plan any changes to the publication timetable for monthly, quarterly or annual GDP and will continue to use the current PPI estimates in these publications until updated data are available.
The UK national accounts are drawn together using data from many different sources. This ensures that they are comprehensive and provide different perspectives on the economy, for example, sales by retailers and purchases by households. Further information on measuring GDP can be found in our Guide to the UK National Accounts. More quality and methodology information is available in our GDP QMI.
The headline estimates of quarterly GDP are seasonally adjusted. Seasonal adjustment is the process of removing the variations associated with the time of year, or the arrangement of the calendar, from a data time series.
GDP estimates, as for many data time series, are difficult to analyse using raw data because seasonal effects dominate short-term movements. Identifying and removing the seasonal component leaves the trend and irregular components.
The ONS uses the X-13-ARIMA-SEATS approach to seasonal adjustment. Seasonal adjustment parameters are monitored closely and regularly reviewed. For more information, please see our seasonal adjustment methodology page.
In our quarterly GDP estimates seasonal adjustment is applied at a low level and the seasonally adjusted series are aggregated to create estimates by sector and total output. As part of our quality assurance approach, residual seasonality checks are regularly completed by our time series analysis team on both the directly seasonally adjusted series and also the indirectly derived aggregate time series.
There are common pitfalls in interpreting data series. These include:
expectations of accuracy and reliability in early estimates are often too high
revisions are an inevitable consequence of the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy
early estimates are often based on incomplete data
Very few statistical revisions arise because of "errors" in the popular sense of the word. All estimates, by definition, are subject to statistical "error".
Many different approaches can be used to summarise revisions. The section on Accuracy and reliability in our GDP QMI analyses the mean average revision and the mean absolute revision for GDP estimates over data publication iterations.
GDP monthly estimates, UK: March 2025 Bulletin | Released 15 May 2025 Gross domestic product (GDP) measures the value of goods and services produced in the UK. It estimates the size of and growth in the economy.
Communicating the UK Economic Cycle Methodology | Released 11 November 2022 Explanation of movement in GDP and wider considerations around technical recessions in the UK.
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GDP quarterly national accounts, UK: October to December 2025
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+ Revised quarterly estimate of gross domestic product (GDP) for the UK. Uses additional data to provide a more precise indication of economic growth than the first estimate.
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UK real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased by an unrevised 0.1% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, following unrevised growth of 0.1% in the previous quarter (Figure 1).
In line with the National Accounts Revisions Policy, this release includes revisions to data from Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025 as a result of updated source data and a review of seasonal adjustment. There have been no revisions to the quarterly path of total real GDP across 2024 and 2025, however, there have been some revisions to underlying components.
Early estimates of GDP are subject to revision (positive or negative). Our recently published analysis shows that the mean absolute revision between the quarterly national accounts GDP estimate, and the same quarterly estimate three years later is, on average, plus or minus 0.24 percentage points. Revisions are made when more detailed information becomes available through the comprehensive annual supply and use balancing process, as the data content increases. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article.
In our next monthly GDP publication on 16 April 2026, we will now be revising our estimates from January 2024 to reflect the latest data. These updates will also be incorporated into the GDP first quarterly estimate being published on 14 May 2026, where there will be revisions from Quarter 1 2024.
Q1 refers to Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar), Q2 refers to Quarter 2 (Apr to June), Q3 refers to Quarter 3 (July to Sept) and Q4 refers to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec).
Chart shows the quarter on previous quarter growth rounded to 1 decimal place (%).
Real GDP per head is estimated to have decreased by 0.1% in the latest quarter, but it is up 0.6% compared with the same quarter a year ago. See Section 6 for more information.
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Table 1: Headline National Accounts indicators for the UK % growth
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GDP (Chained volume measures)
GDP per head (Chained volume measures) [Note 3]
Real household dispoable income per head [Note 3]
GDP (Current market prices)
GDP implied deflator
+
Seasonally adjusted
+
+
2024
1.1
0.0
3.0
5.1
3.9
+
2025
1.4
1.1
0.6
5.1
3.7
+
+
2024 Q1
0.8
0.5
1.7
2.2
1.4
+
2024 Q2
0.6
0.3
0.2
1.7
1.1
+
2024 Q3
0.2
0.1
1.6
1.7
1.4
+
2024 Q4
0.3
0.3
1.3
1.1
0.8
+
2025 Q1
0.7
0.6
-0.9
1.3
0.7
+
2025 Q2
0.2
0.1
0.0
1.3
1.1
+
2025 Q3
0.1
0.0
-1.2
0.9
0.8
+
2025 Q4
0.1
-0.1
1.2
0.6
0.5
+
Nominal GDP is estimated to have increased by 0.6% in Quarter 4 2025 and is now 4.2% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The implied GDP deflator is the broadest measure of inflation in the domestic economy, reflecting changes in the price of all goods and services that make up GDP. The GDP deflator covers the whole of the domestic economy, not just consumer spending. It also reflects the change in the relative price of exports to imports. For more information on the implied GDP deflator, see our Measuring price changes of the UK national accounts: February 2023 article.
Compared with the same quarter a year ago, the GDP implied deflator increased by 3.2% in Quarter 4 2025, mainly caused by household expenditure, gross capital formation, general government, and exports (Figure 2).
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Q1 refers to Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar), Q2 refers to Quarter 2 (Apr to June), Q3 refers to Quarter 3 (July to Sept) and Q4 refers to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec).
Component contributions do not sum to total because of rounding.
An increase in import prices contributes negatively to the implied GDP deflator, while a decrease in import prices contributes positively to the implied GDP deflator.
Real annual GDP is estimated to have increased by 1.4% in 2025, revised up from the first estimate of 1.3% (Figure 3). Compared with the first estimate, the three approaches are now more closely aligned, mainly reflecting upwards revisions in the expenditure approach, which is discussed later in this bulletin. Growth in 2024 remains unrevised at 1.1%, with the three approaches showing growth in the range of 0.9% to 1.2%.
There will be uncertainty at the component level at this stage in the production cycle for 2024 onwards until these data have been confronted through the supply and use tables framework (SUTs). There are various reasons for this uncertainty, and these are further discussed in Section 12: Data sources and quality.
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Output is estimated to have increased by an unrevised 0.1% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, following unrevised growth of 0.1% in the previous quarter. Overall, in Quarter 4 2025, there were increases in 12 out of 20 of the subsectors of GDP.
The production sector increased by 1.2%, while the construction sector decreased by 2.0% (revised up from a fall of 2.1%), and services showed no growth.
Services output showed no growth in Quarter 4 2025, following an increase of 0.2% in Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2025. Services output is estimated to be 1.0% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. Non-consumer-facing services (business-facing services) showed no growth in Quarter 4 2025, while consumer-facing services increased by 0.2%.
Figure 4 shows that 7 of the 14 services subsectors contributed positively to services growth. The largest positive contributor to growth was information and communication, and transportation and storage subsectors. Information and communication increased by 0.7%, mainly caused by increases of 9.0% in information service activities, and 9.0% in motion picture, video and TV programme production, sound recording, and music publishing activities.
The transportation and storage subsector increased by 1.1%, mainly because of rises in five out of the six industries.
The largest negative contributor to growth in Quarter 4 2025 was professional, scientific, and technical activities which decreased by 1.4%.
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Across 2024 and 2025, the services sector saw revisions for the following reasons:
some businesses replied late and updated their Monthly Business Survey returns, along with other source data updates
Value Added Tax (VAT) data for Quarter 3 (Jul to Sept) 2025 was incorporated for the first time
revisions were made across 2024 to the retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles because of updated returns to the Retail Sales Index (RSI) survey; these revisions are discussed in more detail in our Retail sales December 2025 bulletin, published on 23 January 2026
The production sector is estimated to have grown by 1.2% in Quarter 4 2025, following a 1.0% decrease in the previous quarter. Production output is estimated to be 0.6% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago, revised down from the previous estimate of 1.0%.
The growth in production output in the latest quarter was mainly because of a growth of 0.8% in manufacturing, and a growth of 3.4% in electricity, gas, steam, and air conditioning supply. Mining and quarrying (up by 0.8%), and water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (up by 1.0%) also grew in the latest quarter.
Looking at the manufacturing sector in more detail, 8 out of 13 manufacturing subsectors contributed positively to manufacturing growth in the latest quarter (Figure 5). The largest positive contributions to the growth were other manufacturing and repair, which grew by 4.0%, and the manufacture of machinery and equipment not elsewhere classified, which grew by 3.6%.
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Across 2024 and 2025, the production sector sees revisions to growth mainly caused by manufacturing.
Reasons for revisions to production:
some businesses replied late and updated their Monthly Business Survey returns, along with other source data updates
Value Added Tax (VAT) data for Quarter 3 (Jul to Sept) 2025 was incorporated for the first time
a review of seasonal adjustment models
Construction output is estimated to have decreased by 2.0% in Quarter 4 2025 (previously estimated as a 2.1% decrease), following growth of 0.5% in the previous quarter. Repair and maintenance decreased by 1.5%, and new work decreased by 2.3% over the period. Within repair and maintenance, the largest negative contributor came from private housing repair and maintenance, which decreased by 2.4%. In new work, the largest negative contributor came from private housing new work, which decreased by 3.6%.
Expenditure is estimated to have grown by an unrevised 0.1% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, which was mainly caused by increases in gross capital formation: other, household consumption and government consumption (Figure 6).
Within gross capital formation: other, the largest contribution was from acquisitions less disposals of valuables, which increased by £5.9 billion between Quarter 3 and Quarter 4 of 2025. This component is largely made up of non-monetary gold, which also appears within net trade and so the effect is GDP neutral.
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+
+
+
+
There was a 0.1% increase in real household final consumption expenditure in Quarter 4 2025, revised down from the first estimate increase of 0.2%. Household consumption is now estimated to be up by 0.4% compared with the same quarter a year ago and increased by 0.8% across 2025 as a whole.
Within household consumption in the latest quarter, growth was caused by transport, miscellaneous, housing, and clothing and footwear.
Net tourism made little contribution to growth in household consumption in the latest quarter. Net tourism is offset within trade, so there is no effect on the gross domestic product (GDP) aggregate. Information on how we measure net tourism is provided in our National Accounts articles: Treatment of tourism in the UK National Accounts. Excluding net tourism, domestic consumption grew by 0.1% in the latest quarter.
Revisions to household consumption across 2025 are mainly because of updated data and a review of seasonal adjustment models in areas such as transport, financial intermediation services indirectly measured (FISIM), and education.
Real government consumption expenditure grew by 0.1% in Quarter 4 2025, revised down from the first estimate increase of 0.4%. Government consumption is now estimated to be up by 1.1% compared with the same quarter a year ago and increased by 1.7% across 2025.
The growth in government consumption in the latest quarter mainly reflects increases in health, education, and social care.
Revisions in government consumption partly reflect revised source data and updates to our seasonal adjustment model for the volume of education.
Within gross capital formation, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) increased by 0.2% in Quarter 4 2025, revised up from the first estimate decrease of 0.1%. GFCF is now estimated to be 4.2% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago and increased by 4.3% across 2025.
Within GFCF, business investment is estimated to have decreased by 2.5% in Quarter 4 2025, following growth of 1.1% in the previous quarter. Business investment is now 2.0% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. Business investment increased by 4.3% across 2025, compared with 2024.
Revisions in GFCF and business investment mainly reflect updated Quarterly Acquisitions and Disposals of Capital Assets Survey (QCAS) data and other source data.
Excluding the alignment adjustments, early estimates show that chained volume inventories fell by £627 million in Quarter 4 2025 (Table 2).
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Table 2: Change in inventories, including and excluding balancing and alignment adjustments Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, UK
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Change in Inventories
Of which alignment
Of which balancing
Change in Inventories excluding alignment and balancing
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2024 Q1
Current price
1085
-293
0
1378
+
2024 Q1
Chained volume measure
-244
-293
0
49
+
2024 Q2
Current price
4090
3067
750
273
+
2024 Q2
Chained volume measure
3650
2958
750
-58
+
2024 Q3
Current price
636
-1965
-500
3101
+
2024 Q3
Chained volume measure
-1372
-1889
-500
1017
+
2024 Q4
Current price
2118
-809
0
2927
+
2024 Q4
Chained volume measure
3347
-776
0
4123
+
2025 Q1
Current price
112
-1908
-500
2520
+
2025 Q1
Chained volume measure
231
-1795
-500
2526
+
2025 Q2
Current price
2052
2090
-1000
962
+
2025 Q2
Chained volume measure
3169
1949
500
720
+
2025 Q3
Current price
-194
222
-500
84
+
2025 Q3
Chained volume measure
355
211
-500
644
+
2025 Q4
Current price
-2015
-404
0
-1611
+
2025 Q4
Chained volume measure
-992
-365
0
-627
+
The UK's trade deficit for goods and services is now estimated at 1.6% of nominal GDP in Quarter 4 2025. However, this includes non-monetary gold and other precious metals, which is an erratic series. It can be useful to exclude this from the trade balance.
Excluding non-monetary gold and other precious metals, the trade deficit is now estimated at 0.3% of nominal GDP in Quarter 4 2025 (Figure 7).
There have been notable revisions to trade in goods from Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024. This reflects revisions to exports because of new merchanting data. There was also a previous processing error in our last UK trade: December 2025 bulletin, in ship transactions data and an improvement to the methodology for removing double counting of precious metals across different data sources. In addition, precious metals imports seen a large revision in the last quarter of 2025, reflecting updated source data.
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+
+
+
+
Export volumes decreased by 0.7% in the latest quarter and are now 1.2% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The decrease in the latest quarter was mainly caused by a 2.4% decline in goods exports, which offset a 0.6% increase in services exports. Within goods exports, the decline was mainly caused by decreases in machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, material manufactures and fuels. The increase in services exports was mainly because of other business services and transport.
Import volumes are estimated to have increased by 0.7% in the latest quarter and are now 1.9% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. Services imports increased by 2.3%, mainly because of insurance and pension services, and intellectual property. Goods imports decreased by 0.2%, with large movements in non-monetary gold offset by falls in machinery and transport equipment. However, this series also appears within gross capital formation (GCF) as valuables, so the effect is GDP neutral.
Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by an unrevised 0.6% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025 and is up by 4.2% compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in nominal GDP in the latest quarter was mainly caused by increases in compensation of employees (Figure 8).
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+
+
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Q1 refers to Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar), Q2 refers to Quarter 2 (Apr to June), Q3 refers to Quarter 3 (July to Sept) and Q4 refers to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec).
Components contributions may not sum to total because of rounding
Please note, the alignment adjustment is included in the Gross Operating Surplus of nominal GDP.
Compensation of employees increased by 1.0% in the latest quarter, revised down from 1.4% in the first estimate. It is up by 6.0% compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in Quarter 4 2025 was caused by increases of 1.2% in employers' social contributions (mainly in National Insurance contributions) and 0.9% in wages and salaries.
Early estimates of private sector wages and salaries are based on estimates of the number of employees in the economy, from our Labour Force Survey (LFS), and average earnings from our average weekly earnings statistics. However, there is some additional uncertainty around the employee estimates used to derive our figures of wages and salaries, because of low response rates in the LFS. We have therefore used additional information from our Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information UK bulletin to help improve the accuracy of the income measure of GDP. This is reflected in revisions across the quarters open to revision, where balancing adjustments have been applied to improve alignment to PAYE Real Time Information estimates.
Other income is now estimated to have increased by 0.6% in the latest quarter and is 1.5% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. This was caused by an increase in household gross operating surplus.
Taxes less subsidies are estimated to have increased by 0.9% in Quarter 4 2025, and are now 5.0% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
There was a 1.0% increase in taxes (mainly Value Added Tax (VAT)), and a 2.1% increase in subsidies that contribute negatively to GDP.
Total gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations, excluding the alignment adjustment, grew by 2.2% in Quarter 4 2025 (Table 3). This is mainly because of an increase in private non-financial corporations.
There is uncertainty around estimates of non-financial corporations within the GOS of corporations. This is because we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years. We rely on contextual data from other sources to inform these quarterly estimates, as outlined in our Profitability of UK companies quality and methodology information (QMI).
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Table 3: Gross operating surplus of corporations, including and excluding alignment adjustments Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, UK
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Gross operating surplus of corporations
Of which alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
+
Quarter-on-quarter growth
+
2024 Q1
154096
-2266
156362
1.8
+
2024 Q2
160801
2792
158009
1.1
+
2024 Q3
163237
1027
162210
2.7
+
2024 Q4
160919
-1553
162472
0.2
+
2025 Q1
160338
-2184
162522
0.0
+
2025 Q2
167410
3012
164398
1.2
+
2025 Q3
166004
1728
164276
-0.1
+
2025 Q4
165265
-2556
167821
2.2
+
We produce estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) per head (or per capita), which divides UK GDP by the total UK population. This is one proxy indicator of welfare, rather than production, which reflects a country's living standards. It captures the volume of goods and services available to the average person. Further information on this is available in our Trends in UK real GDP per head: 2022 to 2024 article.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have decreased by 0.1% in the latest quarter, but it is up 0.6% compared with the same quarter a year ago. (Figure 9). There have been some small revisions to GDP per head figures across 2025, reflecting some small revisions to GDP £ million figures as discussed at the start of this bulletin.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have increased by 1.1% annually in 2025, following no growth in 2024.
Population figures for up to mid-2024 are based on mid-year UK population estimates published on 26 September 2025. Figures for Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2024 to Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 are based on an interpolation between the mid-2024 estimate and the provisional mid-2025 estimate published on 27 November 2025.
For Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2025, the population figure is based on the provisional mid-2025 estimate. The population figure for Quarter 3 2025 and Quarter 4 2025 is based on an interpolation between UK 2022-based population projections for mid-2026 (as published on 28 January 2025) using the migration category variant and the mid-2025 provisional UK population estimate.
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+
+
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We estimate Real Household Disposable Income (RHDI) per head, by dividing RHDI by the total UK population. RHDI per head has increased by 1.2% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, following a decrease of 1.2% in the previous quarter. The components of this measure are further broken down in section 7 of this bulletin.
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+
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Real household disposable income (RHDI) per head increased by 1.2% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, following a decrease of 1.2% in the previous quarter.
The increase in RHDI is because of several factors. Nominal gross disposable income increased by 1.7% this quarter, following a decrease of 0.3% in the previous quarter. This was caused by increases in wages and salaries of £2.9 billion and social benefits other than social transfers in kind of £1.5 billion, together with a decrease in taxes on income and wealth of £1.3 billion.
The seasonal pattern of PAYE receipts can be driven by many factors, including the timing of public sector pay awards.
This was partially offset by a decrease in net property income of £1.1 billion. The implied deflator (used to remove the effects of inflation) grew by 0.4% in the latest quarter, which tempers the increase in RHDI per head.
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+
+
+
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The households' saving ratio is estimated to have grown to 9.9% in the latest quarter, up from 9.1% in Quarter 3 (Jul to Sep) 2025. During Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, the contribution of non-pension saving increased to 5.7 percentage points, up from 4.5 percentage points. Pension saving contributed 4.2 percentage points to the saving ratio, down from 4.6 percentage points in the previous quarter.
Final consumption expenditure grew by 0.4% this quarter, down from growth of 0.8% in the previous quarter. The growth was caused by increases in spending on Housing, water gas, electric and other, Restaurants and hotels and Food and non-alcoholic beverages. This is also evident in the financial account where households deposited £38.1 billion into their accounts in the latest quarter, compared with £15.2 billion in the previous quarter.
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+
+
+
In the latest quarter, general government and non-profit institutions serving households were net borrowers whilst non-financial corporations, financial corporations, households, and rest of the world were net lenders.
The UK's borrowing position with the rest of the world as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased to 2.5% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025 compared with 1.6% of GDP in Quarter 3 (Jul to Sep) 2025.
Non-financial corporations decreased their net lending to 0.1% of GDP in the latest quarter, from net lending of 1.0% of GDP in Quarter 3 2025. Within non-financial corporations, private non-financial corporations decreased their net lending to £0.4 billion in Quarter 4 2025, from net lending of £7.3 billion in the previous quarter. This decrease was caused by a fall in net distributed income of corporations of £8.5 billion, partially offset by a £3.0 billion decrease in gross capital formation.
Financial corporations net lending position was at 0.1% of GDP (£0.9 billion) in the latest quarter following lending of 0.4% of GDP in Quarter 3 2025. This was caused by an increase in gross capital formation of £8.1 billion and a decrease in social contributions of £1.5 billion partially offset by increases in net capital transfers of £3.3 billion and net property income of £2.2 billion.
General government net borrowing was unchanged from the previous quarter at 5.0% of GDP. Within general government, central government decreased their net borrowing to £34.6 billion, following net borrowing of £36.4 billion in the previous quarter. This decrease was caused by a fall in payments of interest of £4.8 billion partially offset by a rise of £2.8 billion in gross fixed capital formation.
Households increased their net lending position to 2.5% of GDP in the latest quarter, from 2.1% of GDP in Quarter 3 2025. The causes for this position are the same as those identified in the household saving ratio section.
In the latest quarter, general government were net borrowers, whilst non-financial corporations, financial corporations, households, non-profit institutions serving households and rest of the world were net lenders.
The UK's net borrowing position with the rest of the world as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have decreased to 1.2% in Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025 compared with 3.3% of GDP in Quarter 3 (Jul to Sep) 2025.
Non-financial corporations net lending was unchanged from the previous quarter at 0.3% in the latest quarter. Within this sector, private non-financial corporations increased their net lending to £1.8 billion in Quarter 4 2025 from net borrowing of £1.6 billion in the previous quarter. This was caused by a reduction in loan liabilities of £55.3 billion, an increase in net debt securities of £7.8 billion together with an increase in currency and deposits of £ £4.7 billion. Partially offset by a decrease in net equity and investment fund shares and units of £30.9 billion and a decrease in net other accounts of £20.7 billion.
Financial corporations decreased their net lending to 0.1% of GDP in the latest quarter, from 0.4% in Quarter 3 2025. This was caused by a decrease in net debt securities of £35.8 billion, a decrease in net equity and investment fund shares and units of £21.1 billion. Partially offset by an increase in net loans of £48.2 billion and an increase in net other accounts of £4.3 billion.
General government increased their net borrowing as a percentage of GDP to an estimated 5.8% in the latest quarter from 5.4% in Quarter 3 2025. Within general government, central government increased their net borrowing to £38.5 billion, following £38.3 billion in the previous quarter. This was caused by a decrease in net currency and deposits of £22.5 billion, partially offset by an increase in net other accounts of £17.8 billion.
Households increased their net lending as a percentage of GDP in the latest quarter to 4.1% from 1.3% in Quarter 3 2025. This was caused by an increase in net currency and deposits of £24.7 billion, a decrease in loans liabilities of £3.9 billion, partially offset by a decrease in net other accounts of £4.2 billion and a decrease in net equity and investment fund shares and units of £3.0 billion.
In line with our National Accounts Revisions Policy, this release includes revisions to data from Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025.
Early estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) are subject to positive or negative revision, as described in our Why GDP figures are revised article. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article, published on 31 October 2025. The GDP growth vintages to 1 decimal place are shown in Table 4.
+
+
Table 4: Quarter-on-quarter growth for real GDP at different publication vintages Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025
+
+
Relating to Period
2024 Q1
2024 Q2
2024 Q3
2024 Q4
2025 Q1
2025 Q2
2025 Q3
2025 Q4
+
May-24
0.6
+
Jun-24
0.7
+
Aug-24
0.7
0.6
+
Sep-24
0.7
0.5
+
Nov-24
0.7
0.5
0.1
+
Dec-24
0.7
0.4
0.0
+
Feb-25
0.8
0.4
0.0
0.1
+
Mar-25
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
+
May-25
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.7
+
Jun-25
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.7
+
Aug-25
0.9
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.7
0.3
+
Sep-25
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.7
0.3
+
Nov-25
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.2
0.7
0.3
0.1
+
Dec-25
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.7
0.2
0.1
+
Feb-26
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
+
Latest estimate: Mar-26
0.8
0.6
0.2
0.3
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
+
Total revision between first and latest estimate
0.2
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0
-0.1
0.0
0.0
+
+
+
Table 5: Real GDP growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter on quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) for 2025
+
+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual (%)
+
Country
2025 Q1
2025 Q2
2025 Q3
2025 Q4
2025
+
Canada
0.5
-0.2
0.6
-0.2
1.7
+
France
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.2
0.9
+
Germany
0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.3
0.4
+
Italy
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.7
+
Japan
0.3
0.6
-0.7
0.3
1.2
+
UK
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
1.4
+
United States
-0.2
0.9
1.1
0.2
2.1
+
+
+
Table 6: Real GDP per head growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter on quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) per head for 2025
+
+
Country
2025 Q1
2025 Q2
2025 Q3
2025 Q4
2025
+
Canada
0.3
-0.3
0.5
0.0
0.6
+
France
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.1
0.7
+
Germany
0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.3
0.3
+
Italy
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.2
0.7
+
Japan
0.4
0.6
-0.5
0.5
1.7
+
UK
0.6
0.1
0.0
-0.1
1.1
+
United States
-0.3
0.8
1.0
0.1
1.6
+
GDP - data tables Dataset | Released 31 March 2026 Annual and quarterly data for UK gross domestic product (GDP) estimates, in chained volume measures and current market prices.
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Quarterly GDP is a balanced measure of three approaches. The GDP monthly estimate focuses on gross value added (GVA) and output as a proxy for GDP. This results in data differences, in both levels and growth terms, between our quarterly bulletins (average GDP) and our GDP monthly estimate bulletins (output approach to GDP). Quarterly GDP is the lead measure of GDP because of its higher data content and inclusion of variables that enable the conversion from a GVA concept to a GDP basis.
Alignment adjustments, found in Table M of our GDP data tables, have a target limit of plus or minus £3,000 million on any quarter. However, in periods where the data sources are particularly difficult to balance, larger alignment adjustments are sometimes needed. This is explained in more detail in our Recent challenges of balancing the three approaches of GDP article.
Our standard practice is to prefer that the alignment adjustment be out of tolerance rather than over-adjust individual GDP components to achieve a balance. This is most likely to occur in the latest quarter, where the constraints are larger, and where we must align to the output estimate for the change in GDP, and where the data content is at its lowest.
To achieve a balanced GDP dataset through alignment, we apply balancing adjustments to the components of GDP where data content is particularly weak in each quarter because of a higher level of forecast content. Table 7 shows the balancing adjustments applied to the GDP quarterly dataset.
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Table 7: Balancing adjustments applied to the GDP quarterly national accounts dataset Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2024 to Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2025, UK
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+
GDP measurement approach and component adjustment applied to
Since the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, arrangements for how the UK trades with the EU changed. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) implemented some data collection changes following Brexit, which affected statistics on UK trade in goods with the EU.
From September 2025 until early 2027, International Trade in Services (ITIS) data (which account for approximately 50% of total Trade in Services) will be processed once each quarterly period. During this period, the data will be based on a robust survey response rate of between approximately 60% and 70%. This will enable more focus on improving processing systems and ensuring methods and quality in the future.
ITIS-based data in Trade in Services estimates at first quarterly estimate will be forecast until early 2027.
The International Passenger Survey (IPS), which is the source of travel services estimates (accounting for approximately 8% of total trade), is being transformed as part of our Improving our travel and tourism statistics project, and travel services estimates have been forecast since Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2024. Estimates will be forecast during the period of the travel and tourism transformation.
Our Financial Services Survey (FSS) is undergoing transformation to improve the quality of our financial sector statistics. During the period of transformation, starting from Quarter 1 2024, financial services trade statistics in this publication are based on forecasts.
There are three approaches to measuring gross domestic product (GDP):
the output approach
the expenditure approach
the income approach
The data and data quality are different for each approach, and this dictates the approach taken in balancing quarterly data. There are more data available on output in the UK in the short term, than in the other two approaches. To get the best estimate of GDP, our published figure, estimates from all three approaches are balanced to produce an average, except in the latest two quarters where the output data take the lead, because of the larger data content.
The three approaches to measuring GDP allow us to confront our data sources within the national accounts framework. Figure 3 shows there are differences in the three approaches at this stage in the production cycle for 2025, with real growth estimated in a range of 1.3% to 1.5%. There will be uncertainty at the component level at this stage in the production cycle for 2024 onwards until these data have been confronted through the supply and use tables framework (SUTs). This uncertainty may be for various reasons and is discussed further later in this section.
In the output approach, we do not currently have final estimates for intermediate consumption (the value of goods and services purchased to be used up in the production of goods and services). This is outlined in our Blue Book 2025: advanced aggregate estimates article. Initially, we use turnover and output as a proxy for changes in gross value added. We assume that the intermediate consumption ratio by industry, calculated in 2023, holds constant into 2024 onwards. More information on this is provided in Section 11: Data sources and quality of our GDP first quarterly estimate, UK: April to June 2024 bulletin.
In the expenditure approach, we currently have lower response rates for areas, such as the Living Costs and Food Survey, which is one of many data sources that inform our estimates of household consumption. We therefore rely on additional indicators, such as our Monthly Business Survey, to quality adjust some of our estimates in the short term.
In the income approach, we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years.
The UK National Accounts are drawn together using data from many different sources. This ensures that they are comprehensive and provide different perspectives on the economy, for example, sales by retailers and purchases by households. Further information on measuring GDP can be found in our Guide to the UK National Accounts. More quality and methodology information is available in our GDP quality and methodology information (QMI).
The headline estimates of quarterly GDP are seasonally adjusted. Seasonal adjustment is the process of removing the variations associated with the time of year, or the arrangement of the calendar, from a data time series.
GDP estimates, as for many data time series, are difficult to analyse using raw data because seasonal effects dominate short-term movements. Identifying and removing the seasonal component leaves the trend and irregular components.
We use the X-13-ARIMA-SEATS approach to seasonal adjustment. Seasonal adjustment parameters are monitored closely and regularly reviewed. For more information, please see our seasonal adjustment methodology page.
In our quarterly GDP estimates, seasonal adjustment is applied at a low level, and the seasonally adjusted series are aggregated to create estimates by sector and total output. As part of our quality assurance approach, residual seasonality checks are regularly completed by our time series analysis team on both the directly seasonally adjusted series, and the indirectly derived aggregate time series.
Based on our combined assessment from the suite of statistical tests, there is no statistically significant residual seasonality in our aggregate outputs from Quarter 1 1995 to Quarter 4 2025, although we are closely monitoring the evolution of the seasonality for a small number of series within Index of Services.
There are common pitfalls in interpreting data series:
expectations of accuracy and reliability in early estimates are often too high
revisions are an inevitable consequence of the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy
early estimates are often based on incomplete data
Very few statistical revisions arise because of "errors" in the popular sense of the word. All estimates, by definition, are subject to statistical "error".
Many different approaches can be used to summarise revisions. The section on Accuracy and reliability in our GDP QMI analyses the mean average revision and the mean absolute revision for GDP estimates over data publication iterations. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article, published on 31 October 2025.
GDP first quarterly estimate, UK: October to December 2025 Bulletin | Released 12 February 2026 First quarterly estimate of gross domestic product (GDP). Contains current and constant price data on the value of goods and services to indicate the economic performance of the UK.
GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 Article | Released 31 October 2025 Gross domestic product (GDP) revisions in annual and quarterly national accounts rounds, focusing on revisions in Blue Book 2025.
Communicating the UK Economic Cycle Methodology | Released 11 November 2022 Explanation of movement in gross domestic product (GDP) and wider considerations around technical recessions in the UK.
UK Input-output analysis tool: 2019 to 2023 Interactive tool | Released 5 March 2025 This tool shows which industries are the most notable users of a selected product, and which products are required to make other goods and services in the UK economy.
The labour market remains broadly flat in 2026. There has been a slight increase in the employment rate, while the unemployment rate has seen a small fall, in the latest quarter. Over the same period, the number of payrolled employees has fallen, although early estimates for the latest period show little change on the month.
The number of vacancies has seen its largest fall since the start of the year. This is mainly from smaller firms, who continue to suggest that they may not be recruiting because of increased labour costs.
Regular wage growth has remained relatively stable. However, total pay is at its lowest level in nearly six years.
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Estimates for payrolled employees in the UK fell by 111,000 (0.4%) between August 2025 and August 2026, but it remained largely unchanged between July and August 2026, increasing by 1,000 (0.0%). This is based on administrative data from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC).
When looking at June to August 2026, the period comparable with our Labour Force Survey (LFS) estimates, the number of payrolled employees fell by 92,000 (0.3%) over the year and by 37,000 (0.1%) over the quarter.
The early estimate of payrolled employees for September 2026 decreased by 66,000 (0.2%) on the year, but remained largely unchanged between August and September 2026, increasing by 13,000 (0.0%) to 30.3 million. Figures for September should be treated as provisional estimates and are likely to be revised when more data are received next month.
The UK employment rate (based on the LFS) for people aged 16 to 64 years, including both employees and self-employed, was estimated at 75.3% for June to August 2026. This is up by 0.2 percentage points on both the year and the latest quarter.
The UK unemployment rate for people aged 16 years and over was estimated at 4.7% in June to August 2026. This is down by 0.1 percentage points on the both the year and the latest quarter.
The UK economic inactivity rate for people aged 16 to 64 years was estimated at 20.9% in June to August 2026. This is down by 0.2 percentage points on the year and down by 0.1 percentage points in the latest quarter.
The UK Claimant Count for September 2026 increased on the month and on the year to an estimated 1.701 million.
The Claimant Count figure for the latest month is provisional and is subject to revisions after first publication. This is the result of later amendments to records in the administrative systems, for example, as work capability assessments conclude and more information is available about benefit claimants' ability to work.
The estimated number of vacancies in the UK decreased in the latest quarter. Early estimates for July to September 2026 suggest a decrease of 21,000 (2.9%) to 691,000, compared with April to June 2026. This is the largest quarterly fall since January to March 2026, which was also a fall of 21,000 vacancies.
Estimates have remained broadly flat since the start of the year, decreasing by 28,000 since January to March 2026. On the year, vacancies decreased by 37,000 (5.1%).
Outside of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic period, the last time there were 691,000 or fewer vacancies was in July to September 2014, when there were 686,000 vacancies.
Feedback from our Vacancy Survey continues to suggest that smaller firms may not be recruiting because of increases in labour costs.
Annual growth in employees' average regular earnings (excluding bonuses) was 3.7% in June to August 2026 and has been relatively stable over the past six consecutive three-month periods, after a year of slowing growth.
Annual growth in total earnings (including bonuses) was 3.7% in June to August 2026, down from 3.9% on the previous three-month period. It was last lower than 3.7% in August to October 2020, when it was 2.8%.
Annual average regular earnings growth was 6.3% for the public sector and 3.0% for the private sector. Public sector annual pay growth continues to be affected by variations in the timing of pay awards this year. More information on this can be found in our Average Weekly Earnings in Great Britain October 2026 bulletin.
Annual growth in real terms, adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Prices Index including owner occupiers' housing costs (CPIH), was 0.6% for regular pay and 0.7% for total pay in June to August 2026. When using the Consumer Prices Index excluding owner occupiers' housing costs (CPI), annual growth in real terms for regular pay was 0.8%, and for total pay it was 0.9%, in June to August 2026.
Flash estimates should be treated as provisional estimates and are likely to be revised when more data are received next month. We publish information on revisions to payrolled employees monthly. We have also published analysis of recent revisions in our LFS quality update: January 2026 article.
We also publish RTI pay data, which provide a provisional, timelier estimate of median pay. Average weekly earnings and RTI generally trend well for mean total pay. However, there will be differences between the two data sources because of timing and definitional differences.
As part of work to address quality concerns with the LFS, response levels and rates have shown clear improvement, with responses now close to their pre-coronavirus pandemic level. The achieved sample, including imputed cases (the dataset size), has increased from 80,078 individuals in January to March 2026 to 81,193 individuals in April to June 2026, as shown in our LFS performance and quality monitoring report: April to June 2026.
Estimates from January to March 2025 include the full effect of the improvements in LFS data collection and sampling methods introduced from January 2024 onwards. Since then, further changes that were introduced to help increase response levels may have an ongoing impact on the survey. These include allocating more interviewers to the LFS from March 2025, which helped drive a recovery of the response levels for the LFS to close to pre-coronavirus pandemic levels in 2026.
Despite the improvement in LFS responses, some volatility remains, particularly for estimates for mid-2023 and throughout 2024, and for granular breakdowns, where sample sizes are smaller. Caution should be taken when drawing conclusions from short-term changes, and we advise users to focus on long term movements in the data.
An LFS operational issue occurred in May 2026, which led to temporary under-resourcing in LFS telephone collection operations. Our analysis indicates that the issue had a minimal impact on the headline estimates, although it does suggest there is a small but noticeable impact on the estimates of average hours and therefore the total actual hours worked. A summary of our analysis is available in our LFS quality update: July 2026 article.
We recommend using LFS as part of our suite of labour market indicators, alongside workforce jobs, Claimant Count and Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information (RTI) estimates.
We have completed our standard annual seasonal adjustment review, which highlighted the need for a more in-depth review of our indirect, bottom-up approach to seasonal adjustment. We require more time to undertake this in-depth review and implement any solutions required. Therefore, the estimates published in September 2026 remained on our current seasonal adjustment basis. More information on the current seasonal adjustment method can be found in our Workforce jobs quality and methods guide.
We have updated the presentation of this publication as part of our ongoing programme of website improvements. We will continue to make changes to future editions to improve the user experience. Please send any feedback you have to labour.market@ons.gov.uk.
Summary of labour market statistics Dataset A01 | Released 20 October 2026 Labour market statistics summary data table, including earnings, employment, unemployment, redundancies and vacancies, Great Britain and UK, published monthly.
A guide to labour market data Methodology | Last revised 18 August 2026 Summary of labour market datasets, providing estimates of employment, unemployment, average weekly earnings, and the number of vacancies. Tables are listed alphabetically and by topic.
Alternatively, Nomis provides free access to the most detailed and up-to-date UK labour market statistics.
Average weekly earnings (AWE) are calculated using information based on the Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey (MWSS). AWE measures money paid by employers to employees in Great Britain before tax and other deductions from pay. The estimates are not just a measure of pay rises, because they also reflect, for example, changes in the overall structure of the workforce. More high-paid jobs in the economy would have an upward effect on the earnings growth rate.
People not in the labour force who are not in employment but do not meet the internationally accepted definition of unemployment. This is because they have not been seeking work within the last four weeks or they are unable to start work in the next two weeks. The economic inactivity rate is the proportion of people aged between 16 and 64 years who are not in the labour force. The Labour Force Survey (LFS) estimates are official statistics.
Employment measures the number of people in paid work or who had a job that they were temporarily away from (for example, because they were on holiday or off sick). This differs from the number of jobs because some people have more than one job. The employment rate is the proportion of people aged between 16 and 64 years who are in employment. The LFS estimates are official statistics.
Unemployment measures people without a job who have been actively seeking work within the last four weeks and are available to start work within the next two weeks. The unemployment rate is not the proportion of the total population who are unemployed. It is the proportion of the economically active population (people in work and those seeking and available to work) who are unemployed. The LFS estimates are official statistics.
The Claimant Count is an official statistic in development that measures the number of people who are receiving a benefit principally for the reason of being unemployed. Currently, the Claimant Count consists of those receiving Jobseeker's Allowance, and Universal Credit claimants in the "searching for work" conditionality group.
Vacancies are defined as positions for which employers are actively seeking recruits from outside their business or organisation. The estimates are based on the Vacancy Survey. This is a survey of businesses designed to provide estimates of the stock of vacancies across the economy, excluding agriculture, forestry and fishing (a small sector for which the collection of estimates would not be practical).
These data come from HM Revenue and Customs's (HMRC's) Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information (RTI) system. They cover the whole population, rather than a sample of people or companies, and they will allow for more detailed estimates of the population.
On 7 June 2024, the Office for Statistics Regulation (OSR) introduced the new accredited official statistics badge, to denote official statistics that have been independently reviewed by the OSR. Accredited official statistics comply with the standards of trustworthiness, quality and value in the Code of Practice for Statistics.
On 11 August 2026, the ONS wrote a letter to the OSR stating that LFS and APS derived outputs that are currently official statistics in development will move to official statistics. The ONS will not be seeking reaccreditation. Instead, our priority is for outputs based on the Transformed Labour Force Survey (TLFS), as the online-first sustainable replacement for the LFS and APS, to achieve the standards required to become accredited official statistics, and for the OSR to consider their accreditation at the earliest opportunity.
We are reviewing the release times for our market sensitive economic statistics, such as Labour market overview, to consider whether the current arrangements continue to best serve the public good, support user needs and align with the principles set out in the Code of Practice for Statistics. We are running a consultation to gather evidence on the impact of different release times. The consultation asks how you use market-sensitive economic statistics, your views on potential release time options, and any other considerations we should take into account. Please note that this consultation will be closing on Friday 30 October 2026.
Business insights and impact on the UK economy: 8 October 2026 Bulletin | Released 8 October 2026 The impact of challenges facing the economy and other events on UK businesses, including financial performance, workforce, trade, and business resilience.
Labour Force Survey quality update: October 2026 Article | Released 20 October 2026 Assessment of Labour Force Survey data quality, including the impact of recent changes on the statistics, response levels and rates, and respondent characteristics.
GDP quarterly national accounts, UK: April to June 2026
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+ Revised quarterly estimate of gross domestic product (GDP) for the UK. Uses additional data to provide a more precise indication of economic growth than the first estimate.
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+
UK gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have grown by 0.5% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 (revised up by 0.1 percentage points from the previous estimate), following an unrevised increase of 0.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026.
GDP for 2025 as a whole is estimated to have increased by 1.2%, revised down by 0.1 percentage points from the previous estimate.
The level of GDP in Quarter 2 2026 compared with Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2024 is now estimated to be 2.0% higher, revised up from the first estimate of 1.9%.
Real household disposable income per head increased by 1.0% in Quarter 2 2026, following a decrease of 0.8% in Quarter 1 2026.
The household saving ratio increased by 0.2 percentage points to 8.8% in Quarter 2 2026, driven by a rise in the contribution of non-pension saving.
The UK’s borrowing position with the rest of the world as a percentage of GDP is estimated to have decreased to 2.8% in Quarter 2 2026, compared with 2.9% in Quarter 1 2026.
In line with our National Accounts Revisions Policy, this release contains data that are consistent with the UK National Accounts, the Blue Book 2026, which will be released on 30 October 2026.
UK real gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased by 0.5% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 (previously 0.4%), following unrevised growth of 0.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026.
Figure 1 shows there have been some revisions to quarterly GDP across 2025 and 2026, ranging from negative 0.2 percentage points to positive 0.1 percentage points. The level of GDP in Quarter 2 2026 compared with Quarter 4 (Oct to Dec) 2024 is now estimated to be 2.0% higher, revised up from the first estimate of 1.9%. The cumulative increase in real GDP over this period is largely unchanged.
+
+
+
+
+
In line with our National Accounts Revisions Policy, this release contains data that are consistent with the UK National Accounts, the Blue Book 2026, which will be released on 30 October 2026.
Our Blue Book 2026: GDP impacts and main components article published on 20 August 2026 showed the preannounced revisions to nominal and real GDP annual and quarterly growth up to Quarter 4 2024. Today's release now includes revisions up to Quarter 2 2026 as a result of the Blue Book 2026 methodological changes, and additional updated data, which includes new Value Added Tax (VAT) turnover data for Quarter 1 2026.
Based on these new data, we have also reviewed the balancing of the three approaches to measuring GDP from 2025 onwards. In particular, data for Quarter 3 (July to Sept) and Quarter 4 2025 now reflect an average of the three approaches to measuring GDP, whereas these were previously balanced to the output approach, which takes the lead measure in the short run because of the higher data content.
The early estimates of GDP are subject to revision (positive or negative). Our recently published analysis shows that since Quarter 1 2000, there is a mean revision of positive 0.08 percentage points between the first estimate and the final one that is published three years later. The mean absolute revision between the first estimate, and this final one is 0.24 percentage points.
Revisions are made when more detailed information becomes available through the comprehensive annual supply and use balancing process, as the data content increases. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article and our recent blog on managing the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy when producing GDP, including how the properties of revisions can change over time.
Table 1: Headline national accounts indicators for the UK Percentage growth
+
+
GDP (Chained volume measures)
GDP per head (Chained volume measures) [Note 3]
GDP (Current market prices)
GDP implied deflator
+
Seasonally adjusted
+
+
2025
1.2
0.9
4.8
3.6
+
+
Q1 2025
0.6
0.5
1.5
0.9
+
Q2 2025
0.0
-0.1
1.0
1.0
+
Q3 2025
0.2
0.1
0.9
0.7
+
Q4 2025
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.6
+
Q1 2026
0.6
0.6
1.5
0.8
+
Q2 2026
0.5
0.5
0.8
0.3
+
Nominal GDP is estimated to have increased by an unrevised 0.8% in Quarter 2 2026 and is now 3.8% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The implied GDP deflator is the broadest measure of inflation in the domestic economy, reflecting changes in the price of all goods and services that make up GDP. The GDP deflator covers the whole of the domestic economy, not just consumer spending. It also reflects the change in the relative price of exports to imports. For more information on the implied GDP deflator, see our Measuring price changes of the UK national accounts: February 2023 article.
Compared with the same quarter a year ago, the GDP implied deflator increased by 2.4% in Quarter 2 2026, mainly caused by household expenditure, exports and gross capital formation (Figure 2).
+
+
+
+
+
Real annual GDP in 2025 is estimated to have increased by 1.2%, revised down by 0.1 percentage points from the previous estimate (Figure 3).
While the three approaches to measuring GDP remain closely aligned compared with the first estimate, there can still be uncertainty at the component level at this stage in the production cycle for 2025 onwards until these data have been confronted through the supply and use tables framework (SUTs). This uncertainty has various reasons and is further discussed in Section 12: Data sources and quality.
+
+
+
+
+
Output is estimated to have increased by 0.5% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 (previously a 0.4% increase), following an unrevised increase of 0.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026. Overall, in the latest quarter, there were increases in 13 out of 20 subsectors of gross domestic product (GDP).
In Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, the services sector increased by 0.6%, the construction sector increased by 0.8% and the production sector decreased by 0.1%.
From 2025 to 2026, the output approach to measuring GDP saw revisions for the following reasons:
some businesses replied late and updated their Monthly Business Survey (MBS) returns, along with other source data updates
Value Added Tax (VAT) data for Quarter 1 2026 were incorporated for the first time, as well as revisions to previous quarters
a review of seasonal adjustment models
the industry weights have also been updated and will affect the contribution of each industry to overall services growth; please see our GDP output approach – low level aggregates dataset for the latest weights
Services output increased by 0.6% in Quarter 2 2026 (previously a 0.5% increase), following a revised increase of 0.7% in Quarter 1 2026. Services output is estimated to be 1.7% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
In Quarter 2 2026, non-consumer-facing services (business-facing services) grew by 0.7%, while consumer-facing services grew by 0.4%.
Figure 4 shows that 9 of the 14 services subsectors contributed positively to services growth in Quarter 2 2026. The largest positive contributors to growth were the professional, scientific and technical activities, and information and communication subsectors.
Professional, scientific and technical activities increased by 2.3% in the latest quarter, driven by growths in advertising and market research (up by 5.4%), scientific research and development (up by 6.7%) and legal activities (up 3.3%). Information and communication increased by 2.5%, mainly because of growth of 3.6% in computer programming, consultancy and related activities.
The largest negative contributor to growth in Quarter 2 2026 was education, which fell by 0.4%, because of a fall in non-market education. This was the result of the closure of some schools during the heatwave conditions seen across much of the UK during June.
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+
+
+
+
The production sector is estimated to have fallen by 0.1% in Quarter 2 2026 (revised down from the first estimate of no growth), following a 0.3% increase in the previous quarter. Production output is estimated to be 0.4% higher than the same quarter a year ago.
Within production, there were declines in electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, which fell by 0.8% and in water supply; sewerage, waste management, and remediation activities, which fell by 4.5%. These were partially offset by increases of 0.5% and 2.1% in manufacturing, and mining and quarrying, respectively.
Looking at the manufacturing sector in more detail, 6 out of 13 manufacturing subsectors contributed positively to manufacturing growth in the latest quarter (Figure 5). The largest positive contribution to the growth was the manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (up by 4.0%).
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+
+
+
+
Construction output is estimated to have increased by 0.8% in Quarter 2 2026 but is 1.0% lower compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Both new work, and repair and maintenance grew over the period, increasing by 0.9% and 0.8%, respectively. Within new work, the largest positive contribution came from private commercial and infrastructure new work, which grew by 4.5% and 2.9%, respectively. In repair and maintenance, the largest positive contribution came from non-housing repair and maintenance, which grew by 1.0%.
Expenditure is estimated to have grown by 0.5% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, mainly because of increases in net trade.
The previous and latest contributions to expenditure growth in Quarter 2 2026 are shown in Figure 6. There have also been revisions across 2025 and 2026, which is further discussed in this section.
+
+
+
+
+
There was a 0.3% increase in real household final consumption expenditure in Quarter 2 2026, and it is now estimated to be up by 1.2% compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Within household consumption in the latest quarter, growth was caused by increases in nearly all main categories, with the largest contributions from clothing and footwear, restaurants and hotels, and housing.
Net tourism made a positive contribution to growth in household consumption in the latest quarter. Net tourism is offset within trade, so there is no effect on the gross domestic product (GDP) aggregate. Information on how we measure net tourism is provided in our National Accounts articles: Treatment of tourism in the UK National Accounts. Excluding net tourism, domestic consumption grew by 0.3% in the latest quarter.
Revisions to household consumption across 2025 and 2026 are mainly a result of a variety of data source updates, which includes the Living Costs and Food Survey.
Real government consumption expenditure fell by 0.5% in Quarter 2 2026 and is now estimated to be 1.2% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The fall in government consumption in the latest quarter mainly reflects a decline in education, which was caused by the closure of some schools during the heatwave conditions seen across much of the UK during June.
Over the course of 2025 and 2026, government consumption sees revisions mainly as a result of:
updated data for a number of components, including our annual health benchmark data, where we capture more detailed information on services delivered by the NHS
Within gross capital formation, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is now estimated to have increased by 0.9% in Quarter 2 2026 and to be 3.1% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. The main drivers of the growth are increases in other buildings and structures, partially offset by a fall in transport.
Within GFCF, business investment is estimated to have increased by 1.8% in the latest quarter and is now estimated to be 5.2% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
Revisions reflect:
the incorporation of improved and new methodology as part of Blue Book 2026
updated Quarterly Acquisitions and Disposals of Capital Assets Survey (QCAS) data and other source data (mostly affecting the latest period)
a review of seasonal adjustment models
Excluding the alignment adjustments, revised estimates show that chained volume inventories fell by £3.4 billion in Quarter 2 2026 (Table 2), mainly because of a reduction in manufacturing inventories.
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Table 2: Change in inventories, including and excluding balancing and alignment adjustments UK, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
+
+
Change in Inventories
Of which alignment
Of which balancing
Change in Inventories excluding alignment and balancing
+
Q1 2025
Current price
-371
-1441
500
570
+
Q1 2025
Chained volume measure
-1650
-1406
-244
+
Q2 2025
Current price
2
584
-582
+
Q2 2025
Chained volume measure
1382
569
500
313
+
Q3 2025
Current price
2072
1858
214
+
Q3 2025
Chained volume measure
2373
1790
583
+
Q4 2025
Current price
-1811
-1001
-810
+
Q4 2025
Chained volume measure
-1792
-953
-839
+
Q1 2026
Current price
1361
-2979
4340
+
Q1 2026
Chained volume measure
421
-2823
-750
3994
+
Q2 2026
Current price
-4028
-730
500
-3798
+
Q2 2026
Chained volume measure
-4103
-689
-3414
+
The UK's trade deficit for goods and services is now estimated at 1.6% of nominal GDP in Quarter 2 2026. However, this includes non-monetary gold and other precious metals, which is an erratic series. It can be useful to exclude this from the trade balance.
Excluding non-monetary gold and other precious metals, the trade deficit is now estimated at 0.5% of nominal GDP in Quarter 2 2026 (Figure 7).
The trade deficit, excluding non-monetary gold and other precious metals, is shown in Figure 7 as a percentage of nominal GDP in this release compared with the first quarterly estimate. Revisions reflect:
improvements introduced as part of Blue Book 2026, particularly the results from the Annual International Trade in Services (ITIS) Survey
updated ITIS data replacing forecasts used in the first estimate for the latest quarter, particularly through merchanting of fuels
updated globalisation figures for chemicals
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+
+
+
+
Export volumes increased by 2.8% in the latest quarter (revised up from the first estimate increase of 0.5%) and are now 4.2% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
The increase in the latest quarter was mainly caused by a 3.7% growth in goods exports and a 2.0% increase in services exports. Within goods exports, the growth was mainly caused by rises in fuels. The growth in services exports was mainly because of other business service activities and travel.
Import volumes are estimated to have shown no growth in the latest quarter (revised down from a first estimate increase of 0.5%) and are now 2.5% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. Goods imports fell by 0.5% mainly because of decreases in machinery and transport equipment. Services imports increased by 1.0%, mainly because of travel and transportation.
Nominal gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 0.8% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 and is up by 3.8% compared with the same quarter a year ago. Growth in nominal GDP in the latest quarter was mainly driven by an increase in gross operating surplus and taxes less subsidies.
The previous and latest contributions to nominal GDP growth in Quarter 2 2026 are shown in Figure 8. There have also been revisions across 2025 and 2026, which is further discussed in this section.
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+
+
+
+
Compensation of employees showed no growth in Quarter 2 2026, but is now estimated to be 4.1% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. There was an increase of 0.9% in wages and salaries, which offset a 3.4% fall in employers' social contributions.
Early estimates of private sector wages and salaries have historically been based on estimates of employee numbers from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) and average earnings from the Average Weekly Earnings (AWE) statistics. Enhancements to the LFS, introduced since January 2024, mean that movements in the LFS since then reflect both underlying developments in the economy and improved survey quality. Despite the improvement in LFS responses, some volatility remains in estimates of employee numbers.
To therefore improve the accuracy of the income measure of GDP and maintain coherence with related statistics, including the sector accounts, we continue to use additional information from Pay As You Earn (PAYE) Real Time Information (RTI), as published in our Earnings and employment from Pay As You Earn Real Time Information, UK bulletin.
Revisions in compensation of employees mainly reflect:
new annual HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) PAYE benchmark data for 2024 to 2025
review of seasonal adjustment
updated labour market indicators and other source data (replacing forecasts in the later period)
Other income is now estimated to have fallen by 0.2% in Quarter 2 2026 and is 2.5% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago. The fall in the latest quarter was caused by a decline in household gross operating surplus.
Taxes less subsidies are estimated to have increased by 3.2% in Quarter 2 2026 and are now 7.7% higher compared with the same quarter a year ago.
There was a 4.1% increase in taxes and an 11.9% increase in subsidies, which contribute negatively to GDP. The 11.9% increase in subsidies was mainly because of other economic and service subsidies (partially from a new energy subsidy).
Taxes for this quarter were revised upwards from the Quarter 2 2026 first quarterly estimate partially because of a change in HMRC methodology applied from April 2026. There was a published correction to taxes and subsidies published in August 2026, which affected the back series between March and May 2026. HMRC has also implemented a new reconciliation exercise effective from September 2026.
Total gross operating surplus (GOS) of corporations, excluding the alignment adjustment, increased by 2.1% in Quarter 2 2026 (Table 3). This is mainly because of an increase in private non-financial corporations (PNFC) of 3.0%.
Estimates of non-financial corporations within the GOS of corporations remains subject to uncertainty. This is because we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years. We rely on contextual data from other sources to inform these quarterly estimates, as outlined in our Profitability of UK companies quality and methodology information (QMI).
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Table 3: Gross operating surplus of corporations, including and excluding alignment adjustments UK, Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
+
+
Gross operating surplus of corporations
Of which alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
Gross operating surplus of corporations excluding alignment
+
Quarter-on-quarter growth
+
Q1 2025
161520
20
161500
-0.7
+
Q2 2025
166108
1034
165074
2.2
+
Q3 2025
165009
1126
163883
-0.7
+
Q4 2025
162807
-2180
164987
0.7
+
Q1 2026
166087
-214
166301
0.8
+
Q2 2026
170066
333
169733
2.1
+
We produce estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) per head (or per capita), which divides UK GDP by the total UK population. This is one proxy indicator of welfare, rather than production, which reflects a country's living standards. It captures the volume of goods and services available to the average person. Further information on this is available in our Trends in UK real GDP per head: 2022 to 2024 article.
Real GDP per head is estimated to have increased by 0.5% in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026 and is up by 1.2% compared with the same quarter a year ago (Figure 9). There have been some revisions to GDP per head figures, reflecting revisions to GDP estimates rather than population numbers.
Population figures up to mid-2021 for the UK are based on mid-year UK population estimates. Population figures for mid-2022 to mid-2025 are based on:
Population figures for Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2025 up to Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026 are based on an interpolation between mid-year estimates (projection for Northern Ireland) and 2024-based national population projections using the principal variant published on 28 April 2026. Figures for Quarter 2 2026 are based on the 2024-based national population projections.
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+
+
+
+
We estimate real household disposable income (RHDI) per head, by dividing RHDI by the total UK population. RHDI per head has increased by 1.0% in Quarter 2 2026, following a decrease of 0.8% in the previous quarter (Figure 10). The components of this measure are further broken down in Section 7: Quarterly sector accounts.
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+
+
+
+
Real household disposable income (RHDI) per head increased by 1.0% to £6,577 in Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026, following a decrease of 0.8% in the previous quarter.
The increase in RHDI per head is because of the nominal gross disposable income position increasing by 1.6%. This was partially offset by the growth in the implied deflator (used to remove the effects of inflation) of 0.5% in the latest quarter.
Contributing to the growth in the latest quarter:
net social benefits other than transfers in kind rose by £5.3 billion
net social contributions rose by £3.4 billion
wages and salaries rose by £2.8 billion
taxes on income and wealth fell by £0.6 billion
This is partially offset by a decrease in employers' social contributions of £2.9 billion (Figure 11).
+
+
+
+
+
The households' saving ratio is estimated to have risen to 8.8% in Quarter 2 2026, up from 8.6% in Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2026. This was driven by non-pension saving, which increased to 4.5%, up from 3.8% (Figure 12).
Pension saving contributed 4.3 percentage points to the saving ratio, down from 4.8 percentage points in the previous quarter. Households' consumption expenditure grew by 0.9% this quarter, following growth of 1.5% in the previous quarter. Within households' expenditure, the main areas of growth are transport fuels and lubricants, restaurants and cafés, and imputed and actual rentals for housing.
+
+
+
+
+
In Quarter 2 2026, general government and financial corporations were net borrowers while non-financial corporations, households, non-profit institutions serving households, and the rest of the world were net lenders.
The UK's borrowing position with the rest of the world as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have slightly decreased to 2.8% in Quarter 2 2026 compared with 2.9% of GDP in Quarter 1 2026.
Non-financial corporations switched their lending to 0.6% of GDP in the latest quarter, from borrowing of 0.0% (negative £323 million) of GDP in Quarter 1 2026. Within non-financial corporations, private non-financial corporations switched to net lending of £4.3 billion in Quarter 2 2026, from net borrowing of £1.3 billion in the previous quarter. This increase was driven by a rise in gross operating surplus of £4.5 billion and a fall in gross capital formation of £2.2 billion, partially offset by a rise in taxes on income and wealth of £1.2 billion.
Financial corporations net borrowing position was at 0.4% of GDP in the latest quarter following borrowing of 0.7% of GDP in Quarter 1 2026. This was driven by a rise in other capital transfers receivable of £2.6 billion and a fall in the adjustment for pension entitlements of £1.9 billion, partially offset by a rise in gross capital formation of £1.6 billion.
General government net borrowing as a percentage of GDP increased to 5.2% in Quarter 2 2026, from borrowing of 4.2% of GDP in Quarter 1 2026. Within general government, central government increased their net borrowing to £38.5 billion, following £28.3 billion in the previous quarter. This increase was driven by a fall in net social contributions and benefits of £6.7 billion, a fall in net capital transfers of £5.1 billion and an increase in interest payments of £1.9 billion, partially offset by a rise in taxes on production and imports of £3.7 billion and a fall in gross fixed capital formation of £1.1 billion.
Households increased their net lending position to 2.4% of GDP in the latest quarter, from 2.3% of GDP in Quarter 1 2026. The drivers for this position are the same as those identified in the real household disposable income section.
In Quarter 2 2026, general government were net borrowers, while non-financial corporations, financial corporations, households, non-profit institutions serving households, and the rest of the world were net lenders.
The UK's net borrowing position with the rest of the world as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated to have increased to 3.8% in Quarter 2 2026 compared with 1.8% of GDP in Quarter 1 2026.
Non-financial corporations switched to net lending of 0.2% of GDP in the latest quarter following net borrowing of 1.1% of GDP in the previous quarter. Within this sector, private non-financial corporations switched to net lending to £0.6 billion in Quarter 2 2026 from net borrowing of £9.6 billion in the previous quarter. This was driven by a rise in net loans of £37.0 billion and a rise in net currency and deposits of £29.4 billion. A fall in net other accounts of £24.0 billion and fall in net debt securities of £19.5 billion partially offset this.
Financial corporations switched to net lending of 0.2% of GDP in the latest quarter, from net borrowing of 2.5% in Quarter 1 2026. This was driven by a rise in the acquisition of long-term debt securities issued by UK central government of £108.2 billion. A fall in net currency and deposits of £67.4 billion partially offset this.
General government switched to net borrowing of 8.0% of GDP in the latest quarter, from lending of 0.8% in Quarter 1 2026. Within general government, central government switched to net borrowing of £68.4 billion following net lending of £13.9 billion in the previous quarter. This was driven by a rise in the liabilities of UK central government long-term securities of £96.9 billion together with a fall in assets in other long-term loans of £4.1 billion. A rise in net currency and deposits of £15.4 billion and a rise in net other accounts of £12.2 billion partially offset this.
Households increased their net lending as a percentage of GDP, to 3.4% in the latest quarter, from 0.8% in Quarter 1 2026. This was driven by a rise in net other accounts of £11.7 billion, a rise in deposits with UK monetary financial institutions of £10.4 billion, and a rise in the acquisition of UK unlisted shares of £5.7 billion. An increase in the acquisition of long-term loans secured on dwellings of £4.5 billion partially offset this.
In line with our National Accounts Revisions Policy, this release contains data that are consistent with the UK National Accounts, the Blue Book 2026, which will be released on 30 October 2026.
Revisions across the full-time period, in particular Quarter 2 2024, are primarily because of updated source data and Blue Book 2026 improvements. These data are subject to further revision as we receive additional source data and seasonal adjustment improvements. Revisions are managed in-line with the National Accounts Revisions Policy.
The change is the creation of new experimental balance sheet and flow of funds statistics for S.124 Non-money market investment funds (investment funds), creating a more detailed sector breakdown within the financial corporations sector and improving visibility of "from whom-to-whom" financial relationships.
These new data were developed as part of the Office for National Statistics and Bank of England Enhanced Financial Accounts (Flow of Funds) initiative and were intended to be integrated with other sources to improve the coverage and quality of the financial sector in the UK National Accounts.
It was identified that redundancy pay and statutory sick pay were allocated incorrectly to D.612 Employers' imputed social contributions. They have now been allocated to D.611 Employers' actual social contributions, resulting in revisions between the two transactions.
Early estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) are subject to positive or negative revision, as described in our Why GDP figures are revised article. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article, published on 31 October 2025. The GDP growth vintages to one decimal place are shown in Table 4.
Overall, revisions in this release are mainly because of improved and updated source data:
negative 0.2 percentage points in Quarter 2 2025; this is driven by weaker growth in all three approaches: output (mainly in professional, scientific and technical activities, and education), expenditure (mainly in net trade, in exports of goods and services) and income (taxes less subsides and private non-financial corporations)
positive 0.1 percentage points in Quarter 3 2025; this is driven by stronger growth in output (real estate activities) and a small implied deflator revision
negative 0.1 percentage points in Quarter 4 2025; this is driven by the output approach, with cumulative downward revisions in 9 out of the 13 subsectors
positive 0.1 percentage points in Quarter 2 2026; this is driven by the output approach, mainly in professional, scientific and technical activities reflecting revised Monthly Business Survey data
+
+
Table 4: Quarter-on-quarter growth for real GDP at different publication vintages Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
+
+
Relating to Period
Q1 2025
Q2 2025
Q3 2025
Q4 2025
Q1 2026
Q2 2026
+
May 2025
0.7
+
Jun 2025
0.7
+
Aug 2025
0.7
0.3
+
Sept 2025
0.7
0.3
+
Nov 2025
0.7
0.3
0.1
+
Dec 2025
0.7
0.2
0.1
+
Feb 2026
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
+
Mar 2026
0.7
0.2
0.1
0.1
+
May 2026
0.6
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.6
+
Jun 2026
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.6
+
Aug-26
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.6
0.4
+
Latest estimate: Sept 2026
0.6
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.6
0.5
+
Total revision between first and latest estimate
-0.1
-0.3
0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.1
+
+
+
Table 5: Real GDP growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter on quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) for 2025 and 2026
+
+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual (%)
+
Country
Q1 2025
Q2 2025
Q3 2025
Q4 2025
Q1 2026
Q2 2026
2025
+
Canada
0.7
-0.2
0.5
-0.2
0.1
0.8
1.9
+
France
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.3
-0.2
0.0
0.9
+
Germany
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.3
+
Italy
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.7
+
Japan
0.5
0.1
-0.4
0.3
0.5
0.4
1.2
+
UK
0.6
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.6
0.5
1.2
+
United States
-0.2
0.9
1.1
0.1
0.5
0.4
2.1
+
+
+
Table 6: Real GDP per head growth for the G7 economies Percentage change, quarter on quarter and annual growth, real gross domestic product (GDP) per head for 2025 and 2026
+
+
Quarter on previous quarter (%)
Annual (%)
+
Country
2025 Q1
2025 Q2
2025 Q3
2025 Q4
2026 Q1
Q2 2026
2025
+
Canada
0.5
-0.3
0.4
-0.1
0.3
1.0
0.7
+
France
0.1
0.2
0.4
0.2
-0.2
..
0.6
+
Germany
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.5
0.4
0.3
+
Italy
0.4
0.0
0.2
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.7
+
Japan
0.6
0.1
-0.3
0.5
0.6
0.3
1.6
+
UK
0.5
-0.1
0.1
0.0
0.6
0.5
0.9
+
United States
-0.3
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.5
0.3
1.6
+
GDP – data tables Dataset | Released 30 September 2026 Annual and quarterly data for UK gross domestic product (GDP) estimates, in chained volume measures and current market prices.
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Quarterly GDP is a balanced measure of three approaches. The GDP monthly estimate focuses on gross value added (GVA) and output as a proxy for GDP. This results in data differences, in both levels and growth terms, between our quarterly bulletins (average GDP) and our GDP monthly estimate bulletins (output approach to GDP). Quarterly GDP is the lead measure of GDP because of its higher data content and inclusion of variables that enable the conversion from a GVA concept to a GDP basis.
Alignment adjustments, found in Table M of our GDP data tables, have a target limit of plus or minus £3,000 million on any quarter. However, in periods where the data sources are particularly difficult to balance, larger alignment adjustments are sometimes needed. This is explained in more detail in our Recent challenges of balancing the three approaches of GDP article.
Our standard practice is to prefer that the alignment adjustment be out of tolerance rather than over-adjust individual GDP components to achieve a balance. This is most likely to occur in the latest quarter, where the constraints are larger, and where we must align to the output estimate for the change in GDP, and where the data content is at its lowest.
To achieve a balanced GDP dataset through alignment, we apply balancing adjustments to the components of GDP where data content is particularly weak in each quarter because of a higher level of forecast content. Table 7 shows the balancing adjustments applied to the GDP quarterly dataset.
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Table 7: Balancing adjustments applied to the GDP quarterly national accounts dataset Quarter 1 (Jan to Mar) 2025 to Quarter 2 (Apr to June) 2026
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GDP measurement approach and component adjustment applied to
Since the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020, arrangements for how the UK trades with the EU changed. HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) implemented some data collection changes following Brexit, which affected statistics on UK trade in goods with the EU.
From September 2025 until early 2027, International Trade in Services (ITIS) data (which account for approximately 50% of total Trade in Services) will be processed once each quarterly period. During this period, the data will be based on a robust survey response rate of between approximately 60% and 70%. This will enable more focus on improving processing systems and ensuring methods and quality in the future.
ITIS-based data in Trade in Services estimates at first quarterly estimate will be forecast until early 2027.
The International Passenger Survey (IPS), which is the source of travel services estimates (accounting for approximately 8% of total trade), is being transformed as part of our Improving our travel and tourism statistics project, and travel services estimates have been forecast since Quarter 3 (July to Sept) 2024. Estimates will be forecast during the period of the travel and tourism transformation.
Our Financial Services Survey (FSS) is undergoing transformation to improve the quality of our financial sector statistics. During the period of transformation, starting from Quarter 1 2024, financial services trade statistics in this publication are based on forecasts.
There are three approaches to measuring gross domestic product (GDP):
the output approach
the expenditure approach
the income approach
The data and data quality are different for each approach, and this dictates the approach taken in balancing quarterly data. There are more data available on output in the UK in the short term, than in the other two approaches. To get the best estimate of GDP, our published figure, estimates from all three approaches are balanced to produce an average, except in the latest two quarters where the output data take the lead, because of the larger data content.
The three approaches to measuring GDP allow us to confront our data sources within the national accounts framework. Figure 3 shows that there are differences in the three approaches at this stage in the production cycle for 2025, with real growth estimated in a range of 1.1% to 1.4%. There will be uncertainty at the component level at this stage in the production cycle for 2025 onwards until these data have been confronted through the supply and use tables framework (SUTs). This uncertainty may be for various reasons and is discussed further later in this section.
In the output approach, we do not currently have final estimates for intermediate consumption (the value of goods and services purchased to be used up in the production of goods and services). This is outlined in our Blue Book 2025: advanced aggregate estimates article. Initially, we use turnover and output as a proxy for changes in gross value added. We assume that the intermediate consumption ratio by industry, calculated in 2024, holds constant into 2025 onwards.
In the expenditure approach, we currently have lower response rates for areas, such as the Living Costs and Food Survey, which is one of many data sources that inform our estimates of household consumption. We therefore rely on additional indicators, such as our Monthly Business Survey, to quality adjust some of our estimates in the short term.
In the income approach, we do not have up-to-date quarterly information on the gross trading profits of businesses. These data are collected from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and are available with a lag of approximately two years.
The UK National Accounts are drawn together using data from many different sources. This ensures that they are comprehensive and provide different perspectives on the economy, for example, sales by retailers and purchases by households. Further information on measuring GDP can be found in our Guide to the UK National Accounts. More quality and methodology information is available in our GDP quality and methodology information (QMI).
The headline estimates of quarterly GDP are seasonally adjusted. Seasonal adjustment is the process of removing the variations associated with the time of year, or the arrangement of the calendar, from a data time series.
GDP estimates, as for many data time series, are difficult to analyse using raw data because seasonal effects dominate short-term movements. Identifying and removing the seasonal component leaves the trend and irregular components.
We use the X-13-ARIMA-SEATS approach to seasonal adjustment. Seasonal adjustment parameters are monitored closely and regularly reviewed. For more information, please see our seasonal adjustment methodology page.
In our quarterly GDP estimates, seasonal adjustment is applied at a low level, and the seasonally adjusted series are aggregated to create estimates by sector and total output. As part of our quality assurance approach, residual seasonality checks are regularly completed by our time series analysis team on both the directly seasonally adjusted series, and the indirectly derived aggregate time series.
There are conceptual differences between indirect and direct seasonal adjustment. Indirect seasonal adjustment is the aggregation of the directly seasonally adjusted component series, typically chosen at an optimal level and depending on user needs. For the UK National Accounts, GDP aggregates are created with indirect seasonal adjustment. Because ofto processing, including benchmarking and chain-linking, direct seasonal adjustment of the non-seasonally adjusted GDP aggregate will not give the same results as the indirect seasonally adjusted output
Based on our combined assessment from the suite of statistical tests, there is no statistically significant residual seasonality in our aggregate outputs (average GDP, total expenditure, total income and total output) from Quarter 1 1955 to Quarter 2 2026, although we continue to monitor this closely.
There are common pitfalls in interpreting data series:
expectations of accuracy and reliability in early estimates are often too high
revisions are an inevitable consequence of the trade-off between timeliness and accuracy
early estimates are often based on incomplete data
Very few statistical revisions arise because of "errors" in the popular sense of the word. All estimates, by definition, are subject to statistical "error".
Many different approaches can be used to summarise revisions. The section on Accuracy and reliability in our GDP quality and methodology information (QMI) analyses the mean average revision and the mean absolute revision for GDP estimates over data publication iterations. For more information, please refer to our GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 article, published on 31 October 2025.
These accredited official statistics were independently reviewed by the Office for Statistics Regulation in October 2016. They comply with the standards of trustworthiness, quality, and value in the Code of Practice for Statistics and should be labelled "accredited official statistics".
GDP revisions in Blue Book: 2025 Article | Released 31 October 2025 Gross domestic product (GDP) revisions in annual and quarterly national accounts rounds, focusing on revisions in Blue Book 2025.
Communicating the UK Economic Cycle Methodology | Released 11 November 2022 Explanation of movement in gross domestic product (GDP) and wider considerations around technical recessions in the UK.
UK Input-output analysis tool: 2019 to 2023 Interactive tool | Released 5 March 2025 This tool shows which industries are the most notable users of a selected product, and which products are required to make other goods and services in the UK economy.
"))
+
+
+def test_current_series_has_no_invented_release_timestamp_and_rejects_duplicates():
+ csv = "Month,YYYY,ICS_ALL\nDecember,2024,74.0\nJanuary,2025,71.7\n"
+ assert monthly_series(csv) == [("2024-12", "74.0"), ("2025-01", "71.7")]
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="重复"):
+ monthly_series(csv + "January,2025,72.0\n")
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="列名"):
+ monthly_series("Month,YYYY,ICS\nJanuary,2025,71.7\n")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("text,payrolls,rate", [
+ ("Total nonfarm payroll employment changed little in July (+73,000). The unemployment rate changed little at 4.2 percent.", "7.3", "4.2"),
+ ("Total nonfarm payroll employment declined by 92,000. The unemployment rate edged up to 4.4 percent.", "-9.2", "4.4"),
+ ("Total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 177,000. The unemployment rate was unchanged at 4.2 percent.", "17.7", "4.2"),
+ ("Total nonfarm payroll employment edged down by 92,000. The unemployment rate changed little at 4.4 percent.", "-9.2", "4.4"),
+ ("Total nonfarm payroll employment edged up by 119,000. The unemployment rate, at 4.4 percent, changed little.", "11.9", "4.4"),
+])
+def test_archived_jobs_wording_units_and_negative_values(text, payrolls, rate):
+ values = parse_bls_text("jobs", text)
+ assert values["payrolls"]["actual"] == payrolls and values["unemployment"]["actual"] == rate
+
+
+def test_pce_combined_release_has_two_periods_and_no_false_previous():
+ html = b'''January 22, 2026 10:00 a.m.
+
Personal Income and Outlays, October and November 2025
+
From the same month one year ago, the PCE price index increased 2.7 percent in October,
+ followed by an increase of 2.8 percent in November. Excluding food and energy, the PCE price index also increased
+ 2.7 percent followed by an increase of 2.8 percent.
+
October
November
+
PCE price index
0.2
0.2
+
PCE price index, excluding food and energy
0.2
0.2
'''
+ first, second = parse_announcements("pce", html)
+ assert (first.period, second.period) == ("2025-10", "2025-11")
+ assert first.at == second.at == datetime(2026, 1, 22, 15, tzinfo=UTC)
+ assert first.values["pce_yoy"]["actual"] == "2.7" and second.values["pce_yoy"]["actual"] == "2.8"
+ assert all(v["previous"] is None for a in (first, second) for v in a.values.values())
+ with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="表头"):
+ parse_announcements("pce", html.replace(b"
October
", b"
September
"))
+
+
+def test_pce_rounded_zero_comes_from_official_table_not_imprecise_prose():
+ from alphapulse.calendar.parsers import parse_values
+ html = '''
From the preceding month, the PCE price index for March decreased less than 0.1 percent.
+ Excluding food and energy, the PCE price index increased less than 0.1 percent.
+
From the same month one year ago, the PCE price index increased 2.3 percent. Excluding food and energy,
+ the PCE price index increased 2.6 percent.
+ THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION -- DECEMBER 2025
+ Both total nonfarm payroll employment (+50,000) and the unemployment rate (4.4 percent) changed little.
+ Historical note — revised.
'''.encode("cp1252")
+ [announcement] = parse_announcements("jobs", html)
+ assert announcement.period == "2025-12" and announcement.values["payrolls"]["actual"] == "5"
+ assert announcement.at == datetime(2026, 1, 9, 13, 30, tzinfo=UTC)
+
+
+def test_official_missing_cpi_monthly_is_not_zero_or_two_month_change(trading):
+ from pathlib import Path
+ from alphapulse.calendar.parsers import parse_values
+ from alphapulse.calendar.service import release_rows
+ body = (Path(__file__).parent / "fixtures/calendar/cpi.html").read_text()
+ # 官方停摆期表格用横线标识单月读数缺失；正文的累计变化不能代替它。
+ from parsel import Selector
+ sel = Selector(text=body)
+ for node in sel.css("#cpi_pressa tr"):
+ cells = node.xpath("./th|./td")
+ if len(cells) == 9:
+ cells[-2].root.text = "-"
+ cells[-3].root.text = "-"
+ values = parse_values("cpi", sel.get())
+ assert values["cpi_mom"]["actual"] is None and values["cpi_mom"]["previous"] is None
+ assert values["cpi_yoy"]["actual"] is not None
+ now = datetime.now(UTC)
+ row = SimpleNamespace(id=1, family="cpi", source="bls", title="CPI", period="2025-11", stage=None,
+ scheduled_at=now, schedule_status="scheduled", first_received_at=now, values=values,
+ last_checked_at=now, error=None, release_url=None, schedule_url="https://www.bls.gov", revision_no=2)
+ [mom, _, core, _] = release_rows(row, now)
+ assert mom["status"] == core["status"] == "unavailable"
+ assert "两个月" in mom["explanation"] and mom["impact"] == "uncertain"
+
+
+def test_archive_discovery_uses_real_links_and_excludes_state_gdp(trading):
+ from alphapulse.calendar.backfill import archive_links
+ body = """Personal Income and Outlays, December 2024
+ Gross Domestic Product by State, 2025
+ Personal Income and Outlays, November 2024
+
